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Abstract
The static nature of cyber systems gives attackers a valuable and asymmetric advantage
- time. To eliminate this asymmetric advantage, a new approach, called Moving Target De-
fense (MTD) has emerged as a potential solution. MTD system seeks to proactively change
system configurations to invalidate the knowledge learned by the attacker and force them
to spend more effort locating and re-locating vulnerabilities. While it sounds promising,
the approach is so new that there is no standard definition of what an MTD is, what is
meant by diversification and randomization, or what metrics to define the effectiveness of
such systems. Moreover, the changing nature of MTD violates two basic assumptions about
the conventional attack surface notion. One is that the attack surface remains unchanged
during an attack and the second is that it is always reachable. Therefore, a new attack
surface definition is needed.
To address these issues, I propose that a theoretical framework for MTD be defined.
The framework should clarify the most basic questions such as what an MTD system is
and its properties such as adaptation, diversification and randomization. The framework
should reveal what is meant by gaining and losing knowledge, and what are different attack
types. To reason over the interactions between attacker and MTD system, the framework
should define key concepts such as attack surface, adaptation surface and engagement sur-
face. Based on that, this framework should allow MTD system designers to decide how to
use existing configuration choices and functionality diversification to increase security. It
should allow them to analyze the effectiveness of adapting various combinations of different
configuration aspects to thwart different types of attacks. To support analysis, the frame-
work should include an analytical model that can be used by designers to determine how
different parameter settings will impact system security.
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types. To reason over the interactions between attacker and MTD system, the framework
should define key concepts such as attack surface, adaptation surface and engagement sur-
face. Based on that, this framework should allow MTD system designers to decide how to
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Cyber security is currently implemented in an ad hoc and inconsistant fashion due to the
priority of business concerns over system security. Technologies used in enterprise networks
are usually implemented to satisfy the business needs such as communication, data pro-
cessing and customer support while leaving cyber security as a second priority. Enterprise
network administrators are left to patch potential vulnerabilities, scan the system to remove
potential intrusions, maintain access lists to add or remove users, and modify firewall rules
to limit communications between the internet and internal hosts. Due to the complexity
and heavy workload of modifying a system, once it is deployed, the configuration could re-
main unchanged for a long period of time. This static nature of current enterprise networks
gives attackers an asymmetric advantage – time. Attackers can spend as much time as nec-
essary to perform reconnaissance of the target network, study and determine its potential
vulnerabilities, choose the best time to launch the attack and can even maintain a backdoor
without being discovered for a long period of time.
Recently a new approach called Moving Target Defense (MTD) was proposed to elimi-
nate the attacker’s asymmetric advantage1,2. A high-level intuition that demonstrates the
1
key idea behind MTD is shown in Figure 1.1. The notion of attack surface was introduced by
Manadhata et,al 3,4 to indicate the vulnerable components in a computer system that could
be exploited. Since attackers need to perform exploration or reconnaissance to investigate
the configuration of the target system before launching an actual attack, we introduce a
concept called exploration space to represent this space. In this thesis, the attack surface
will represent a specific configuration in which a vulnerability exists. For example, if we
consider exploration space from an IP address perspective, then for a machine running in a
typical C class subnet (say 192.168.0.x) whose IP address can be changed during runtime,
the exploration space is a set {192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.2, . . . 192.168.0.254} and the size of this
space is 254. However, since a machine that runs a vulnerable service has only one active
IP address when running, the attack surface size is 1. Formal definitions of attack surface
and exploration space will be given in Chapter 6.
Current Systems Hardened Systems
Adaptive
MTD 
Systems
Adaptive 
Hardened 
Systems
MTD 
Systems
Exploration 
Space
Attack 
Surface
Velocity & 
Direction
Figure 1.1: MTD High Level Intuition
For most critical networks and systems, the typical way to increase system security is
to reduce the attack surface, or in other words, harden the system. To reduce the attack
surface, administrators usually patch and update operating systems, remove unneccessary
software, delete obsolete user credentials, close unused service ports, set up firewalls, etc 5,6.
Nevertheless, such approaches are caused by a legacy information system design where
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ease of use, maintainence and business needs take precedence over security. Moreover, for
complex systems such approaches could quickly lead to convoluted firewall rules, inadequate
authentication mechanisms and fragmented policies due to complex software configuration,
and significant access control and credential maintenance efforts. These traits basically
guarantee a relatively long period of static configuration, thus leaving the attacker a large
time window in which to penetrate the system.
More advanced adaptive hardening approaches capture input from intrusion detection
systems (IDS) and reactively launch automated responses to patch or block services to
thwart ongoing attacks7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17. These automated responses change the attack
surface at runtime, which eases the maintenance overhead of administrator. However, such
approaches require a significant effort to develop and maintain large numbers of signatures
for identifing intrusions and malware and have the potential for triggering a large number
of false-positive alarms, which could be harmful for interrupting normal operations. Also,
such reactive defenses are ineffective against new and zero-day attacks.
Instead of focusing on reducing the attack surface, MTD seeks to enlarge the exploration
space during the design phase and shifting the attack surface to force re-exploration during
the runtime phase. Intuitively, by increasing the exploration space and shifting the attack
surface, an attacker needs to spend more effort locating and re-locating vulnerabilities. Pre-
vious research, such as network18,19,20,21 and memory address space randomization22,23,24,
instruction set randomization25,26, host IP mutation27,28, and software diversification29,30,31
tried to increase the difficulty of discovering the target systems’ configuration by enlarg-
ing the exploration space or proactively shifting the attack surface. Moreover, by taking
advantage of adaptive hardening approaches, more advanced moving target defense sys-
tems can incorporate feedback from an IDS to proactively launch automated responses to
change or shift the attack surface during runtime, thus increasing penetration difficulty even
further32,33,34.
Although there are many ongoing research efforts, moving target defense is still in its
3
infancy. Most of the previous work focuses on some specific aspect of system configuration,
such as IP address18,19,20,21, memory layout22,23,24, instruction set25,26, html keyword35,29,
SQL query36, database table keywords29, etc. While recently a few comprehensive frame-
works37,38,39,40,41,42,43 have been proposed, most of these frameworks are still at the concep-
tual level and significant effort is required to bring them to fruition, from both theoretical
and practical standpoints.
A major challenge is the need for new metrics. As indicated by Huang31, existing met-
rics3,4 for attack surface areas are not suitable for evaluating a moving attack surface because
two basic assumptions of the existing metrics have been broken. One assumption is that
the attack surface remains unchanged, while the other is that the target attack surface is
always reachable by attackers. Thus, new metrics are required to take into account MTD’s
changing and unpredictable nature. Manadhata44 extended his original attack surface defi-
nitions3 to include definitions for a shifting attack surface. This extension allows modeling
the interaction between the defender and the attacker as a two player game, using game
theory to determine optimal defense strategies. However, as admitted by Manadhata, the
potential state and action space explosion are serious problems. The paper also leaves the
instantiation of the model in software as future work. Kant45 points out that the changing
of the attack surface can be done by exploiting MTD or more generally by introducing
diversity. However, quantitative models for guiding the design of good diversification tech-
niques and assessing their effectiveness remain largely unexplored. Christodorescu et,al 29
also indicate that a fundamental challenge in understanding the impact of diversification is
to introduce a precise, computationally-meaningful way to measure the increase in difficulty
for the attacker.
4
1.2 Thesis Statement
A theoretical framework for moving target defense systems will provide insights into the key
design choices for an MTD system as well as enable objective measurement and analysis of
the effectiveness of different movement mechanisms against different types of attack.
The theoretical framework should clarify the most basic questions such as “What is a
moving target defense system?”, “What can be moved?”, “How and when?”.
The framework should also provide support for making key design decisions such as:
• What features should be implemented to reduce the attacker’s intrusion success like-
lihood?
• How the diversification of functionality will impact security?
• What adaptation interval is required to maintain security at certain level with accept-
able costs?
• How much can security be increased by implementing a specific MTD defense when
compared to static systems?
To answer these questions, the theory framework should provide a set of fundamental
definitions to support the measurement and analysis involved in a MTD system.
A common paraphrase of Lord Kelvin (a.k.a William Thomson) is “If you can not mea-
sure it, you can not improve it”. However, measuring security is hard, if not impossible46.
The key reason behind this is that the attacker’s effort is often linear in terms of security
layers. The effort required to break each layer is low. Once a layer is penetrated, the next
layer is exposed and the the attacker has almost unlimited time to attack it. Thus, the
total attacker effort is a summation of the effort required for each layer. Bellovin46 claims
that what is really needed for defense systems is an exponential property where the intru-
sion effort is proportional to the product of each defense layer’s difficulty. I propose that
MTD provides a way to achieve this exponential property thus providing a way to measure
5
security. By constantly adapting configuration aspects, such as IP addresses, port numbers,
instruction sets, OS types, program keywords, etc, MTD systems can overcome the brittle-
ness of standard defenses since, once a layer is penetrated, the attackers have limited time
to reach their objective before an adaptation forces the attacker to re-penetrate previously
compromised layers.
The framework should help designers decide how to use existing configuration aspects
and functionality diversification to provide the defense strength for each layer. To support
measuring such strength, the framework should provide foundamental definitions such as
attack surface and exploration space that are appropriate for the dynamic nature of MTD
systems without making limiting assumptions.
The framework should also be general enough to be used by designers to analyse the
effectiveness of adaptating various combinations of configuration aspects to thwart different
types of attacks. To support analysis, the framework should provide an analytical model
that can be used by designers to easily determine how different parameters and settings will
impact the security provided by an MTD system.
1.3 Research Approach
To address these issues, I propose to define a taxonomy based on a survey of MTD research
and provide a basic MTD design that will separate what the system should do from how
the system will implement it. This taxonomy and design will show that the MTD system
could use diversification at the Service layer (running software configurations), OS layer
(operating system settings such as type, version, memory size, etc), and Network layer (such
as IP address, port number) within a random adaptation process that proactively changes
the mapping from the required functionality (the what) to the system implementation (the
how). This framework will support integrating existing low-level MTD techniques to thwart
a broad range of attack types.
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Based on this taxonomy and design, I present a concrete simulated MTD system and
how to model an automated pivoting attack component to penetrate this MTD system.
Simulation results show that increased adaptation speed reduces the number of success-
ful attacks, and an intrusion detection enabled MTD system could reduce the number of
successful attacks even further.
Next, I extend the simulator and present an efficient and scalable analytical model that
reveals and captures the relationships between the key elements involved in a MTD system.
The model will provide insight to MTD designers so that better decisions can be made
when employing an MTD system. Simulation results show the analytical model can be
effectively used to estimate the success likelihood of intrusion and significantly simplify the
measurement of the increase in system security.
Based on the insights gained from the survey, simulations and analytical model, I propose
a complete MTD theory that can be used to understand key parameters and interactions
between attacker and MTD system, evaluate the potential effectiveness of an MTD system
from attack surface, adaptation surface, engagement surface, and quantifing the effectiveness
in terms of success likelihood of intrusion.
This thesis uses simulated multi-hop remote exploit attacks (or pivoting attacks) in an
enterprise network context as a specific example to show how this framework can be used
to guide the MTD design and implementation as well as to analyze how different MTD
parameter settings can impact security. To validate the MTD theory, this thesis uses the
return-to-libc attack, which is a concrete remote exploit attack. However, the framework is
general and similar methods can be used to determine what features to implement to defend
against other types of attack.
1.4 Contributions
In this moving target defense research, I make the following contributions:
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1. A taxonomy that categorizes current moving target defense techniques to help better
understand the state-of-the-art MTD research. The taxonomy categorizes related
work by Adaptable Aspects, Tactics, Strategies, and the Attack Type it is intended
to thwart. It also helps to point out the potential MTD research areas.
2. A theoretical framework for moving target defense that supports understanding and
quantifing the effectiveness of such defenses.
• A MTD system theory that defines the key concept of a moving target defense
system.
• A cyber attack theory that defines key concepts of attack such as attacker knowl-
edge, attack type, attack instances and exploration space.
• A MTD theory that defines key concepts to capture the interactions between at-
tacker and MTD system, such as attack surface, adaptation surface, engagement
surface, coverage and success likelihood of intrusion.
3. An evaluation of the framework and analytic model in a simulated MTD testbed.
• A MTD defense component that performs random adaptations as well as event
triggered adaptations.
• An offensive component that features modeling the automated pivoting attacks to
emulate multi-hop remote exploit attacks against simulated enterprise networks.
• A probabilistic analytical model that explicitly illustrates how to measure MTD
system security in terms of intrusion success likelihood to individual targets.
• A set of experimental simulations to validate the proposed analytical model and
typical examples to demonstrate that the theoretical framework can guide the
design and development of an MTD system that protects enterprise network
systems better than static defenses.
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1.5 Overview
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the related mathematical, infor-
mation theoretic and cloud computing background necessary to understand the rest of the
thesis. Chapter 3 presents a taxonomy for categorizing the state-of-the-art MTD research.
Chapter 4 discusses the work on a high-level MTD architecture design, a simulator based
on this design32,33,34, and initial experiments to study the effectiveness of MTD. Chapter 5
extends the simulator presented in Chapter 4 to investigate a scalable analytical model that
can be used to analyze multi-hop attacks to a group of hosts. Simulation results to eval-
uate the accuracy of this model will also be presented. Chapter 6 proposes a theoretical
framework that comprises MTD System Theory, Cyber Attack Theory and MTD Theory
in order to understand the interactions between attackers and MTD systems, evaluating
the potential effectiveness from attack surface, adatation surface, engagement surface and
coverage, and quantifing the effectiveness of MTD in terms of success likelihood of intrusion.
Chapter 7 ends with a conclusion and potential areas of future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents background information that would be beneficial for understanding
the following chapters’ contents. Related mathematics, such as geometric series, product
rule of probability and conditional independence are introduced first, then related concepts,
such as enterprise network, cloud computing and IT automation are presented. Based on
the discussion of state-of-the-art IT automation technology, we will gain a high level under-
standing of how enterprise networks that are comprised of a cluster of physical machines
can be configured and deployed remotely and scaled easily. We will also see how it enables
a cloud to become an example of such enterprise networks comprised of clustered virtual
machines instead of bare metal hosts.
2.1 Related Mathematics
As a reference, this section shows related mathematic concepts, definitions and theorems. As
most of the involved theorems are common and well known, they are provided directly with-
out proofs. Interested readers who want to know more about the proofs of these theorems
may find these resources helpful47,48.
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2.1.1 Geometric Series
In mathematics, geometric series often refers to a series with constant ratio of successive
terms.
Definition 2.1. A geometric series is a series whose ratio of successive terms is constant.
Let a represent the first term of the series and q represent the common ratio, then the
geometric series can be represented as:
a+ aq + aq2 + aq3 + . . . =
∞∑
k=0
aqk
A geometric series with infinite elements could be converge or diverge. The condition
for a geometric series to converge and the final converged value stated in this theorem will
be used in Chapter 5 to derive a scalable analytical model of MTD.
Theorem 2.1. For the geometric series to converge, the absolute value of q must less than
1 and when | q |< 1:
a+ aq + aq2 + aq3 + . . . =
∞∑
k=0
aqk =
a
1− q
2.1.2 Product Rule of Probability
We will use the product rule of probability in Chapter 6 when quantifing the success likeli-
hood of intrusion under a concrete MTD scenairo.
Theorem 2.2. Let A, B represent events, if P (B) > 0, then P (A,B) = P (A|B)P (B). If
P (A) > 0, then P (A,B) = P (B|A)P (A).
This rule can be extended to more general case.
Theorem 2.3. Let A1, A2, . . . , An ,where n ≥ 2, represents n events, then P (A1, A2, . . . , An) =
P (A1, A2, . . . , An−1)P (An|A1, A2, . . . , An−1).
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2.1.3 Conditional Independency
Conditional independency also plays an important role when we analyze the effectivenss in
terms of success likelihood of intrusion.
Theorem 2.4. Let A, B, C represent three events, if A and B are independent with each
other, then P (A|C) = P (A|B,C), P (B|C) = P (B|A,C).
2.2 Related Concepts
As indicated in Chapter 1, this thesis considers moving target defense in cyber security
context, more specifically, it focuses on the security of enterprise network environment.
Thus, it’s necessary to provide a basic introduction to what is an enterprise network.
2.2.1 Enterprise Network Basics
An enterprise network is an enterprise’s communications backbone that helps connect com-
puters and related devices across departments and workgroup networks, facilitating insight
and data accessibility49. An enterprise network also eliminates isolated users and work-
groups, facilitates system and device interoperability, effectively combines different commu-
nication protocols and improves internal and external enterprise data management. It can
integrate all kinds of computer operating systems such as Windows, Linux and Mac comput-
ers and mobile devices, such as smart phones and tablets. In addition, enterprise networks
can be combined with local and wide area networks according to operational requirements.
The key component that comprises an enterprise network is machine, which is a host
or node that resides in an enterprise network environment, which can either be physical or
virtual.
Typical examples of machines in an enterprise network environment are physical devices,
such as servers or workstation computers, routers, cellphones, etc. or virtualized devices such
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as virtual machine, virtual switch or virtual router created by virtualization techniques such
as VirtualBox50, VmwareWorkstation51, KVM52, Xen53, LXC54, etc. A machine will be
the main unit that will be considered to adapt in this thesis.
2.2.2 A Glance at IT Automation
IT automation has been around for decades as computers and softwares have filled the
world. Companies often own hundreds or thousands of physical servers, which are burdens
for system administrators to manually setup servers, script operating system and appli-
caton installations, maintain user credentials and service dependencies, perform network
configuration changes, configure storage repositories and deliver security settings. Ideally,
all these processes should be automated to make them repeatable, robust and consistent.
Enabled by today’s virtualization and cloud computing technology, companies are able to
easily create and configure tens of thousands or even more of virtual machines. For example,
Xen53, KVM52, LXC54, VirtualBox50, etc. all provide API for creating and destroying vir-
tual machines. Openvswitch55 provides a programmable virtual switch as an alternative to
traditional virtual network interface. Puppet56, Chef57, Ansible58, Salt59 provides software
automation tools. Enabled by these techniques, cloud computing platforms such as Amazon
Web Service (AWS)60, Windows Azure61, Google Cloud Platform (GCP)62, OpenStack63,
etc. allow the company to build up their whole infrastructure totally based on virtualized
devices. Companies like Netflix64 and Adobe65 are concrete examples that use Amazon Web
Services as their enterprise network infrastructure.
Figure 2.1 shows an example network environment. Traditionally, to reduce the workload
of configuring each server/workstation manually, different operating system templates and
software packages are stored in the network file servers. Administrators can use automated
procedure such as contained in bootable disks to retrieve required operating system and soft-
ware packages from file servers or network repositories to manage each server/workstation.
However, this method still needs administrators to configure each machine locally and in-
13
dividually. To reduce the workload even further, tools like Cobbler66 use Preboot Execution
Environment (PXE) booting67 and a kickstart technique to remotely provision operating
systems on hardware servers. By taking advantage of this technique and Wake-on-Lan
(WOL)68, Metal as a Service (MAAS)69 from Ubunt enables administrators to treat phys-
ical servers like virtual machines in the cloud. Administrators will be able to easily power
up, tear down, provision the OS, check or redeploy hardware nodes at will over the network.
Juju70, which is an cloud automation tool that enables administrators to configure, man-
age, maintain, deploy and scale the services running in each machine efficiently. With pre-
defined charm files, which are essentially configuration commands for different applications,
users can easily build up infrastructure with provided services as defined in these files. In
addition, users can also easily create their own charm files using configuration management
assets such as Puppet56 or Chef57 to bring up their customized infrastructure. When MAAS
and Juju are paired, it turns physical machines into an elastic cloud-like resource. From
this perspective, the cloud is just an example where all physical machines are virtualized.
Consider Figure 2.1. The following describes the typical process when use MAAS and
Juju together to deploy and configure services on bare-metal servers.
1. Install MAAS in Controller. This includes downloading Operating System Images
from Ubuntu and these images could be saved in the File Server.
2. Use PXE to remotely signal and recognize machines A, B, C (mainly through MAC
address of the network interface on that machine). Then register and enlist machine
A, B, C in MAAS.
3. MAAS uses WOL to remotely power up machine A, B, C and then uses PXE boot to
retrieve the Operating System Images from MAAS and install Operating System to
A, B, C.
4. Install Juju in Controller.
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5. Use Juju to deploy and configure services to machine A, B, C using charm files.
Example services could be web server services such as Apache and Tomcat, database
services such as MySQL and PostgreSQLs. Juju also supports to easily establish and
maintain relationships between services.
Controller
A
B
C
File Server
Figure 2.1: IT Automation Overview - Hardware
In a cloud environment, as shown in Figure 2.2, virtualization techniques such as Xen,
KVM, LXC, Virtualbox, can be used to replace MAAS and easily bring up, tear down
and deploy virtual machines (VMs). When these machines are initially created, the cloud
platform can use stored images (which are actually OS templates) and user data (which are
scripts that run after the OS is installed to set up user accounts or install basic software)
to configure the provisioned VM. Such software could be Puppet or Chef configuration
automation tools whose daemon processes run in the background and wait for configuration
commands. After the VMs are up and running, the master controller node can push further
configuration settings remotely to these provisioned VMs to setup various services.
Instead of simplify maintaining, configuring and remotely deploying various services to
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Controller
VMVMVM
VMVMVM
Cloud
Figure 2.2: IT Automation Overview - Cloud
different hosts, new techniques, such as Software-defined Networking (SDN)71 and Open-
Flow72 provide the administrators a programmable and flexible way to make traffic flow
decisions and manage network communications. Enabled by these techonologies, one could
imagine the potential of creating and maintaining versatile and dynamic network topologies
for moving target defenses.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter introduces important background information that will be helpful to com-
prehend this thesis. Firstly, it presents some mathematical definitions and theorems as a
reference. Secondly, it discusses the main application context, which is enterprise network
systems, that we focus our MTD theory towards. Last but not least, it provides a brief
overview of cloud computing and state-of-the-art configuration management techniques,
that will help in understanding some of the key definitions involved in Chapter 6’s MTD
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theory. This introduction to IT automation will also help the reader understand why these
definitions are practical and applicable in enterprise network environment.
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Chapter 3
Related Work and A Taxonomy
The initial concept of moving target defense was proposed in the 2009 National Cyber Leap
Year Summit1,2. Since then, a lot of research devoted to this area has been published.
Although moving target defense as a concept is new, the ideas behind it have emerged from
previous work.
A formal classification and well-defined taxonomy will not only help better understanding
related work from several different dimensions, such as how, when, what to move, and which
attack to thwart, but it will also support the potential of combining different techniques to
foster a holistic approach to MTD. Based on a survey of related work, Figure 3.1 presents a
diagram that categorizes previous and ongoing research. To the best of our knowledge, this
taxonomy is the first to try to categorize and organize state-of-the-art research in MTD.
When talking about moving target defense systems, key questions include:
• “What is a moving target defense system?”
• “What can be moved?”
• “How can it be moved?”
• “What are the security benefits of such a system?”
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To help answer these questions and better understand moving target defense, a taxonomy
for MTD research is proposed. This review and taxonomy also supports the theoretical
framework proposed in Chapter 6, which includes a formal definition for moving target
defense systems.
In the first level of the taxonomy, moving target defense research has been classified into
four categories according to the Attack Type, Adaptable Aspects, Tactics, and Strategies.
The classification is driven by the above list of key questions and refined by adopting some
military terminologies, such as tactics and strategies. In the Attack Type category, the
related work that claims to use moving target defense ideas to thwart different types of
attacks is summarized. This category helps to clarify the security benefit of an MTD system.
Similarly, the Adaptable Aspects category groups research by the configuration aspects or
parameters that can be changed to achieve the defensive objectives. The Tactics category
categorizes the different techniques used to achieve different moving mechanisms. This
category groups these techniques into two sub categories: diversification and randomization.
These two terms are widely used in the literature but without a clear definition or distinction
of their relationships. For example, diversification actually provides space for randomization.
This category will clearly reflect this relationship. The Strategies category categorizes work
by when a move should be launched. Entities in this diagram are then grouped according
to the different characteristics of the four categories.
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Attack Type TacticsAdaptable Aspects Strategies
Hardware
Cache Side Channel
Software
DDOS
Buffer Overflow
Scanning/Recon
SQL Injection/XSS
Web Bot
Worm
Zero Day Exploit
Shuffling
Machine Learning
Bio Inspired
Game Theory
Control Theory
Genetic AlgorithmHardware Level
Memory to Cache Mapping
Newtwork Level
IP Address
Network Protocol
OS Level
Instruction Set
Memory Layout
Function Signature
Program Level
HTML Elements
Event-based
Time-based
MTD Taxonomy
Diversification
Randomization
Existing
Artificial
Uniform distributed
Proactive
Reactive
Combined
Time + Event
Machine Level
Virtual Machine
Program functionality
Port Number
Cryptography
Spam
DNS/DHCP attack
Figure 3.1: MTD Taxonomy
3.1 Attack Type
Cyber attacks target both hardware and software. Various techniques have been created and
utilized to either steal, alter, or ruin a specific target by hacking into a vulnerable system.
Although MTD research is at an early stage, researchers have already considered adopting
this concept to protect the system, which includes both hardware and software aspects.
3.1.1 Hardware Attacks
From the hardware perspective, a well known type of attack is side channel attack. Side
channel attacks73 are a form of reverse engineering by which an attacker can infer how the
electronic circuits works and what data it is processing by analyzing the information leakage
such as heat, electromagnetic emissions or even sound, without direct access to the circuits
itself. Lee74 presents a moving target defense approach for secure hardware design. The
motivation is that despite strong cryptography and software isolation mechanisms, cache
side-channels can still leak critical information. Lee proposes a novel cache design in which
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a redesigned address decoder circuit and a longer cache index, coupled with a random
replacement algorithm, allow it to perform dynamic memory to cache mapping. As a built-
in hardware component, there is no software modification required. However, despite the
benefits, the accurate performance comparison with conventional caches and verification of
security enhancements are challenging.
3.1.2 Software Attacks
From a software perspective, the moving target approach has also been adopted to thwart
some of the most typical cyber attacks.
3.1.2.1 Scanning/reconnaissance
Scanning/reconnaissance is a critical step for information gathering before an actual in-
trusion is launched. Attackers usually use existing or customized tools to scan the target
network and system in order to figure out host information, such as OS type, IP address,
open ports, running services and potential vulnerabilities. Thus, one way to effectively
enhance system security is to invalidate the scanning results. Al-Shaer et al.27 presents
an architecture called Mutable Networks or MUTE for moving target defense. The main
goal is to restrain an attacker’s capability in scanning or discovering network targets by
dynamically changing network configurations, such as IP addresses and routes. It uses a
formal approach based on BDD (binary decision diagrams)75 to model network behavior as
well as create randomized and constrained network configuration mutations. However, in
its current form, the work is purely theoretical. To make it practical and effective, MUTE
must be fast, unpredictable, operationally safe, deployable, and scalable.
Jariath et al.28 uses OpenFlow to develop an MTD architecture that transparently mu-
tates IP addresses with high unpredictability while maintaining configuration integrity and
minimizing operation overhead. The key idea is to not touch the real IP address, which
can only be reached by authorized entities, but instead mutate a host’s virtual IP address,
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which can be acquired by the DNS. The benefit of this technique is that it thwarts network
scanning, which is the key step in network intrusion. The emulation results are impressive
as they claim to invalidate 99 percent of external scanners and saves up to 90 percent of
the hosts from zero-day unknown worms. However, the cost to user’s normal operation is
unknown. Also, the author indicates that more investigations need to be performed for
other types of attacks, such as DDoS and application-layer attacks.
Research18 has shown that scanning an IPv6 subnet takes around 8.77 ∗ 1010s. MT6D20
provides an effective way to thwart scanning attacks in the IPv6 environment by dynamically
changing IP addresses to invalidate scan results. MT6D20 can also be used to prevent
attacks where scanning/reconnaissance are used to obtain privacy and anonymity, as IPv6’s
StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLACC) track protocol potentially exposes hosts
information, which could potentially be used to map human users to network traffic if
the network remains static. Another scanning/reconnaissance-based attack, the man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack, can also be thwarted as MT6D rotates the addresses of the
attacker’s intended victim.
3.1.2.2 Buffer overflow
Buffer overflow usually happens due to the lack of buffer boundary checking. Manipulated
input can overwrite the adjacent memory and alter the original way the program performs.
Many software vulnerabilities exist because of such flaws. Popular attacks such as remote
exploits and worms work over the network to take advantage of such vulnerabilities to obtain
control of systems or to cause denial of service without prior access to the vulnerable sys-
tem. Existing techniques such as StackGuard76 and ProPolice77 help to mitigate the buffer
overflow attack. From a moving target defense perspective, address space layout random-
ization (ASLR)22 and address space layout permutation (ASLP)23– which randomizes the
memory positions of the stack, heap and libraries of running programs–provides orthogonal
enhancements24 to help further invalidate the buffer overflow related attacks.
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3.1.2.3 SQL injection/XSS
SQL injection/XSS is a technique that tries to insert malicious SQL statements into a web
application’s entry field for execution, so that database contents can be revealed to the
attacker. Usually the vulnerabilities used by SQL injection are due to incorrectly filtered
string literal escape characters and weakly typed user inputs. It can be thwarted by applying
instruction set randomization to SQL language keyword38. Cross-Site Scipting(XSS) takes
advantage of known vulnerabilities in web applications and injects malicious scripts into a
compromised sites’ web pages that deliver modified contents to client-side web browsers from
trusted sources so that sensitive credential or session information are gained by the attacker.
Gundy et al.78 presents Noncespaces, which utilizes HTML source randomization to enable
web clients to easily identify untrusted content to prevent XSS vulnerability exploitation.
By randomizing various database aspects, such as table and column names and javascript
runtime APIs, end-to-end software diversification29 techniques can be used to mitigate SQL
injection and XSS attack.
3.1.2.4 Zero day exploit
Zero day exploits are software bugs or holes that are found by hackers and can be used to gain
privilege or corrupt the vulnerable system that all previously unknown to the software vendor
or developers. Although it is usually first known only to a small group of hackers due to the
significant effort required to discover and develop effective exploit, today’s ability to quickly
share information can lead to severe problems. SCIT-MTD41,42,79,80 proposes to utilize
virtual machine rotation to reduce the intrusion time window and increase attack difficulty.
Here rotation means bringing online servers oﬄine and launch a cleansing procedure, which
will remove potential malware and thus mitigate the impact of zero-day vulnerabilities.
Then, oﬄine servers that are already in a pristine state are used to replace these servers
to keep providing services for clients. However31, SCIT uses an open source version of
Terracotta81 to share information among servers, which means it’s not a completely stateless
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solution and poisoned states can still be disseminated.
In addition, OpenFlow random host mutation28 results show it can save up to 90 percent
of network hosts from zero-day worms. Although zero-day vulnerabilities can bypass IDS
systems, Chapter 4 shows that, an MTD system that randomly refreshes various hosts helps
mitigate this type of attack, since all nodes will eventually be removed from the system.
3.1.2.5 Web bot attack
Web bot attacks use automated programs to perform large amounts of web browsing be-
havior attacks, such as account registration/login, comment form/email spamming, online
game/vote cheating, etc. Fifty one percent of web site traffic is non-human and is often
malicious as the result of various automated hacking tools and web bots35. NOMAD, a
novel approach that randomizes key HTML elements, is proposed to prevent the automated
web-bot based resource access, form or comment submitting attacks while not affecting
legitimate users’ access35.
3.1.2.6 DDos attack
DDoS attack represents the distributed denial of service attack, which uses a large number
of compromised systems (botnets) to attack a single target by flooding traffic messages from
multiple sources to force it shutdown or to deny services to legitimate users. Jia et al.82
developed MOTAG, which employs dynamic, hidden proxies as moving targets to secure
service access for authenticated clients against flooding DDoS attacks. To reach protected
services, the authenticated clients are assigned to individual proxy nodes that will redirect
packets and enforce session policy checking. When the proxy is under DDoS attack, the
client will be re-assigned to an alternative proxy to evade the ongoing attack and maintain
legitimate access. Also, since DDoS attackers assume end-hosts or targets use fixed IP-
address or routes, the proposed MUTE27,28 and MT6D20, which proactively change the IP
addresses and routes, can also be used to protect network infrastructures against this type
24
of attack.
3.1.2.7 Worm attack
A worm is usually a stand-alone piece of malware that employs the network to replicate and
spread itself to other machines by relying on existing software bugs or holes in the target
system. The damage caused by a worm can be as simple as just consuming bandwidth or as
complex as turning worm infected machines into botnets that can be used by its owner to
profit from spams or DDoS attacks. Portokalidis et al.38 shows the potential of instruction
set randomization to contain some extremely elaborate worms like Conficker and Stuxnet.
A hitlist worm, which takes advantage of a precalculated lists of vulnerable targets, can
spread extremely fast and infect a million hosts in less than two seconds83,84. Antonatos
et al.19 proposed a defense mechanism called network address space randomization (NASR)
to intentionally accelerate hitlist decay to contain the spread speed. There are limitations
to the applicability of NASR, such as services that require static addresses, applications
that do not tolerate address changes, and ineffective against DNS hitlist worms. However,
results showed that it is effective in restricting and slowing down the infection of IP hitlist
worms and forcing these worms to exhibit scan-like behavior, which makes them more easily
detected.
3.1.2.8 Spam
Spam is usually thought of as unsolicited emails or news postings. Spam filter designers
try to train good filters by using recently received emails. On the other hand, spammers
try to reverse engineer the existing filters to generate messages that can circumvent these
filters. Colbaugh85,86 proposed to introduce movement into the classifier-based defense. The
key strategy is first to divide the original feature set F for each activity behavior into K
randomly selected subsets. Next, they train one classifier for each subset of features to get
K classifiers. Then specify a scheduling policy to select these classifiers to minimize the
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effectiveness of adversary adaptation. Results based on empirical study showed that this
strategy outperforms static filters.
3.1.2.9 DNS/DHCP attack
The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the mapping from easily remembered host names
to IP addresses. Attacks targeting DNS usually try to modify the domain name server’s
database to divert the traffic to other malicious addresses. The SCIT-DNS87 approach–
where a cluster of servers constantly rotate between primary DNS, secondary DNS, Oﬄine
for Cleaning and Cleaned for rebooting states to confine the damage of successful attack to a
limited time–digitally sign dynamic DNS updates using a private key while keeping the key
oﬄine at all times. The authors claim SCIT-DNS ensures high availability and master file
data integrity even in the face of unknown or undetected attacks. However, as indicated in
the paper, extending the current cluster model to an arbitrary number of servers instead of
three and utilizing rotation schemes other than pure round robin requires additional work.
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) works to automatically provide basic
parameters for network interface configuration. However, the weakness of this protocol is
that it provides the attacker a possibility to masquerade as either valid DHCP clients or
servers. Rowe et al.88 suggests introducing diversity to the DHCP protocol by inserting
more states and transitions to the protocol’s finite state machine to thwart such attacks.
More discussion for this work will be given in Section 3.2.1.3 and 3.3.2.6.
3.2 Adaptable Aspects
Deciding what to move, or the adaptable aspects to use, is a key step in developing moving
target defense systems. This decision has a direct impact on what kinds of attacks the
MTD system will be able to constrain. It turns out that classifying research according to
the different levels of a machine’s functioning environment is very natural. The levels used
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in this classification include the the network level, OS level, the program level, the machine
level and the hardware level.
Network level configurations range from physical network to logical network. Elements
include physical devices, such as routers, switches and firewalls, policies, such as router
configuration and firewall rules, protocols, such as TCP/UDP/IP/NAT, logically separated
networks, such as VPN, and network location identifiers, such as IP/MAC addresses.
OS level configurations abstract the operating system installed on top of either a physical
or virtualized hardware and provides the context for applications run at program level.
Program level configurations include all the applications or programs that can be in-
stalled and run in an operating system. Applications or programs run at this level needs
the environment provided at OS level as well as network level to communicate with remote
machines.
Machine level configurations are composed of the adaptable aspects range over the above
three levels. This level mainly represents that a machine (either physical or virtual) itself,
as a configuration unit, can be adapted.
A machine can be either physical or virtual. The Hardware level abstracts the underline
environment a machine runs in and mainly refers to the physical configurations, such as
CPU, memory, cache, circuits, disks, etc.
3.2.1 Network Level
At the network level, to increase the difficulty of identifying the target, the adaptable aspects
can be divided into three subcategories: IP address, port number and network protocol.
3.2.1.1 IP Address
IP addresses have been considered an adaptable aspects in previous work20,27,28,32,33,34 to
increase the intrusion difficulty and thwart different types of attacks, such as scan/mapping,
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worms, DDOS, etc. Dynamically changing IP addresses can effectively invalidate the ad-
dresses discovered by attackers that they use to target the victim machines.
3.2.1.2 Port Number
Port number also has been proposed as an adaptable aspect27,32,33,34 that could benefit
moving target defense. Dynamically changing port numbers could make it more difficult for
the attacker to locate the target service. It provides a similar effect as IP address changing
(see section 3.2.1.1) and can be used together with IP address changing to support the
exponential property for layered security, as discussed in Chapter 1.
3.2.1.3 Network Protocol
Network Protocols have also been thought of as adaptable aspects to thwart network based
attacks. Rowe et al.88 propose to insert artificial states and transitions into existing network
protocol state machines to counter network-based attacks. The authors used a modified
DHCP protocol to demonstrate how this idea can be used to thwart the DHCP attack. By
inserting a new state into both DHCP server and client, forged DHCP messages sent by the
attacker will move the victim client or server to a state that is unknown to the attacker.
However, valid clients or servers will have the modified protocol specification and will be
able to complete the state transition. As pointed out by the author, this approach may
introduce increased costs due to service interruption when switching to the new and shared
secret states.
3.2.2 OS Level
In OS Level, existing research has focused on randomizing the memory layout and diversi-
fying the instruction set.
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3.2.2.1 Memory Layout
Memory layout mainly refers to the segments of an executable file such as stack, heap, data
and linked libraries’ addresses or positions in the memory. Previous attacks such as remote
exploits and worms take advantage of the standard layout of compiled programs and relies
on smashing the memory through malicious code injection to alter the ordinary execution.
Randomizing the actual memory addresses of executable segments or data has been shown
to noticeably reduce such attacks22,89,23.
3.2.2.2 Instruction Set
The Instruction set represents the machine language or commands that can be understood
by a specific type of processor. Guanav, Boyd et al.25 proposed instruction set randomiza-
tion (ISR) as an approach to counter code-injection attacks. By creating process-specific
randomized instruction sets, an attacker who doesn’t know the key of the randomization
algorithm will fail to inject code that can be recognized by the processor, thus leading to a
runtime exception. Later26, to counter the attacks that attempt to circumvent the low-level
machine language ISR, Boyd et al. demonstrates that this approach can also be applied to
high-level scripting or interpreted languages, such as Perl and SQL. In Global ISR38, they
propose the holistic adoption of ISR across all system layers, which requires all binaries in
the system to be pre-randomized with different secret keys. New installations require user
authorization to continue and finish this randomization process, which makes unauthorized
injection of binary code unable to execute as they are unrecognized.
3.2.3 Program Level
Many applications are built on top of OS. A modern software system’s complexity almost
guarantees that vulnerabilities will exist, resulting in an imperfect security system. Adapt-
able aspects, at this level, include three areas: program functionality, function signatures
and HTML elements.
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3.2.3.1 Program Functionality
Due to the high cost of developing software systems to fulfill a wide range of user needs,
continued feature augmentation, backward compatibility and reusability, many software sys-
tems are complex and provide more functionality than users require, desire or are even aware
of. Rinard et al.90 views security vulnerabilities as undesirable functionality present in a
system. They discuss several low-level techniques, such as input rectification, functionality
replacement, loop perforation, cyclic memory allocation, etc. to help either excise or change
system functionality that may help eliminate security vulnerabilities while still leaving the
program able to provide acceptable functionality. From MTD perspective, eliminating se-
curity vulnerabilities can be viewed as reducing the attack surface.
3.2.3.2 Function Signature
Function signatures refer to the names, key words and static identifiers used in a software sys-
tem to communicate between system components. Concrete examples include database table
or column names, application programming interface (API) function names, etc. Christodor-
escu et al.29 shows how to apply transformations to subprograms and execution environ-
ments so that each program instance actually uses syntactically and semantically distinct
subprograms to diversify the function signatures. For example, they demonstrate that by
randomizing the identifiers associated with various aspects of database interface, such as the
table name and column name of a table, the difficulty of SQL Injection is increased. Also
diversifying the JavaScript runtime environment, such as randomize the Document Object
Model API method names, XSS attacks can be mitigated.
3.2.3.3 HTML Elements/Programming Language
HTML elements usually refer to the specific source component of a web page that have
attributes and contents. Critical HTML elements include registration forms, submission and
file upload buttons, etc. These are usually used by servers to collect or update information
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stored in a remote database. NOMAD35 focuses on how to randomize key HTML elements
to prevent widely used web bot attacks with a relatively low overhead. This work can
also be viewed as a specific example of end-to-end software diversification as defined by
Christodorescu et al.29. Programming languages can be viewed as specific instruction sets at
the application level. As discussed in Section 3.2.2.2, concrete examples include techniques
that randomize SQL and Perl language keywords.
3.2.4 Machine Level
A Machine as a unit to provide redundancy, improve fault tolerance and ensure high
availability has been wildly used for decades. From a moving target defense perspective,
SCIT79,87,42, TALENT40, ChameleonSoft43, MEERKATS39 and this thesis32,33,34 all con-
sider virtual machines as a unit of replacement. Combining machine replacement with other
adaptable aspects from network, OS or program level will provide more flexible adaptation
choices and defeat a broad range of attack types as shown in Chapter 6.
3.2.5 Hardware Level
Adaptable aspects from the hardware/physical level in current research has only one sub-
category, which is memory to cache mapping.
3.2.5.1 Memory to cache mapping
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, side channels can leak secret information despite strong cryp-
tography and software isolation mechanisms. These hardware problems are difficult to solve
using only software solutions. Lee74 proposed to design new hardware circuits for caching
that enables dynamic and random mapping of memory addresses to cache instead of a direct
and static mapping to foil the cache side-channel attack. The benefit of such design is that
it has no impact to the software. However, there are challenges as already indicated in
Section 3.1.1.
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3.3 Tactics
After determining which adaptable aspects to move, the next step is to consider how to move.
From a military perspective, the techniques used to achieve this movement are called tactics.
In this section, the most popular techniques used in current MTD research are summarized
and categorized into two sub categories: diversification and randomization. These two terms
are popular in related literatures but with some key distinctions and relationships missing.
The first distinction is about diversification. Generally, diversification introduces func-
tionally equivalent but internally unique variants of a piece of software. These variants
form a space for selection. Some spaces, such as IP address space, memory space and port
number space, are introduced by existing diversification. While other spaces, such as in-
struction set space and function signature space, are created by artificial diversification to
relatively fixed configuration aspects, such as instruction set and function signature. This
is why diversification category has two sub-categories: existing and artificial.
Randomization is closely related to diversification, as diversity provides the space for
randomization. In the physical world, for military units to perform tactic maneuvre, space
is clearly indispensable. This is also true for moving in the cyber world. The difference is
that space in the physical world is three dimensional, while in the cyber world the moving
space is created by diversification.
In addition, randomization usually refers to randomly choosing a variant from current
space. Random choice is usually understood as making selections such that the probability of
each selection forms a uniform distribution. However, if we view randomization as a decision
making process to make selections based on a specific probability distribution applied to
the variants in current space, then it turns out randomization can generalize to all AI
techniques, such as genetic algorithms, machine learning, game theory, etc. Indeed, saying
that a specific variant will always be chosen given corresponding environmental information
is nothing more than saying that the probability of choosing this variant is 1 with the
probability of all other variants at 0. This way, it captures another key missing relationship
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between randomization and all other AI techniques which is also why these AI techniques
are put as sub-categories of randomization. The formal definition of diversification and
randomization is given in Chapter 6.
3.3.1 Diversification
Cloud or enterprise configurations typically prefer identical or homogeneous settings for a
large number of servers due to the ease of maintenance. However, this leaves the potential of
a single vulnerability being exploited by an attacker to compromise many similarly config-
ured machines. Diversification was proposed to mitigate such situations as an attacker may
compromise one variant but will probably not have the knowledge of all different variants.
Alternatively, forcing the attacker to learn all variants will consume significant attacker
resources and time.
Evans et al.91 presents a model for thinking about dynamic diversity defenses. The
authors analyze a few example defenses and attacks using the model and show scenarios
where MTDs are and are not effective. The authors present several of the most commonly
used low-level automatic diversity techniques, such as address space randomization and
instruction set randomization, which range over both existing and artificial diversification
space. Results show that these low-level diversity techniques have limited effectiveness to
high-level attacks and the authors suggests using composition and N-variant systems to
improve the effectiveness of diversify defenses. Composition strategies require the attacker
to break multiple different diverse defenses simultaneously, whereas N-variant systems re-
quire an attacker to break multiple variants of the same diversity defenses simultaneously.
ChamelenonSoft43, MEERKATS39 and N-Variant37 all use these strategies in their system
design. Similar principles have also been proposed by Jackson et al.30 in their compiler-
generated software diversity work where two orthogonal techniques have been suggested.
One is multi-variant execution, where a monitoring layer can monitor and execute diversi-
fied variants and examine difference in behavior to indicate possible attacks. The other is
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to use large-scale software diversity where all users get their own unique variant. Since the
attackers have no knowledge of the internal structure of each variant, they cannot construct
an attack. In short, MTD systems should make proper use of existing as well as artificial
diversification space to improve their effectiveness.
3.3.1.1 Existing
As discussed in adaptable aspects , there are MTD work tries to randomize the selec-
tion of several configuration aspects by taking advantage of existing configuration space,
such as IP address space18,19,20,21,27,28,32,33,34, port number space27,32,33,34, and address layout
space22,89,23. All these are related to the available choices that already exists in the system.
3.3.1.2 Artificial
Diversification also refers to proactively diversifying relatively fixed configuration aspects
such as instruction sets, HTML elements, etc. to provide new space for randomization.
There are mainly four artificial diversity techniques.
One is to use cryptography algorithms. Perhaps the most obvious example is our daily
usage of password to log into various systems. Christodorescu29 suggests diversifying iden-
tifiers, such as database tables or column names and javascript runtime APIs, to thwart
SQL injection/XSS attacks. Global ISR38 seeks to diversify the instruction set from all
levels such as machine/assemble language, SQL and Perl language keywords, to thwart code
injection and SQL Injection attacks. NOMAD35 and Noncespaces78 both try to diversify
HTML sources to thwart web bot and XSS attacks. All these work make use of cryptography
techniques to enlarge the fixed configuration factor’s space.
Another artificial diversity technique takes advantage of compiler techniques. Instead
of generating fixed machine code for a given program, compilers techniques30 allows us to
generate functionally equivalent but internally unique variants of the program. Adopting
compiler-generated software diversity makes it less likely that a single attack (such as worms)
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could affect large numbers of targets. In addition, it will be no longer possible for an attacker
to analyze their own copy of software to find exploitable vulnerabilities.
The third diversity technique takes advantage of cloud computing and IT automation.
As discussed in Chapter 2, virtualization platform and configuration management tools
can be used to easily create, configure and deploy services to machines, which potentially
provides a powerful way to compose different machine, OS, service implementations, etc. to
provide the same functionality to the user. Huang31 proposes to introduce such diversity
for web services to better protect web servers.
The fourth diversity technique is to artificially manipulate data files, protocols, network
topologies, etc. Intended users can copy, slice or regroup data files at will to fill their pur-
poses. For example, in Section 3.1.2.8, Colbaugh et al.85,86 proposed to diversify classifiers
by dividing the original feature set into K randomly selected subsets to train and get K clas-
sifiers instead of one. Rowe et al.88 suggests generating a diverse set of DHCP protocols by
artificially injecting intermediate states. Chapter 2 also discussed the potential to diversify
network topologies through Software-defined Networking (SDN)71 and OpenFlow72.
In general, these four artificial diversity techniques together with existing diversification
can be used to achieve the suggested Composition and N-variant principles for MTD system.
3.3.2 Randomization
Randomization has been used in existing MTD research to make intrusion more diffi-
cult27,28,20,38,22,23,18. The key idea in randomization is to take advantage of existing or
artificially introduced configuration space to randomly pick the next system configuration
variants in these spaces to add more uncertainty to the attacker, which in turn increases the
difficulty of intrusion. As indicated, randomization is usually understood as making selec-
tions by assuming the probability of each selection forms a uniform distribution. However,
this concept generalizes if we view it as a decision making process that makes selections
based on a specific probability distribution. This allows AI techniques to be viewed as
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producing different probability distributions of variants in the current space and uniform
distribution becomes a specific instance of randomization.
3.3.2.1 Uniform Distributed
Several existing approaches27,28,20,18 try to randomize the machine’s IP address in existing
IPv4 or IPv6 configuration space to increase the difficulty of locating the target. Memory
layout randomization22,23 uses existing memory address space to randomize memory posi-
tions of the stack, heap and libraries of running programs to add difficulty to buffer overflow
attacks. Global ISR38 diversifies instruction sets for an OS or programing language, which
can be considered as an artificial instruction set space. During runtime the actual working
instruction set can be randomly selected from this artificial space, which will significantly
increase the difficulty in correctly identifying the real instructions. Although not explicitly
indicated, these approaches all make selections based on uniform distribution which applies
the maximum uncertainty to attacker. This thesis32,33,34 investigates the effectiveness of
randomly picking virtual machines according to uniform distribution from a group of VMs
to change IP address to prevent remote exploit attacks.
3.3.2.2 Shuﬄing
As discussed in Section 3.1.2.6, MOTAG82 hides the proxy nodes from the public forcing
attackers to use insiders to locate proxy nodes and attack them. To quarantine insider-
assisted attacks, MOTAG employs a shuﬄing mechanism to randomly pick proxy nodes
to defeat them. The author gives a detailed analysis for shuﬄing optimization and then
presents a greedy shuﬄing algorithm. The experiment results show that MOTAG can
protect a majority of innocent clients from DDoS attacks assisted by hundreds of insiders
within a small number of shuﬄes.
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3.3.2.3 Machine Learning
In Section 3.1.2.8, a machine learning based approach, which diversifies classifiers to add
difficulty for spam adversaries to reverse engineer spam filters, was proposed by Colbaugh
and Glass86. The approach decreases the adversarie’s ability to generate junk email with
enough difference from the training data to bypass machine learning-based filters. The
authors present a scheduling policy (see Section 3.3.2.5) to select these classifiers and claims
the strategy is simple, flexible and near optimal for a broad range of security problems. Case
studies show that the proposed algorithm outperforms standard static methods. However,
the data set used for network intrusion detection analysis is specific –KDD Cup9992 and
there are harsh criticisms on these datasets93,94.
3.3.2.4 Bio Inspired
Cui95 proposed a new host-based defense mechanism that they call Symbiotic Embedded
Machines (SEM) or Symbiotic. It is based on perpetual mutation and diversity that is
inspired by a natural phenomenon known as Symbiotic Defensive Mutualism. This phe-
nomenon generally refers to any association between different species where the survival or
evolutionary fitness of one or more partners is enhanced by the association. The key idea
in this approach is that defenses are provided by defensive mutualism. First, each Sym-
biote and host program is created uniquely by rewriting using advanced polymorphic code
engines. This diversity provides inherent protection against attackers. Second, Symbiote
treats the entire host program as an external and untrusted entity, which eliminates the
traditional trust relationship between anti-virus software and the underlying OS. This way,
Symbiote has full visibility into the code and execution state of its host program, which can
passively monitor or actively react to the exploitation and incorrect behavior at runtime. At
the same time, host program requires Symbiote to successfully execute (which costs compu-
tation resources) in order to operate. Any successful attempts to disable, modify or remove
the Symbiote will render the host program inoperable. The author describes the Symbiote
37
code structure and argues it can reside within any level of the software stack due to the
fact that it makes no assumption about the functionality of the host program. The idea
sounds promising, but the author does not provide a prototype system. In addition, the
impact on system performance and functionality are not addressed. Azab et al.43 propose
a biologically-inspired defense framework called ChameleonSoft, which builds over a novel
cell oriented architecture. More discussion about this will be given in Section 3.5.
3.3.2.5 Game theory
Colbaugh86 investigated MTD in the framework of a repeated two-player games with in-
complete information. The defense system and adaptive adversaries were modeled as a
hidden mode hybrid dynamical system (HM-HDS) to specify a scheduling policy for select-
ing classifiers during each time period to minimize the effectiveness of adversary adaptation.
However, key assumptions are made regarding HM-HDS that only hold under some condi-
tions or applications in which empirical data assessment are allowed. Manadhata44 modeled
the interaction between defender and attacker as a two player stochastic extensive game96
and used game theory to determine optimal defense strategies. However, as admitted by the
author, the potential state space explosion and action space explosion are disadvantages of
this model.
3.3.2.6 Control theory
Rowe et al.88 view MTD as an optimal secure reconfiguration problem. The goal is to
develop novel control theoretic approaches such that, based on a range of cyber maneuver
techniques, a most cost-effective technique can be selected to counter a detected ongoing
attack. The authors model the defense as a closed control loop where state transitions occur
due to contingencies as well as selected cyber maneuvers. The paper proposed a maneuver
to thwart the DHCP attack. By generating a diverse collection of DHCP protocols through
artificially injected intermediate states and altered state transition paths and messages,
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attackers who make use of the standard DHCP state machine will fail. However, as revealed
by the authors, other maneuvers could also be considered. In addition, estimating the
security state and selecting the most cost-effective maneuvers between different states are
primary research challenges.
3.3.2.7 Genetic algorithm
Crouse97 proposes an interesting approach to model a computer’s configuration as a chromo-
some where an individual configuration setting is a trait or allele. Then the author employs a
Genetic Algorithm to find temporally and spatially diverse secure computer configurations.
The paper presents the experimental results based on a simulated environment composed
of 256 computers, each with 80 parameters. However the author does not show what these
parameters are. The paper shows results from temporal and spatial diversity, configuration
vulnerabilities and perceived configuration vulnerabilities aspects. The experiments start
with vulnerable configurations and eventually find more secure and diverse configurations.
However, the impact of the evolving genetic algorithms to system operations is unknown. In
addition, it is also unknown how the author deals with system configuration dependencies
and constrains.
3.3.2.8 Cryptography
Yackoski et al.98,21 designed the SDNA architecture to work on top of IPv6. A hypervisor
within each network node transparently rewrites packets entering and exiting the OS to
conceal real addresses from OS. Each SDNA entity operates independently to process packets
and directly coordinates with other relevant SDNA entities to facilitate communication,
achieve scalability and avoid single point of failure. During transmission, packets generated
from the OS will be intercepted by SDNA, who uses packet metadata and a cryptographic
key to rewrite the IP addresses before sending it to the network. When receiving packets
from the network, SDNA verifies the packets using a shared key and then rewrites the
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IP addresses in the packets before offering the packets to the OS. Using this approach,
various dynamics can be imposed at the network layer. Packets that failed verification
can be dropped or redirected to a honeypot. However, SDNA interferes with network
security components such as IDS, logging, etc. To accommodate SDNA dynamics without
modifying these security components, one could have intermediate nodes reconstruct the
original packets based on SDNA mechanisms. To deploy SDNA on existing systems, it
requires enabling IPv6 and modifying the network configuration. Also, an SDNA entity and
hypervisor must be added to each host.
3.4 Strategies
Another category is Strategy. In military terms, strategies can be understood as a high
level plan to achieve military objectives or win the war. Similarly, here Strategy is used
to summarize high level plan that can be adopted to win the cyber war. As discussed in
Chapter 1, MTD systems seek to proactively enlarge the exploration space during design and
either proactively or reactively shift the attack surface during runtime. In proactive mode,
these changes occur at random times, thus a proactive strategy is based on time. In reactive
mode, when incorporating detectors, such as IDS and system monitors, a reactive strategy
becomes event-based. These events could be related to intrusions, operational errors, system
failures, etc. Obviously, as captured by Figure 1.1, proactive and reactive strategies could
coexist in MTD system, which was titled as the third strategy type: combined.
3.4.1 Proactive
With a proactive strategy, MTD systems launch adaptations at will, which is summarized
as a time-based sub-category.
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3.4.1.1 Time-based
SCIT87,42,79 uses a fixed time interval to constantly rotate and replace virtual machines to
restrict the damage of successful attacks to a limited time. Each virtual machine loops and
rotates through three phases: online working, oﬄine for cleansing potential compromise,
and rebooting to replace current online functioning VMs. More discussion about SCIT
can be found in Section 3.1.2.4 and Section 3.1.2.9. Later, Huang31 suggests to introduce
diversity by combining different OS, web server programs and web applications to create
a moving attack surface for web service. It takes a similar routine as SCIT to rotate the
virtual machines. Rowe88 suggests to proactively launch cyber maneuvre where a specific
maneuvre that artificially injects intermediate states and alter DHCP protocol state ma-
chine’s transition path has been proposed. Section 3.3.2.6 gives more discussion about this
work. In MT6D20, Jariath28 proposes to proactively change the IP address at specified time
and frequency. Chapter 4 also presents a pure random MTD system design that seeks to
proactively change different adaptable aspects , such as VM, IP address, port number during
runtime at specified time interval. Chapter 5 provides additional insight by investigating key
relationships between adaptation time interval and attack time interval. Crouse and Fulp97
introduce genetic algorithms to proactively evolve vulnerable configurations to eventually
find more secure and diverse configurations. Cui and Stolfo95 propose to proactively inject
diverse Symbiotes into existing host programs. ChameleonSoft43 and TALENT40 both sug-
gests creating a checkpoint strategy such that poisoned state can easily removed through
roll back. TALENT also dynamically changes the live-migration destination platform at
randomly chosen time intervals to create a moving target for attackers. Note here live-
migration is not the same as VM migration, which can only be done with a homegeneous
OS and hardware. TALENT uses OS-level virtualization to sandbox an application and
migrate the environment. MEERKATS39 proposes a high level vision for a Cloud Security
Architecture. The proposed Evade component periodically moves data from one location
to another randomly to impede the targeted attack. This move is lightweight as it uses
41
pre-established ciphertext replicas and data is migrated by simply transferring small key
shares instead of the actual data. The other proposed components – CSSH (Collaborative
Self-healing and Service Hardening), CSIFT (Cross-System Information Flow Tracking),
DIGIT (Deceptive Information Generation, Injection and Tracking) and DREME (Diver-
sified Replica Execution and Monitoring Environment) – all reflect the idea of proactive
defense. ChameleonSoft and TALENT both introduce proactive diversity to increase sys-
tem resillience as well as the difficulty of intrusion. More discussion about ChameleonSoft,
TALENT and MEERKATS is given in Section 3.5. In addition, related work that has been
discussed in Section 3.3.1.2 that refers to proactively diversify corresponding adaptable as-
pects through artificial diversification all belong to this category. From the time-based
perspective, the differences between all these approaches lie in the fact that some proac-
tive strategies are applied at design and implementation phase while others are applied at
runtime. In addition, some are only applied once while others repeat many times.
3.4.2 Reactive
Reactive strategies mainly refers to launch adaptations based on environmental information
changes, such as exploitation detected, system crash or operation error happens, etc. All
these situations can be summarized as event-based.
3.4.2.1 Event-based
Instead of simply rotating VMs at fixed time interval as in SCIT, MAS31 installs anomaly
detection engines in each VM to enable event-driven rotation. Rowe et al.88 model cyber-
defense as a control system where the system has Secure Normal, Insecure Normal, Emer-
gency and Restorative states. A system is in an Insecure Normal state if it’s operating
normally but with indications of attack from IDS or runtime monitors. Such a system needs
a preventative control action to pull it back to Secure Normal state, otherwise if the sys-
tem is partially compromised it will go into an Emergency state and then to a Restorative
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state to interrupt services and block malicious activity and use new secure resources to help
the system transition back to Secure Normal state. As introduced before, a diverse DHCP
protocol example where protocol’s state machine has been injected by artificial states to
thwart DHCP attack has been demonstrated. Biologically inspired Symbiotic Embedded
Machines (SEM)95 can monitor and react to observed events, such as malware that attempts
to hijack the host’s execution environment, to prevent it. Colbaugh and Glass85,86 model
an attacker’s adaptive learning ability to reverse engineer machine learning enabled spam
filters and defenses as repeated, incomplete information games. MEERKATS39’s proposed
components, such as DMCC (Distributed Monitoring and Crosschecking), are also exam-
ples of reactive strategy. ChameleonSoft’s43 failure recovery mechanism also dealing with
malicious induced failures by adversaries. TALENT40’s live-migration can be triggered not
only periodical but also by malicious activities. In addition to a pure random MTD design,
Chapter 4 also presents an intelligent MTD design that includes an analysis engine that
produces adaptation triggers, based on detected intrusions and failures.
3.4.3 Combined
Based on the previous two categories, it’s not hard to see that recent MTD research tends to
embrace both proactive and reactive strategies. The following sub category simply includes
the research that adopt both strategies.
3.4.3.1 Time + Event
From the time-based and event-based discussion, we see that MAS31, Rowe et al.88, MEERKATS39,
ChameleonSoft43, TALENT40 and the work in this thesis32,34 all use both proactive and re-
active strategies in their overall approach. Although there may be other work also considered
both strategies, these examples should be enough to demonstrate the ideas.
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3.5 Using the Taxonomy
This taxonomy starts with the attack type and then discusses adaptable aspects, tactics and
strategies. Different configuration factors that can be adapted have been introduced from
several dimensions, such as network level, OS level, program level, etc. Adaptable aspects
provide input to tactics, tactics classify all different kinds of techniques that can be adopted
to fulfill the strategy, and the strategy captures the high-level plan to achieve the goal of
MTD. These three categories together determine what kinds of attack the MTD system can
thwart, which in turn increases system security.
From this taxonomy, we can see that, from network dimension, adaptation applied
to IP address, DHCP protocol can be used to constrain attacks, such as worms, scan-
ning/reconnaisance, DDos or DHCP attack. Randomization of OS level aspects, such as
memory layout, can be used to defeat buffer overflow attacks. Program level aspects can
be used to defeat attacks, such as SQL injection/XSS and web bot intrusion. Machine level
aspects, such as VMs, can be used to mitigate the impact of zero day vulnerabilities. Obvi-
ously, to thwart as many different attacks as possible, future MTD systems should consider
techniques from all of these categories. Based on this observation, this taxonomy can be
used to help evaluate the strengths and weakness of an MTD system based on the types of
attack that can be prevented. For example, MT6D20 provides a practical MTD solution at
the network level, but it is not effective for attack types at the program level, such as SQL
injection/XSS, etc.
Based on this review, most of the existing MTD research has focused on low-level con-
figuration units. However, recent efforts are starting to focus on extending or combining
these low-level aspects to provide a more comprehensive MTD solution. These again reflect
the trend that future MTD system should properly incorporate the configuration units from
different levels as discussed in the taxonomy to provide a holistic solution. The following will
summarize several typical research efforts towards this trend; most have already been refer-
enced in previous sections. Nevertheless, MTD research is still in its infancy and significant
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effort is required, both theoretically and practically.
Portokalidis38 proposes a holistic adoption of ISR (instruction-set randomization) across
the software stack to prevent the execution of unauthorized binaries and scripts regard-
less of their origin. This approach requires the programs be randomized with different
keys during a user-controlled installation, which effectively combines the benefits of code
whitelisting/signing and runtime program integrity. The paper discusses how ISR can be
implemented in hardware as well as entirely in software.
Keromytis39 proposes a novel architecture, MEERKATS, for the cloud environment that
enables an environment to constantly change along several dimensions to create an unpre-
dictable target for an adversary. MEERKATS focuses on both software and data, not just
protecting, but leveraging them to improve mission resilience. MEERKATS includes many
subcomponents. Existing techniques, like instruction set randomization, migration, and N-
schedule, have been leveraged and integrated into different subcomponents. While the main
goal of the paper was to give the vision of MEERKATS and describe the ways to prototype
it, such a system has not been built yet.
Okhravi et al.40 proposes the TALENT (Trusted dynAmic Logical hEterogeNeity sys-
Tem) framework. By using two key ideas, containers and a portable checkpoint compiler,
TALENT can create an OS level virtualization environment and migrate running, mission-
critical applications across heterogeneous platforms while preserving the state (execution
state of the process, open files and sockets) of the application. It is designed to work with
general purpose system languages (such as C). In this paper, the threat model assumes that
the hypervisor, hardware and OS-level virtualization logic are trusted. The paper shows that
after optimization, the environment migration time has been reduced to one second. How-
ever, the current prototype is still focused on providing high availability and no guarantees
are made about the migrated state not being corrupted.
Azab et al.43 proposes a biologically-inspired defense framework that builds over a novel
cell oriented architecture to achieve moving target defense. The key principles are:
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1. employ multidimensional software diversities such as functionally-equivalent, behaviorally-
different code variants
2. decouple functional roles and runtime role players
3. separate logic, state, and physical resources to induce a spatio-temporal software be-
havior encryption
It presents a prototype of Behavior Encryption and recovery mechanisms and also studies
the provisioned level of security. Although this design seems promising, the key assumption
made in the design prototype, to create a checkpoint at each stage of the program, ignores
the potential performance impact on complex software systems. In addition, how to correctly
implement the rollback to a clean checkpoint and the costs of hot cell shuﬄing to normal
user’s access are all unknown.
Carvalho et al.99 describes a human-agent teamwork command and control framework
for moving target defenses. The author argues that the reason behind this work is the fact
that there are important interdependencies between different defense tools and functionality
of critical applications and services. In addition, different operational contexts will require
different configurations of these different tools. Thus, it’s important to provide a framework
that can enhance human system interactions to better support the coordination of different
MTD tools.
This taxonomy mainly reviews MTD work in enterprise network context, there may be
MTD work from other context that is not covered in this taxonomy.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a review of related MTD work as well as a taxonomy for these works.
From the taxonomy, we see that many different MTD mechanisms have been tried to defeat
different attack types. These mechanisms include different combinations of strategies and
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tactics that applied to various adaptable aspects . It not only helps one understand the
state-of-the-art research in MTD, but also helps point out future research directions. It
also underscores the need for a comprehensive theoretical framework for MTD, which is
presented in Chapter 6.
Based on the review, almost all of the work that provides analysis of MTD security ben-
efits are qualitative. As discussed in Chapter 1, developing new metrics for moving target
defense is a major challenge. Operation and security are both important concerns today.
Unfortunately, these two aspects are usually irreconcilable in MTD. Increased security usu-
ally brings increased costs. New metrics for MTD should not only help measure and analyze
the different mechanism’s impact on security, but it should also help MTD designers to make
better decisions about system parameter settings such that reasonable trade offs between
security and operation can be achieved.
The tension between operation and security in MTD brings another major challenge.
This challenge is engineering based and lies in how to sanitize potentially compromised
machines while not interrupting normal operations significantly. MT6D does a good job at
network-level although IP collisions are still possible. But at the machine-level, ensuring
a potentially compromised VM is cleaned is still a major challenge. Although ideas like
checkpointing have been proposed in Chameleonsoft43, no concrete system that evaluates
the performance or validates such an approach’s applicability is presented. Also as discussed
in Section 3.1.2.4, SCIT is not a completely stateless solution and poisoned states can still
be disseminated. TALENT40 also provides a checkpoint mechanism, but leaves how to
ensure the migrated virtual machines are not corrupted as future work. Rowe et al. points
out that selecting the most cost-effective maneuvers between different states, especially the
transition from a Restorative state to a Secure Normal state (which essentially represents
how to ensure compromised state to be cleaned), are important research challenges.
This thesis focuses on tackling the first major challenge. The next chapter presents a
more comprehensive high-level MTD system design that supports this taxonomy. A set of
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exploratory simulation and related experiment results will also be discussed to show our
first step of investigating the effectiveness of MTD system.
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Chapter 4
Exploratory Experiments
In this chapter, a high-level MTD system design framework is presented. Then a simulation,
based on this design, is used to investigate the degree to which proactive and random adap-
tations can decrease an adversary’s chance of success. A set of experiments are conducted to
examine both a purely random MTD system, as well as an intelligent MTD system, which
uses attack indicators to augment adaptation selection. The results show that the attacker’s
success likelihood can be reduced under such MTD system.
4.1 High-Level System Design
The high-level architecture of a proposed MTD system33,32,34 that adapts in a purely ran-
dom fashion, is shown inside the dashed box in Figure 4.1. This system produces random
adaptations that do not inhibit correct system operation. The key to making these random
adaptations is that they are based on a Logical Mission Model, which captures an abstract
view of the Physical Network’s current configuration along with the functional requirements
of the network. The driver is the Adaption Engine, which orders random adaptations to
the network configuration at random intervals. These adaptations are implemented by the
Configuration Manager, which controls the configuration of the Physical Network. The ar-
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chitecture of an intelligent MTD system is the complete system shown in Figure 4.1. The
basic operation of the random adaptation remains the same; however, an Analysis Engine
has been added to take real-time events from the Physical Network and the current config-
uration from the Configuration Manager to determine possible vulnerabilities and on-going
attacks. The Adaptation Engine is extended to look at the network’s current state along
with its security status, as captured in the Logical Security Model. The Logical Security
Model also consists of two runtime models: a goal model and a model of system vulnerabili-
ties. The goal model captures the system’s security goals while the vulnerability model is in
the form of a novel Conservative Attack Graph (CAG)33,32,34, which captures both known
and unknown system vulnerabilities and how an attacker might move through the system
to gain specific privileges.
4.1.1 Resource Mapping System
Chapter 3 discussed the tension between operation and security in MTD systems. An
MTD system proactively launches adaptations to increase system security, which at the
same time breaks the common operation patterns as appeared in static system. One key
problem caused by this is how to ensure each component can still correctly locate and
communicate with other components it depends on. Thus, a resource mapping system
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has been proposed. Ideally, an RMS can be implemented as communication enforcement
component that knows the location of all related components in the system. The RMS
interacts with the Configuration Manager, to get the up-to-date location information of the
various resources.
One possible design of the RMS’s use in MTDs is shown in Figure 4.2. Assume the over-
all mission is executed in a cloud computing environment, then each VM could be configured
to have a RMS component to support communications with other roles. Such RMS compo-
nent can be implemented by making use of existing OS firewalls or, more rigorously, as a
dedicated operating system layer. The limitation of this design becomes evident if attackers
compromise a critical role or VM. In this case, roles with which the compromised role initi-
ates communications can be easily located and attacked since the compromised role’s RMS
knows their location. However, the attacker must follow the exact communication pattern
defined by the Logical Mission Model; communication outside the pre-defined paths can be
easily detected. In addition, adaptation can come to the rescue as, eventually, the VM of
the compromised role will be refreshed and the attacker will lose any gained privilege.
Other possible solutions include using an existing cloud-computing platform, such as
OpenStack’s APIs, or Software Defined Network (SDN), such as Openflow, protocol to set
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up and update the corresponding communication rules at network-level between various
component. These rules could be understood as routing tables maintained by the Configu-
ration Manager.
No matter which solution is being selected, the purpose of RMS is to ensure the overall
system functionality given a constantly adapting MTD environment. This purpose obviously
increases the complexity of normal operational requirements, however, it also restricts the
possible intrusion paths used by the attacker, which makes any violations more easily to be
detected.
4.1.2 Adaptation Engine
In traditional adaptive systems, the adaptation algorithm would attempt to provide optimal
or near optimal configurations100. The objective of this component is to produce effective
configurations that are significantly different in some aspect while limiting the costs of adap-
tation, or essentially maximizing the entropy of the configurations. Effective configurations
must be functionally correct and consistent, and have a tolerable impact on network perfor-
mance; the physical network and logical mission models are designed to allow the adaptation
engine to predict these impacts based on the capabilities of the machines assigned to the
system roles.
While the use of intelligent adaptations allows the MTD to react to suspected intru-
sions instead of simply adapting randomly, using intelligent adaptations in conjunction with
purely random adaptations allows the MTD to effectively mitigate unpredicted attacks as
well as mask the actions of the intelligent control of system. While the use of random
adaptations may not keep an attacker from learning all aspects of how the MTD system
responds, it will make the learning process more difficult and time consuming. Addition-
ally, by incorporating responses to suspected intrusions into adaptations, the system can
react to suspected intrusions much sooner than a normal intrusion response system since
even responses to false positives will leave the system in an operational state with no more
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overhead expended than for a random adaptation.
Since the Adaptation Engine is the main decision making facility for the MTD, it must
be able to control the various adaptable configuration unit of the system that range from
Network Level, OS Level, Service Level to Machine Level as categorized in Chapter 3.
4.1.3 Analysis Engine
The purpose of the Analysis Engine is to infer the most critical vulnerabilities and most
likely attack activities so the Adaptation Engine can make intelligent adaptation choices.
To analyze the effect of an MTD on computer networks, a conservative attack graph (CAG)
has been proposed32,33,34. The key output of the Analysis Engine is the CAG that captures
known and unknown vulnerabilities and indicates paths the attacker might take in attacking
the system.
Assuming unknown vulnerabilities in CAG actually reduces the size of the state model
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and makes it easier to apply stochastic analysis. Modeling an attacker both gaining and
losing knowledge and privileges in CAG invalidates the typical monotonicity assumption101
of most attack-graph work and requires a state-machine model, rather than traditional
dependency attack graphs102,103,104. Previous state-enumeration attack graphs105,106 have
encountered scalability challenges when applied to large networks104; however, Chapter 5
shows an analytical model that is efficient and scalable to tackle this non-monotonicity
challenge of MTD.
As an example, Figure 4.3 shows the CAG for the mission planning scenario used in
this thesis. The topology of the conservative attack graph is partially derived from the
logical mission model, where dependencies between roles are explicitly captured. In normal
operation, valid users log in from the internet through the Authorizer node and interact
with the Planner node. The Planner node interacts with the user by using data from the
three database nodes, GeoDB, TargetDB, and AssetDB. The only legitimate access paths
in the system are (1) from the Internet to the Authorizer, (2) from the Authorizer to the
Planner and (3) from the Planner to the three database servers (AssetDB, TargetDB, and
GeoDB). The conservative attack graph captures these logical access paths.
The conservative attack graph can also be viewed as a state-transition system. Each
arrow is annotated with a label describing the activities involved to move from one state
to the next. The effort involved in the activities can be measured in various ways. For
example, one can ascribe a success-likelihood to time diagram to indicate how much time it
will take the attacker to reach a certain success likelihood for a specific action.
4.2 Simulated MTD Testbeds
To determine if this approach has merit, simulated MTD testbeds were developed to reflect
the MTD approach discussed above. The simulated MTD testbeds have three components,
the Defense component, the Attack component and the Ground Truth component. In gen-
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eral, Defense Component combines the functionality of Configuration Manager, Adaptation
Engine and Analysis Engine as described from Figure 4.1. As time elapses, at each adapta-
tion time interval, the Defense component will select a valid state from current configuration
space through appropriate decision making option and perform an adequate adaptation to
transform the system to the selected configuration state. The updated configuration state
will be sent to the Ground Truth component. The Attack component simulates the attacker
and uses the CAG to allow it to know where to attack next to achieve its goal. The nodes of
CAG represents active VMs running in the system and the edges represents the communica-
tion enforcement between nodes. Values in the CAG edges denote the attacker’s probability
of intrusion success between nodes assuming both nodes remain static. The Ground Truth
component maintains the up-to-date ground truth system configuration information. The
Ground Truth component not only receives updated configuration state informaiton from
Defense component after new adaptation has been launched, but also feed these information
to Attack component when requested.
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To make it clear, lets again use the mission planning scenario example to explain the
overall idea. Figure 4.4 shows the network topology of this scenario. The Defense compo-
nent contains three physical machines (hosts) and five active VMs. These five VMs can
being assigned to any host to play any of the five roles: Authorizer, Planner, TargetDB, As-
setDB, or GeoDB. The Attack component simulates the attacker and uses the CAG shown
in Figure 4.5 to allow it to know where to attack next to achieve its goal, which is the
TargetDB. The edges in the graph (with the exception of the Internet to Authorizer edge)
show the valid paths supported by the RMS. In normal operation, valid users log in through
the Authorizer node and interact with the Planner node. The Planner node interacts with
the user by using data from the three database nodes, GeoDB, TargetDB, and AssetDB.
The attacker is assumed to locate at the Internet node and wishes to attack the TargetDB.
Since the only available attack path is to penetrate from Internet to the Authorizer,
the Authorizer to the Planner, and then from Planner to TargetDB. The edge values in
the CAG denote the attacker’s probability of intrusion success between nodes assuming
both nodes remain static. As shown, the attacker has a 40% chance of compromising
the TargetDB if (1) it has already compromised the Planner and (2) the Configuration
Manager does not adapt to either the Planner or the TargetDB during the time step. In a
real system, these probabilities would be based on the current probability of unknown and
known vulnerabilities of the roles.
Each simulated attack has several steps. First the current configuration state is retrieved
from the Ground Truth component to simulate that the attacker somehow obtained the sys-
tem configuration after conducting reconnaissance. Next, the attack waits ∆t time intervals,
which simulates the time required to actually launch and finish an attack, then an updated
configuration state is retrieved and used to determine whether the attack has succeeded or
not. To determine attack success, first a random probability value is generated to check
whether it’s less than the CAG edge value for the current attack. If it does, the simulation
determines if the VMs on either the attacker’s current node or the attacked node have been
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refreshed; if either of them has been refreshed, the attack fails. If the attacker’s current
node was the VM that was refreshed, the attacker is pushed back to its previous node. If
neither were refreshed, the attack succeeds.
Both the Attacker and the GroundTruth owns a conservative attack graph (CAG). The
key difference between this two conservative attack graphs lies in the authenticity about the
MTD system configuration. The Attacker’s CAG reflects the attacker’s belief of the system
configuration, which is not necessarily true when facing a constantly changing environment.
While the CAG contained in the GroundTruth component reflects the actual and up-to-
date system configuration. Comparing the difference between the attacker’s belief and the
genuine MTD configuration is the key for judging whether the current intrusion is a success
or not and update the VM instances the Attacker currently obtained, detailed algorithms
will show this in a moment.
In this chapter, several assumptions has been made to simplify the simulations and
focus on investigating the key effect of MTD to attack. The next chapter presents a scalable
analytical model, which enables the capability to predict these simulation results. In the
next step, after a more comprehensive MTD theory has been developed as discussed in
Chapter 6, current simulation and analytical model can be extended to investigate more
broad attack scenarios with unnecessary assumptions relaxed.
1. Adaptations are applied at a specified time interval and are random in nature (which
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is extended in the third simulation to include intelligent adaptation).
2. Adaptations are limited to VM refreshing.
3. All VMs assigned to play a given role have the same configuration except for its ID
and IP address.
4. The attacker has the full knowledge of the logical system configuration and once a
node is compromised, the attacker can immediately know where the the next node is
located to attack.
5. Attacks are restricted to the VMs playing the five roles.
6. The attacker knows immediately when a VM it has compromised has been refreshed.
While these assumptions make the simulation easier, they are also tilted toward the
attacker since only the IP address from the network level is used, and each VM assigned to
play a given role has the same configuration, advanced diversification techniques at OS level
and service level is not considered, which would make compromises more difficult. Also the
attacker is assumed to know immediately where the next node is located to attack and when
a compromised VM has been refreshed, which typically both costs more time to realize in
practice.
In addition, the simulation also reserves important characteristics of intrusion in reality.
Although assumed the attacker knows the logical system configuration, that doesn’t neces-
sarily mean the attacker knows the exact vulnerability of each machine and how to make
use of them, which still requires the attacker’s effort to learn and explore, and is indirectly
incorporated into the attack time interval. This assumption only means the attacker is
aware that there are four VMs, and the Planner is directly reachable from the internet and
also can communicate with the other three VMs.
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4.2.1 Defender Modeling
In this section, several algorithms will be presented to show how the MTD simulator Defense
component performs the moving target defense.
The Defense component in the simulator will maintain the set of roles, R, the current
available IP addresses set, I for allocation, the set of physical hosts, H, which can be used
to launch new VM instances and current set of tasks, T . A task, t = 〈r, h, vmid, ip〉, is
composed by a role, r, a host, h, an IP address, ip, a VM instance with vmid. It represents
that a VM instance that has vmid will be launched on host, h, with IP address, ip, to play
the role, r. As stated in above assumptions, all VMs assigned to play a given role have
the same configuration except its ID and IP address, thus a task is a flat combination of
r, vmid, ip and h, without the need to create more complex role specification and machine
implementation.
Algorithm 1 adaptation(R, I, H, T, n)
Require: Parameters R: set of roles, I: ip table, H: set of physical hosts, T: set of tasks, n: number of nodes to refresh
1: Tnew = generateTask(R, I,H, T, n)
2: for each tnew in Tnew do
3: told = 〈r, i′, h′, v′〉 = getTaskFromRole(T, tnew.r)
4: inform h′ to shutdown v′
5: inform h to start v
6: T ← T − {told}
7: T ← T ⋃ tnew
8: inform GroundTruth to remove told
9: inform GroundTruth to add tnew
10: end for
The moving mechanism adopted in the MTD simulator is as follows: for the node set,
V , at each time interval, Tr, named as adaptationInterval, the simulator randomly pick,
n, nodes in V , n ≤ |V |, shutdown the old VM instances, which assigned to play the corre-
sponding roles, and start new VM instances to replace them. Algorithm 1 shows the overall
process of the adaptation. It first calls algorithm 2 which will return a new set of tasks,
Tnew, according to the number of nodes that chosen to refresh in one adaptation. Then in
lines 2-10 it iterates through all the new tasks in Tnew to inform corresponding hosts to shut
down old VM instances and launch new VM instances, it will also notify the GroundTruth
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component to update these changes. Notice that Algorithm 1 and 2 follow the assumption
that adaptations are limited to VM refreshing. As already discussed in Chapter 3, direct
machine modification is not suggested as it can not guarantee the potential compromise to
this node is totally sanitized.
Algorithm 2 generateTask(R, I, H, T, n)
Require: R: roles, I: IP table, H: physical hosts, T: tasks
1: Tnew ← ∅
2: count← 0
3: while count < n do
4: r ← randomly pick a role r from R
5: i← randomly pick an unassigned IP address i from I
6: h← randomly pick a host h in H
7: v ← generate a new ID v for new VM
8: Tnew ← Tnew ∪ 〈r, i, h, v〉
9: count+ +
10: end while
11: return Tnew
When the GroundTruth component receives the notification from the Defense compo-
nent, it will update the mapping information between the role and the actual VM instance’s
IP and VMID information. Algorithm 3 shows this process. Lines 1-5 of Algorithm 3
correspond to line 9 of Algorithm 1, which informs the GroundTruth component to add a
new task, lines 7-11 of Algorithm 3 correspond to line 8 of Algorithm 1, which informs the
GroundTruth component to remove the old task.
Algorithm 3 groundTruthProcessMesssage(m)
1: if m contains new task information then
2: tnew ← m.getTask()
3: node← groundTruth.cag.getNode(tnew.r.id)
4: node.ip← tnew.i
5: node.vmid← tnew.v
6: . . .
7: else if m contains old task information then
8: told ← m.getTask()
9: node← groundTruth.cag.getNode(told.r.id)
10: node.ip← null
11: node.vmid← null
12: . . .
13: end if
This section models the defense of a moving target system, the next section will show
how to model the intrusion.
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4.2.2 Attacker Modeling
There are various different kinds of attacks existing today. In this offense modeling section, I
will mainly focus on the typical multi-hop remote attack launched from external sites. In this
attack type, the attacker attempts to compromise, or make use of, intermediate machines
while jumping board to pivoting attack machines that hide deeper. Here we assume each VM
instance that plays a role in the defense component has a remote exploitable vulnerability.
The RMS enforces the communication paths for the VM instances inside the MTD system.
Thus the attacker needs to follow the paths defined in CAG to perform the multi-hop attack.
One complete attack will start from node i, and keep penetration until either the attacker
compromises the target node or the attacker totally lost any compromised node other than
i due to VM refresh. During this process, the attacker will gain and lose node privileges.
Before given the algorithms, two notions called single step attack and complete attack are
introduced to help understand the simulations.
Definition 4.1. A single step attack represents the intrusion effort involved in compromising
a node b, through a directly connected node a. Each single step attack has an associated time
interval, Ta, termed as attack interval to represent the time cost of this attack.
Definition 4.2. A complete attack represents the overall intrusion that the attacker either
compromises the target node or totally loses any compromised nodes and gets pushed back
to the origin.
Definition 4.3. A frontier edge, f = 〈p, c, t〉, represents a single step attack that will be
launched from parent node, p, to compromise child node, c, and finishes at time tick, t. Let
E represent all the edges in CAG, then obviously, 〈p, c〉 ∈ E.
Algorithm 4 shows the main attack simulation flow. Since the Defender will change
the system configuration during runtime, the Attacker is also assumed to be diligent and
will keep trying every possible intrusion frontier edge available in the time until it either
compromises the target node, or totally gets pushed back to the starting node.
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Let N represent the set of nodes currently obtained by the attacker. Let mn represent the
most recently acquired node. Let F represent the current frontier edges that the Attackers
plan to penetrate based on N . In practice, F is a priority queue of f , f ∈ F , ordered by t.
Not every attack will be successful, thus there will be a success probability, pr, associated
with each edge. This probability depends on the vulnerability the child node has.
As shown in algorithm 4, there will be maxTimesOfAttack number of complete attacks
performed. In each complete attack, the GroundTruth history CAG list, G = {g1, g2, . . . , gtmax},
will be regenerated. Here tmax is the maximum time ticks the simulator needs to run, tmax
should be sufficiently large, such that it is enough for a complete attack to finish (either
compromise the target node or totally get pushed back to origin). Notice that for two
complete attacks, the overall time spent on each complete attack might vary due to the
uncertainty involved in adaptation as well as each single step attack’s success likelihood. In
time range [1, tmax], every adaptation interval, Tr, there will be an adaptation occurred.
Thus in {g1, g2, . . . , gtmax}, the CAG in {g1, g2, . . . , gTr−1} will be the same. Similarly, the
CAGs in {gTr , gTr+1, . . . , g2∗Tr−1} are also the same, and the rest can be analysed in the
same manner.
In Algorithm 4, Lines 3-19 will initialize the acquired nodes set, N , and corresponding
frontier edge set, F . Notice in line 5, the algorithm randomly picks a start attack time
tick between [0, Tr], this actually reflects the real world situation that, when the intrusion
is being launched, the attacker does not necessarily know how long there will be another
adaptation happens. Lines 20-48 perform the main loop in one complete attack as previously
described. Line 23 calls Algorithm 5 to judge whether the current frontier edge can be
successfully penetrated or not. Algorithm 5 first calls Algorithm 6 to compare the node
in N with the corresponding node in GroundTruth to check whether they have the same
VM instance’s identifier vmid. If not then it means the acquired node has been refreshed,
thus the attacker loses the privilege and this node needs to be removed from N , also all
corresponding frontier edges that start from this node need to be removed from F . Then
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Algorithm 4 attackSimulation
1: for i = 0→ maxTimesOfAttack do
2: regenerate the groundtruth
3: N ← ∅
4: F ← ∅
5: ct← randomly pick an integer in [0, reorganizationInterval] . Simulate the start time of attack
6: mn← node i in attacker’s cag
7: N ← N ∪ {mn}
8: E′ ← get all edges start from mn
9: for each 〈p, c〉 in E′ do
10: if c /∈ N then
11: ctcag ← get cag at ct from ground truth
12: ip← ctcag.getNode(c.getID()).ip
13: vmid← ctcag.getNode(c.getID()).vmid
14: c.ip← ip
15: c.vmid← vmid
16: f ← 〈mn, c, ct+ attackInterval〉
17: F ← F ∪ {f}
18: end if
19: end for
20: while mn.id 6= targetID or (|N | > 1 and |F | > 0) do
21: f ← poll a ticked edge from priority queue F
22: ct← f.t
23: b← singleStepAttack(f) . Call Algorithm 5
24: if b then
25: N ← N ∪ {f.c}
26: mn← f.c
27: end if
28: for each n in N do
29: if n is not start node i then
30: E′′ ← get edges start from n
31: for each e in E′′ do
32: if e.c /∈ N then
33: for each f in F do
34: if not e ⊂ f then
35: cag ← get cag at ct from ground truth
36: ip← cag.getNode(c.getID()).ip
37: id← cag.getNode(c.getID()).vmid
38: c.ip← ip
39: c.id← id
40: f ← 〈mn, c, ct+ attackInterval〉
41: F ← F ∪ {f}
42: end if
43: end for
44: end if
45: end for
46: end if
47: end for
48: end while
49: end for
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Algorithm 5 singleStepAttack(f)
1: refreshPushBackCheck(f.t) . Call Algorithm 6
2: cag ← get cag at f.t from ground truth
3: d← randomly generate a double value between [0,1]
4: e← get edge from f.p to f.c in attackerCag
5: if d > e.prob then
6: return false
7: end if
8: beliefIp← f.c.ip
9: beliefV mid← f.c.vmid
10: trueIp← cag.getNode(f.c.id).ip
11: trueV mid← cag.getNode(f.c.id).vmid
12: if beliefV mid 6= trueV mid then
13: return false
14: else if beliefV mid == trueV mid and beliefIp 6= trueIp then
15: if 〈f.p, f.c〉 ∈ cag.E and f.p ∈ N then
16: return true
17: else
18: return false
19: end if
20: else
21: if f.p ∈ N then
22: return true
23: else
24: return false
25: end if
26: end if
Algorithm 6 refreshPushBackCheck(t)
Require: Parameter t: the time tick to check
1: cag ← get cag at tick t from ground truth
2: for each n in N do
3: if n is not start node i then
4: vmid← cag.getNode(n.id).vmid
5: if vmid 6= n.vmid then
6: N ← N − {n}
7: E′ ← get all edges start from n in attackerCag
8: for each 〈p, c〉 in E′ do
9: for each f in F do
10: if 〈p, c〉 ⊂ f and t == f.t then
11: F ← F − {f}
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
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Lines 3-7 of Algorithm 5 mimic the real world situation that not every exploit will be success.
If lines 3-7 of Algorithm 5 pass the probability check, then lines 8-25 perform a last check to
judge whether the current single step attack was a success or not. The main idea is that at
the finish time f.t of current single step attack, only when node f.p is still in acquired node
set N and the belief IP and VMID in node f.c are the same as the one in GroundTruth,
this single step can be considered as success.
The algorithms in offense and defense modeling are general in terms that they can be
applied to different graph structures, such as trees, directed and undirected graphs.
4.2.3 Simulations and Results
Three high-level simulations were developed to reflect the MTD approach discussed above.
The first simulation, which we call the RMS-only Simulation, was developed to evaluate the
effectiveness of our MTD approach using an existing network simulator called NeSSi2, an
open-source, distributed and discrete-event based network security simulator with support
for complex application-level scenarios based on a simulated TCP/IP protocol stack107. In
this simulation, we assumed the attacker had full knowledge of the logical system config-
uration and only attacked through the restricted communication path. In the second and
third simulations (which are termed as broad attack simulations), while the attacker still
has full knowledge of the logical system configuration, the attacker also attempts attacks
between nodes not directly connected via enforced communication path. For these broad
attack simulations, we developed a unique event-driven simulator based on the experience of
building our first NeSSi2-based simulator. In the first two simulations, a basic MTD system
that adapted randomly at a specified time interval was implemented. However, in the last
simulation, we upgraded the MTD to an intelligent MTD system that could detect on-going
intrusions when attacks were attempted outside the RMS system.
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4.2.3.1 RMS-only Attack Simulation System
The three main components of the RMS-only testbed include the Defense component, the
Attack component and the Ground Truth component. The Defense component contains
the Configuration Manager, three physical machines (hosts) and five active VMs. These
five VMs can be assigned to any hosts to play any of the five roles: Authorizer, Planner,
TargetDB, AssetDB, or GeoDB. The Configuration Manager is the core of the Defense
component and combines the functionality of the Configuration Manager and the Adaptation
Engine from Figure 4.1. At each adaptation time interval, the Configuration Manager selects
an adaptation by creating a new task, tnew = {role, host, vmid, ip}, by (1) randomly picking
a role, (2) randomly picking a host, (3) generating a new unique VM ID, and (4) randomly
picking an unassigned IP address. The Configuration Manager finds the associated old task,
told = {role, host′, vmid′, ip′}, within its set of existing tasks, T , by matching role names. It
then informs the old task’s current host, host′, to shut down the vmid′ VM and tells the new
host, host, to start up a new VM at address ip to play the role. Finally, the Configuration
Manager updates the Ground Truth component with the current configuration.
The Attack component simulates the attacker and uses the CAG shown in Figure 4.5 to
allow it to know exactly where to attack to achieve its goal, the TargetDB. Since the only
available attack path is to penetrate from the Internet to the Authorizer, the Authorizer
to the Planner, and then from Planner to TargetDB. The edge values in the CAG denote
the attacker’s probability of intrusion success between nodes assuming both nodes remain
static. As shown, the attacker has a 40% chance of compromising the TargetDB if (1) it has
already compromised the Planner and (2) the Configuration Manager does not adapt either
the Planner or the TargetDB during the time step. In a real system, these probabilities
would be based on the current probability of unknown and known vulnerabilities of the
roles.
Each simulated attack has several steps. First the current CAG is retrieved from the
Ground Truth component. Next, after waiting ∆t time intervals (which simulates the time
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required to launch an attack), an updated version of the CAG is retrieved and used to
determine whether the attack has succeeded or not. To determine attack success, we first
generate a random value and check to see if it’s less than the CAG edge value for the current
attack. If it does, the simulation determines if the VMs on either the attacker’s current node
or the attacked node have been refreshed; if either of them has been refreshed, the attack
fails. If the attacker’s current node was the VM that was refreshed, the attacker is pushed
back to its previous node. If neither were refreshed, the attack succeeds.
The Ground Truth component maintains the current CAG. The Ground Truth compo-
nent receives adaptation information from Configuration Manager and updates the CAG as
required. It also supplies the current CAG to the Attack component when requested. The
Attack component, Defense component, and Ground Truth component are implemented as
NeSSi2 components along with the three host resources: hostA, hostB, and hostC. These
six components are loaded onto the corresponding nodes as shown in Figure 4.4.
4.2.3.2 RMS-only Attack Simulation Results
We conducted two different experiments (denoted 1a and 1b) to see how the frequency of
system adaptation would impact attack success. Within each experiment, we included a
control scenario where no adaptation occurred. Attacks were launched from the Internet
towards the TargetDB. Each attack consisted of single step attacks from the Internet to the
Authorizer, the Authorizer to the Planner, and from the Planner to the TargetDB. Once the
TargetDB was compromised, the attack was counted as successful. If a single step attack
failed, the attacker remained at its current VM and retried the attack until successful or the
MTD system refreshed the VM. In each experiment, we performed 1000 single step attacks
with a fixed ∆t between each single step attack of 100 time intervals. We ran the 1000 single
step attacks against an MTD system using 5 different time intervals (20, 50, 100, 200 and
∞) between each adaptation. Note that an ∞ adaptation interval corresponds to a static
system.
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In the experiment 1a, we assumed that in order to stop a single step attack from suc-
ceeding, either a randomly generated probability value is greater than the single step edge
associated probability in CAG, or the MTD must refresh either the node under attack or the
node from which the attack was launched during the attack (100 time intervals). Therefore,
if there was a single step attack occurring from the Planner to the TargetDB, it could be
stopped if either a randomly generated probability value is greater than 0.4, or the Plan-
ner, or TargetDB roles were refreshed by the MTD system during the attack. However,
the attacker would remain on the network unless the actual VM it was residing on was
refreshed. The green bars in Figure 4.6 show the ability of the MTD to deter a successful
attack from the Internet through the Authorizer and the Planner to the TargetDB. When
the configuration is static, the number of successful attacks (of each round of 1000 single
step attacks) is 183. Essentially, since no refreshing was going on, this is the maximum
number of successful attacks given the probabilities of single step attack success. Once the
MTD system is activated, the number of successful attacks decreases. With an adaptation
interval of 200, the number of successful attacks is reduced to 123, while an interval of 100
reduces it to 57, and an interval of 20 eliminates all successful attacks against the TargetDB.
Figure 4.6 clearly shows that as the adaptation interval is reduced, the effect of the MTD
defense is clearly visible.
In the experiment 1b, we assumed that in order to stop an attack from succeeding, the
MTD could refresh any node on the path to the node being attacked during the attack (100
time intervals). Thus in this version, if there was a single step attack occurring from the
Planner to the TargetDB, it could be stopped if either the Authorizer, Planner, or TargetDB
roles were refreshed during the attack. The gold bars in Figure 4.6 shows the ability of the
MTD to deter a completed attack from the Internet through the Authorizer and the Planner
to the TargetDB. When the configuration is static, the number of completed attacks (out of
1000) is 168, while an adaptation interval of 200 reduces that number to 107, 100 reduces
it to 41, and an adaptation interval of 20 again eliminates all successful attacks against
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Figure 4.6: Attack Success Against TargetDB (experiment 1a are shown by green while
experiment 1b are shown by gold bars)
the TargetDB. Again, Figure 4.6 clearly shows that as the adaptation interval is reduced,
the effect of the MTD defense is obvious. Experiment 1a and 1b actually represents two
different types of attacks. For 1a, the attack can be considered as worms, which can infect
machines by the program itself, while for 1b, it’s corresponding to the situation where the
attacker tries to compromise the target machine through the intermediate nodes that are
compromised as springboard.
4.2.3.3 Broad Attack Simulation System
In the broad attack simulation, the TargetDB is again the attacker’s goal. However, we
assume a more aggressive attacker who automatically attacks each available node in the
network from each compromised VM using either the RMS or by guessing an address and
port of an available node. Thus, the attacker is not limited to the RMS routes and the
attack routes form a completely bidirectionally connected graph (except for the Internet
node) as shown in Figure 4.7. However, since we assume that the RMS is designed to not
respond to standard requests for mapping information, this eliminates the attacker’s ability
to automatically map the address space.
The probabilities associated with each attack depend on the node from which the attack
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Figure 4.7: Attack Success Probabilities in Broad Attack Simulation
originates and the node being attacked. All attacks along the RMS maintain their prob-
abilities as shown in Figure 4.7. However, the dashed lines, which denote attacks outside
the RMS, have a much lower probability due to the fact that the attacker must guess the
appropriate port for the attack to even have a chance to succeed. Therefore, each dashed
line has an attack success probability of p/65, 536 where p is the probability of successfully
attacking that node through the RMS and 65536 is the port number space. Thus, all attacks
against the TargetDB from any node but the Planner would have a 0.4/65, 536 probability
of success. While this might seem like a very low probability, we believe that it is actually
the upper bound for such an attack. Since the VMs addresses are being modified over time,
the attacker will also have to guess the VM address. However, since it is hard to determine
the specific range over which the addresses be assigned, we assume the attacker can guess
that in some way (again giving the benefit to the attacker as opposed to the MTD system).
The simulation starts with the attacker at the Internet node. From the Internet node,
the attacker attempts to attack each node in the network. The success of each attack is
determined based on the probability of success of the attack and whether either the node
being attacked or the node from which the attack originated was refreshed during the attack.
If any of the attacks were successful, the newly compromised nodes are used to mount new
attacks. Again, we assume we try to attack all uncompromised nodes from each newly
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compromised node. This process continues until the TargetDB becomes compromised, or
the attacker has no compromised nodes in the network (other than the Internet).
4.2.3.4 Broad Attack Simulation Results
We conducted 1000 runs (as opposed to 1000 single step attacks used in the RMS only
experiments) of the broad attack simulation against various frequencies of MTD adaptation
to determine its impact against attack success. Each run consisted of a sequence of attacks
starting with the initial attack from the Internet to the Authorizer node and continuing
until either (1) the attacker did not have access to a compromised node in the network or
(2) the attacker successfully compromised the TargetDB. As with the previous experiments,
we included a static control scenario where no adaptation occurred. In each experiment, we
again assumed a fixed time interval ∆t = 100 between each single step attack, and we ran
the 1000 runs using 5 different adaptation intervals (20, 50, 100, 200 and ∞).
Figure 4.8 shows the ability of the MTD to deter an attack from the Internet through
the network to the TargetDB. When the configuration is static, the number of completed
attacks (out of 1000) is 588, which is close the expected 60% rate given that the probability
of compromising the Authorizer node from the Internet is 0.6. This is due to the fact
that if the attacker compromised the Authorizer node on the first attack, with a static
network, the attacker will remain on the Authorizer node attacking various network nodes
until the TargetDB is eventually compromised. We also noted that no attacks outside the
RMS actually succeeded, which was expected given the extremely low probability of success.
When we introduced our random adaptations, we found that an adaptation interval of 200
reduced the number of successful attacks against the TargetDB to 421, an adaptation interval
of 100 reduced that number to 57, an adaptation interval of 50 allowed only 24 successful
attacks, and an adaptation interval of 20 totally eliminated the ability of the attacker to
compromise the TargetDB. Once again, Figure 4.8 clearly shows that as the adaptation
interval is reduced, the effect of the MTD defense is clearly visible.
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Figure 4.8: Attack Success Against TargetDB for Broad Attack Simulation Against Simple
MTD
4.2.3.5 Intelligent MTD Simulation System
To help determine the effect of an intelligent MTD system, we again used our broad attack
simulation where the attacker attempts to compromise the TargetDB. In fact, the exper-
imental setup was the same as for the broad attack simulation presented above with one
exception. To simulate an intelligent MTD system, we assumed that whenever the attacker
attempted an attack outside the RMS, that such an attack could trigger an alert based on
some probability of detection, pd. Since the RMS is set up to allow only communication from
known nodes on exactly one port, we believe the implementation of such detectors would be
both practical and efficient. When detected, alerts would be sent directly to the Adaptation
Engine, which would request that Configuration Manager immediately refresh the VM from
which the detected attack originated. In addition, random adaptations continued to occur
at the same predetermined intervals ∆t as used in the previous experiments.
4.2.3.6 Intelligent MTD Simulation Results
The result of the intelligent MTD simulation is shown in Figure 4.9; note that the graph
is logarithmic to show proper detail. Since the attacker indiscriminately attacks all nodes
in the network without necessarily attempting to go through the RMS system, thus raising
many alerts, the success rate of the attacker is reduced significantly. At a 100% probability
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Figure 4.9: Attack Success Against TargetDB for Broad Attack Simulation Against Intelli-
gent MTD
of detection, the attacker is always immediately detected and removed from the system, thus
the attack success rate is 0%. However, even with lower pd values, the reduction in attack
success is significant. Even in the static case, with a pd of 50%, the number of successful
attacks is reduced from 616 (61.2%) to 32 (3.2%). We believe this shows the power of using
an RMS with an intelligent MTD system. The RMS minimizes the attack surface to such
a degree that attacks outside the RMS are easily detected and significantly decreases the
attacker’s likelihood of success.
When compared to the attack success rate of the simple MTD (shown by the pd = 0%
line in Figure 4.9), the intelligent MTD performs significantly better. A slight data anomaly
is evident at adaptation interval 20 when pd is 15% and 25%; there is one successful attack
while there are none when pd = 0%. With more runs, we believe the data would normalized.
This does show that while the probability is extremely low, the attacker can succeed. While
not conclusive, this clearly shows the need for further research into the costs and benefits
of intelligent MTD systems.
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4.3 Conclusion
This chapter presents a high-level moving target defense system design. Based on this
design, simulated MTD testbeds are developed with the core algorithms given. Then several
simulation experiments are conducted to study the effects of randomly adapting one aspect
of the system (role to VM mapping) in reducing attacker’s success likelihood. The results
show a reduction in attack success as the rate of adaptation increased. In addition, more
simulations also have been conducted by incorporating the knowledge of when and where to
adapt based on detecting attacks outside the RMS. Even with less than perfect detectors,
significant improvements in network security can be made.
Simulations help us understand the effect of MTDs with intuitive results, however, sim-
ulations cost time and does not mathematically reveal the hidden relationships between
key involved parameters, such as Ta and Tr. If we could have a model that captures these
relationships clearly, then based on that, more useful predictions can be made to help the
settings of various MTD system operational parameters. Targeted at this goal, the next
chapter will present an scalable analytical model.
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Chapter 5
A Scalable Analytical Model
5.1 Motivation
As shown in Chapter 4, more frequent system adaptation and more accurate intrusion
detection leads to a reduced likelihood of intrusion. This brings up the question of whether
an underlying model exists that can be used to predict the intrusion success likelihood.
Models like this will be invaluable for MTD systems because they can explicitly reveal
the key relationships between the important parameters involved and is the key to help
understanding why and how adaptation can improve security.
In this chapter, offensive and defensive modeling is used along with simulations to create
an analytical model that can answer these questions. The event-driven simulation from the
last chapter was extended and used to investigate how well the results predicted by this
proposed analytical model match the simulation results.
5.1.1 Extended Simulation
The extended event-driven simulator used in this chapter still has three components : the
Attack component, the Defense component and the GroundTruth component. In this ex-
tended event-driven simulator, a more complex scenario is considered and can be represented
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by the conservative attack graph as shown in Figure 5.1. As we see, there are eight roles and
each is assigned to a VM to play it. The intrusion path could be from as long as four hops
from the original attack node to the target node, such as the path i→ a→ c→ f → h, to
as short as only one hop, such as the path i→ a. With this setting, experiments can be set
up to evaluate the different impact of MTD adaptation to these varied length attacks.
ai c
b e
d g
f h
pcf
pdg
pac
pad
pab
pia
pce
pfh
Figure 5.1: sample conservative attack graph
The CAG is a graph, g = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of
edges in this graph. Figure 5.1 shows a sample conservative attack graph. In this CAG,
node set, V = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}, are roles that are defined in the Defender. Each role
specifies the configuration. During runtime, when a role is played by a VM instance, the
VM instance implements these specified configurations, such as a unique ID and IP address.
The configurations are not necessarily restricted to just VMID and IP address, they can
be extended to all the identified adaptable configuration units discussed in Chapter 3. The
edge set E = {i → a, a → b, a → c, a → d, c → e, c → f, d → g, f → h}, represents the
communication rules between different roles defined by the RMS and contains the success
likelihood of intrusion when both nodes connected by this edge are static. The intrusion
starts from node i where the attacker is located.
The GroundTruth component maintains a list of CAGs, G = {g1, g2, g3, . . . , gt}, where
t represents the time tick. These graphs contain key configuration information that is used
to compare the attacker’s belief to judge whether the intrusion is successful or not.
The first set of experiments, which focused on investigating the impact of pure random
adaptation to the intrusion success likelihood, is based on the broad attack simulation as
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discussed in chapter 4. This means that the Attacker owned CAG not only contains the
topology as the GroundTruth CAG defined it, but it also adds all the potential intrusion
paths from the current compromised node to all other nodes (except i). These added
paths could deviate the path enforced by RMS. However, based on the experience of the
broad attack simulation experiments conducted in Chapter 4, the probability of succesfully
following these deviated edges is extremely low and can be neglected. Thus, in this set of
experiments, we drop these deviated edges in the Attacker’s CAG, which gives the Attacker’s
CAG the same topology as the GroundTruth’s CAG. The attacker will keep attacking until
it either compromises the target or it gets totally pushed back to the original node i.
5.2 The Model
Based on the algorithms and MTD simulation presented in Chapter 4, one straightforward
way to estimate the success likelihood of an intrusion to a target node is to use Monte Carlo
simulation. One can run multiple complete attacks and count the fraction of times that the
Attacker successfully acquires the target node. However, simulation takes time, especially
when the size of CAG becomes large and the target node is deep in the system. This method
is good for oﬄine precalculation if we know all the possible network configurations, but it’s
not suitable for online estimation of success likelihood when new network configurations are
deployed.
In this section, an analytical model is presented based on the attacker and defender
modeling and can be used to estimate the intrusion success likelihood. This model not only
has important characteristics, such as efficiency and scalability, but also helps to clearly
reveal the relationships between the key parameters involved in an MTD system. Ideally,
this model will provide deeper understanding about the key MTD settings, such as diver-
sification, randomization and time as discussed in Chapter 3, that impact various types of
attacks against an MTD system. As we will see, the insights gained facilitates the develop-
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ment of a theory of MTD in Chapter 6, which will greatly benefit and guide MTD system
design and development.
5.2.1 Suitable Structure
The analytical model presented in this section is suitable for graph structures where no
cycles exist. However, for cyclic graphs, we can take advantage of techniques for unfolding
cyclical graphs into non-cyclical graphs108 that allow this analytical model to still apply.
Thus it can be easily applied to large number (hundreds or thousands) of computing nodes
that are common in today’s enterprise network environment.
5.2.2 Model Parameters
This section defines the input and output parameters as well as the assumptions that are
used in our mathematical analysis model.
Input parameters:
• A conservative attack graph
The conservative attack graph not only reflects the role relationships in the system,
but also contains security information such as vulnerability and success likelihood
for static intrusion. This graph should follow the structure discussed in the previous
section. Figure 5.1 shows the sample CAG that used to conduct the simulations. Note
that the Attacker will launch intrusion from node i, and this node doesn’t belong to
the Defender. The edges in this CAG define the communication rules between the roles
(except i → a). When the system runs, each role will be played by a VM instance.
The actual movement happens when we change the mapping between the roles and
VMs.
• Ta : attack interval
The time required for an attack along an edge from one node to an adjacent node. For
78
now, we assume each edge in a CAG has the same attack interval. This assumption
is relaxed later.
• Tr : adaptation interval
The time interval between each system adaptation. For now, we assume this value
will not change once system starts running. This assumption is relaxed later.
• n : number of active V Ms in the system
Each virtual machine is assigned to a specific role and is involved in sytem adaptation.
• k : number of VMs refreshed in each adaptation
Each adaptation randomly picks k out of n VMs for refreshing.
• pij : success likelihood of intrusion
pij reflects the success likelihood of intrusion from node i to node j assuming no
adaptation occurs on both nodes, which is a typical static situation. For example,
in Figure 5.1, pia represents the success likelihood of intrusion from node i to the
node a when neither node gets refreshed. And pab represents the success likelihood of
intrusion from node a to node b when neither a and b gets refreshed.
Output parameters:
• Psuccess x
Using the input parameters, the model predicts the success likelihood of intrusion from
node i to each other node x in the given CAG. For example, in Figure 5.1, Psuccess a
represents the success likelihood of intrusion from node i to node a. And Psuccess c
represents the success likelihood of intrusion from the node i to node c.
5.2.3 Challenges
The key challenge in defining an analytical model for MTD systems lies in its nonmono-
tonicity. In the MTD context, the typical asymmetrical time advantage of the attacker
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(such as having enough time to perform reconnaissance, choosing the best time to launch
an intrusion and maintaining obtained privileges for a long time without being discovered)
is eliminated. In an MTD system, the attacker might constantly lose any privileges gained
during an attack due to adaptation and be required to regain them to achieve the final
target. MTD systems not only add time pressure for an attacker but also can reduce the
impact of a compromise by proactively adapting to eliminate the compromise. Thus, when
facing an MTD system, an attacker will have to be diligent if they want to succeed. How-
ever, the defender’s consistent adaptation will frustrate them again and again and hopefully
force them give up. Thus, modeling a diligent attacker that works inexhaustibly until either
compromise or elimination from the system is required. Inspired by this, the analytical
model captures the extreme situation where the attacker keeps attacking the next node as
long as he/she can stay in the system. The intrusion success likelihood estimated under
such situation should capture the upper bound of Psuccess.
The first attempt to get the output parameters was to create a Markov Chain and derive
the success likelihood when this Markov Chain converges. One way to model the Markov
Chain is to consider the set of nodes currently obtained by the attacker as a Markov Chain
state. Unfortunately, it turns out that in this approach, the state space is exponential when
the CAG size becomes large due to the nonmonotonicity of MTD system. In addition,
the state transition probabilities become extremely difficult to derive (if not impossible) as
the transition possibility can be from one state that contains several compromised nodes
(for example, 5) to another state that can contain any number of compromised nodes (for
example, 0-8). An alternative approach is to consider each node as a state. The forward
transition from one state to a deeper node represents the probability that the attacker can
successfully obtain the next node. The self transition represents the probability the attacker
can stay at current node. The backward transition from a deeper node state to a previously
obtained node represents the probability the attacker gets pushed back to previous node due
to adaptation. However, this approach also turns out to be poor because as the CAG size
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becomes large, the backward transition becomes extremely hard to derive due to adaptation.
The attacker can be pushed back to any previously obtained node in one or more adaptation.
Also the nonmonotonicity totally breaks the important assumption that exists in Markov
Chain model that state Xi only depends on Xi−1 and is independent of all previous states
of Xi−1.
Nevertheless, these attempts proved to be benefitial in that they provided the key insight
that the analytical model should only consider forward and self transitions, with backward
transitions being ignored. Although we do not directly consider backward transitions, they
can be modeled indirectly by using forward and self transitions as described below.
5.2.4 An Original Model
In this section, the original analytical model is presented. As an example, we use the system
in Figure 5.1 and assume that the attacker is trying to compromise node b from node a.
The following analysis for b can be applied to node c and d similarly. The key idea of this
original model is illustrated by Figure 5.2. The values of p1, p2, p3 represent the transition
probabilities from i to a, from a to a and from a to b under the condition that adaptations
may occur during the attack.
ai b
p1
p2
p3
Figure 5.2: Original Transition Model for i→ a→ b
The forward transition probability from node i to node a is obtained as follows. The
probability that node a gets refreshed in one adaptation is k
n
, thus the probability of it not
being refreshed in one adaptation is 1− k
n
. The intrusion from i to a takes time interval Ta
and during this time period, Ta
Tr
adaptations occur. Each adaptation is independent of each
other and during Ta, the probability that node a does not get refreshed is (1− kn)
Ta
Tr . In the
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static situation, the transition probability from i to a is pia, thus the final success likelihood
from i to a (which is p1) can be derived as shown in Equation (5.1).
For the self transition from a to a, there are two possible ways for an attacker to remain
at the node a during a time period Ta. First, the attacker may fail to penetrate from
a to b with probability (1 − pab) assuming node a doesn’t get refreshed during this time
period, which gives us the probability (1 − pab) × (1 − kn)
Ta
Tr . The second probability is
that node a does not get refreshed, the attacker successfully follows the edge from a to b
with probability pab, but node b does get refreshed during time period Ta. This has the
probability of (1 − k
n
)
Ta
Tr × pab × (1 − (1 − kn)
Ta
Tr ). Summing these two possible transition
probabilities, the final probability of remaining at a is p2 as shown in Equation (5.2).
Similarly the attacker can successfully compromise b from a when both a and b do not
get refreshed and the attacker can follow the edge from a to b with probability pab. This
gives us the probability p3, which is shown in Equation (5.3).
p1 = pia × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr (5.1)
p2 = pab × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr × (1− (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr )+
(1− pab)× (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr
= (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr − pab × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.2)
p3 = pab × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.3)
Based on p1, p2, p3, the following equations define the final probability of compromising
b from i. As shown in Equation (5.2), p2 can be simplified as (1− kn)
Ta
Tr − pab × (1− kn)
2Ta
Tr .
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Thus, the final probability of compromising b can be derived as Equation (5.5):
Psuccess b = p1 × [p02 + p12 + . . .+ p∞2 ]× p3 (5.4)
= pia × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr × [p02 + p12 + . . .+ p∞2 ]
×pab × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.5)
As 0 < p2 < 1, then p
0
2 + p
1
2 + p
2
2 + . . .+ p
∞
2 =
1
1−p2 , thus:
Psuccess b = pia × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr × 1
1− p2 × pab × (1−
k
n
)
2Ta
Tr
=
1
1− p2 × pia × pab × (1−
k
n
)
3Ta
Tr (5.6)
This derivation actually shows that the probability of compromising the ultimate target
node is the summation of the probabilities associated with all possible intrusion paths the
attacker could take that lead to the target. This illustrates the key idea of the analytical
model. As long as the attacker can stay on a system node, new attacks will be launched as
long as the target has not been obtained.
For example, consider a deeper penetration path, such as attempting to compromise node
h from i in Figure 5.1. The attacker might first compromise a, then c and later f , but then
lose the privilege of f . In this situation, as the attacker still has c, thus they must restart from
c again to regain f . Now assume that the attacker successfully obtains f again and then h. In
this case, the overall intrusion path is i→ a→ c→ f → c→ f → h, where f → c actually
represents a backward transition. However, as discussed, the analysis model does not model
backward transition directly but uses forward and self transitions to indirectly model it.
Thus, the overall intrusion path can be indirectly captured as i→ a→ c→ c→ c→ f → h.
The key point here is that in the process of a complete attack to target node h, the
attacker can gain and loose intermediate nodes such as c and f multiple times. However,
how often and with what probability the attacker moves forward and gets pushed back is
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not important any more, as it can be either pushed back to c from f or pushed back directly
to a from f . As long as the attacker can stay at a or c or f , he/she will keep attacking the
next node, trying to get to h. Obviously, if the attacker loses access to a, c and f , a whole
new attack will need to be started. This way, one can avoid modeling the huge number
of backward transition probabilities when CAG size becomes large and focus only on the
analysis of forward and self transitions.
To verify whether this analytical model can be used to estimate the success likelihood,
the values predicted by this model are compared to the success likelihood calculated through
Monte Carlo simulations. The CAG used in these experiments is as shown in Figure 5.1.
In these experiments, the attack interval Ta is set as 100, the adaptation interval Tr has
17 different values, they are 20, 30, 50, 70, 80, 90, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800,
1,200,000. In these values, 1,200,000 represents the static situation where no adaptation
occurs. In addition, every edge x→ y is assumed to be associated with the static transition
probability pxy = 0.6. In each Tr setting, 20,000 complete attacks have been executed. In
these experiments, the attacker tried to compromise b, e, g and h. For example, in each
complete attack where the attacker tried to compromise b, the attacker tried all edges in
the CAG until either the attacker obtained b or got totally pushed back to i. In each of
the 20,000 complete attacks attempting to compromising b under a specific Ta and Tr, the
success likelihood of compromising b can be calculated by dividing 20,000 by the number of
times that b is successfully compromised. Similarly, experimental results can also be used
to calculate the success likelihood of compromising e, g and h.
Figure 5.3 shows the comparison between the model probabilities calculated by Equa-
tion (5.5) and the success likelihood values obtained from the experiments.
As Figure 5.3 shows, the model matches the trend of the experimental results. However,
the left part of the red curve that represents the model’s prediction overestimates the results
from the Monte Carlo simulations. The first row of Table 5.1 shows that the maximum
deviation between the model and experiments is about 8% and standard deviation between
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Figure 5.3: Model vs Experiment – Compromise b
the model and experiments is around 4.6%.
To further investigate this, consider node e (Figure 5.1) as the target. Again, all the
backward transitions are discarded and only forward and self transitions are considered as
shown in Figure 5.4. The following analysis also applies to node f and g. Notice this time,
p1 is still the same, but p2 represents the self transition probability from a to a when trying
to compromise c instead of b. Likewise, p3 represents the forward transition from a to c,
instead of a to b.
Table 5.1: Original Model versus Experiment
max deviation variance std deviation
b 0.082141 0.0021680 0.046562
e 0.074130 0.0015741 0.039675
g 0.073930 0.0016396 0.040493
h 0.065965 0.0016256 0.040319
The probabilities p4 and p5 represent the transition probabilities from c→ c and c→ e
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Figure 5.4: Original Transition Model for i→ a→ c→ e
and can be calculated as follows:
p2 = pac × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr × (1− (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr )+
(1− pac)× (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr
= (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr − pab × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.7)
p3 = pac × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.8)
p4 = pce × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr × (1− (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr )+
(1− pce)× (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr (5.9)
= (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr − pce × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.10)
p5 = pce × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.11)
Thus, the final success likelihood of compromising e is shown in Equation 5.12,
Psuccess e = pia × (1− k
n
)
Ta
Tr × [p02 + p12 + . . .+ p∞2 ]
×pac × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr × [p04 + p14 + p24 . . .+ p∞4 ]
×pce × (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.12)
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which can be simplified to:
Psuccess e =
1
1− p2 ×
1
1− p4
×pia × pac × pce × (1− k
n
)
5Ta
Tr (5.13)
Figure 5.5a shows the comparison between the probability values calculated through
Equation 5.13 and the values computed from experiment results. As shown, the two curves
doesn’t match exactly. The second row of Table 5.1 shows that for node e, the model
predicted results have a maximum deviation around 7.4% and a standard deviation around
4% as compared to the Monte Carlo simulation results. A careful comparison shows us
that the model underestimates the experimental results when Tr > Ta, but overestimates
the experimental results when Tr < Ta. This observation reveals a missing aspect of this
original model. When we derive the probability formula for each transition, the original
model tries to model each transition edge as a single step attack with time interval Ta.
However, when Ta < Tr, a diligent attacker can actually launch multiple single step intrusion
attempts in time period Tr if the first one fails, thus increasing the possibility of success.
Also when Ta > Tr the attacker could be kicked out without even being able to finish a
single step attack, thus reducing the probability of success. However, the original model
does not consider this and treats it as a single step intrusion, which is why it overestimates
the success likelihood when Ta > Tr. Based on this analysis, the next section presents
an improved model that takes into consideration these missing aspects and shows that it
improves the accuracy of the analytical model.
5.2.5 An Improved Model
In this section, an improved model is proposed to better estimate the success likelihood of
compromising each node. As analyzed above, the main problem with the original model
is that when Tr becomes larger than Ta, we ignore the fact that the attacker can actually
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(b) Improved Model vs Experiment
Figure 5.5: Comparison of Compromise e
launch multiple attacks during Tr. When Tr becomes smaller than Ta we ignore the fact that
the attacker can be kicked out and can not spend the whole Ta attack interval. The model
proposed in this section is enhanced to compensate for these situations in both forward and
self transitions.
Using Figure 5.4 as an example, the static probability associated with the edge from a
to c is not pac any more, but 1 − (1 − pac)
Tr
Ta . In time period Tr, attacker can launch
Tr
Ta
intrusions. The probability that all these attacks are fail is (1− pac)
Tr
Ta , thus the probability
that the attacker can succeed in this attack is 1 − (1 − pac)
Tr
Ta . In the improved model,
this probability is used to replace all the pac probabilities in the original model. Similarly,
1− (1− pce)
Tr
Ta is used to replace all the pce probabilities in the original model.
Thus the improved transition model for i→ a→ c→ e is shown in Figure 5.6 where p′1,
p′2, p
′
3, p
′
4 and p
′
5 represent the new transition probability.
ai ec
p′5p
′
1
p′2
p′3
p′4
Figure 5.6: Improved Transition Model for i→ a→ c→ e
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Table 5.2: Improved Model versus Experiment
max deviation variance std deviation
b 0.039401 5.6117e-04 0.023689
e 0.025617 1.8209e-04 0.013494
g 0.025922 1.7676e-04 0.013295
h 0.027851 1.5973e-04 0.012639
p′1 = pia × (1−
k
n
)
Ta
Tr (5.14)
p′2 = (1−
k
n
)
Ta
Tr − (1− (1− pac)
Tr
Ta )× (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.15)
p′3 = (1− (1− pac)
Tr
Ta )× (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.16)
p′4 = (1−
k
n
)
Ta
Tr − (1− (1− pce)
Tr
Ta )× (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.17)
p′5 = (1− (1− pce)
Tr
Ta )× (1− k
n
)
2Ta
Tr (5.18)
Equation 5.19 gives the final improved model for calculating the probability of compro-
mising e in the CAG of Figure 5.1. The derivation process is similar as the one used in
Equation (5.12). The formula used to compute the success likelihood of compromising f
and g can be derived similarly as e.
Psuccsess e =
1
1− p′2
× 1
1− p′4
× pia × (1− (1− pac)
Tr
Ta )×
(1− (1− pce)
Tr
Ta )× (1− k
n
)
5Ta
Tr (5.19)
Figure 5.5b shows the comparison between the probability values calculated from Equa-
tion 5.19 and the experimental results. As we can see, the improved model now has a better
match with the simulation results than the original model. The second row of Table 5.2
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also clearly indicates that the maximum deviation has been reduced from 7.4% to 2.56%
and the standard deviation has been reduced from 0.039675 to 0.013494.
Figure 5.7 shows the comparison of original model versus the experiments as well as a
comparison of the improved model versus the experiments when the target node is b, g and
h. All the figures and statistical data collected in Table 5.2 demonstrates that the improved
model more closely matches the Monte Carlo simulation results.
Another finding is that as the target hides deeper, the success likelihood becomes smaller.
For example, in Figure 5.7, at adaptation interval Tr = 100, the success ratio for compro-
mising b is around 0.4, for compromising g is reduced to around 0.3, and for h is further
decreased to around 0.27.
5.2.6 General Form
In the previous section, a model is derived based on the assumption that the attack interval
Ta associated with each edge is the same. This assumption directly follows the assumption
made in the simulator that all VMs assigned to play the given role has the same configuration
except ID and IP address. However, in reality, different VM will be assigned to play different
roles and will have different configuration. Thus, the time spend on compromising different
nodes will usually not the same.
Based on the knowledge of our previous analysis and the simulation results, this section
proposes a new model to relax this assumption. The following defines several notations used
in the model.
• i – the node where the attacker launches the intrusion.
• t – the target node.
• x→ y – an edge from node x to y.
• i→ a→ b→ . . .→ t –the path the attacker must follow to compromise t.
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Figure 5.7: Model Comparisons
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• Vp – nodes in the intrusion path.
• Ep – edges in the intrusion path.
• prxy – forward transition probability of x→ y where adaptation might occur.
• psxy – static transition probability from x to y.
• T xya – attack time interval associated with edge x→ y.
• Tr – adaptation time interval.
The improved model with the time assumption relaxed can be summarized as follows
where Equation (5.20) represents the forward transition probability, Equation (5.21) repre-
sents the self transition probability and Equation (5.22) represents the more success likeli-
hood from i to target t.
prxy =

psxy × (1− kn)
T
xy
a
Tr if x = i;x, y ∈ Vp;x→ y ∈ Ep
(1− (1− psxy)
Tr
T
xy
a )× (1− k
n
)
2T
xy
a
Tr if x 6= i;x, y ∈ Vp;x→ y ∈ Ep
(5.20)
prxx = (1−
k
n
)
T
xy
a
Tr − (1− (1− psxy)
Tr
T
xy
a )× (1− k
n
)
2T
xy
a
Tr if x 6= i;x→ y ∈ Ep (5.21)
Psuccesss t =
∏
x∈Vp
x 6=i,t
1
1− prxx
×
∏
x→y∈Ep
prxy
=
∏
x∈Vp
x 6=i,t
1
1− prxx
×
∏
x→y∈Ep
x6=i
(1− (1− psxy)
Tr
T
xy
a )× psiy × (1−
k
n
)
Tixa +
∑
x→y∈Ep
x 6=i
2T
xy
a
Tr (5.22)
Here, Ta has been replaced with T
xy
a to relax the assumption that all values of Ta are
identical. Thus, attack time associated with different edge could be different. Another
92
important assumption is that all VMs assigned to play the given role has the same configu-
ration as well as a vulnerability. Here this assumption is relaxed such that VMs assigned to
play different role could have different configuration, but all VMs assigned to play the same
role still have same configuration, this is captured by psxy. However, in reality, MTD could
adopt different movement mechanisms, thus VMs assigned to play the same role would have
different configuration states with different – or no – vulnerabilities.
Relaxing this limitation requires the MTD theory in Chapter 6 that helps understanding
the interactions between attacker and MTD system. In fact, as will see in the Cyber Attack
Theory, T xya and P
s
xy are important characteristics of an attack instance. Definitions in
MTD System Theory, such as diversification and randomization, also play a key role as they
formally describe the configuration state space and the probability that each configuration
state shows up. Clearly, whether a vulnerability exists or not is closely related with a
configuration state. We will see in Chapter 6 that once the theory is in place, solve this
limitation is straightforward.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, an efficient and scalable analytical model that can be used to analyze and
estimate the success likelihood of multi-hop remote attacks in an MTD context has been pre-
sented. This chapter motivates the need for an analytical model and describes the challenges
of such a model. By focusing on forward and self transitions (thus indirectly capturing back-
ward transitions), an analytical model suitable for non-cyclic network topology structures
is presented.
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Chapter 6
A Theoretical Framework for Moving
Target Defense
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
6.1 Overview
Security is a critical concern that exists in computer systems as well as in the physical world.
Chapter 3 presented a taxonomy of the state-of-the-art moving target defense research in
a cyber-security context. However, as with security in general, many intuitive examples of
MTDs are found in physical world as well.
Example 6.1. In an air battle, two opposing aircraft often end up in a one-on-one situation,
which is typically called a dogfight. In dogfights, one aircraft is the attacker while the other
becomes the defender. It is up to the pilot of the defending aircraft to maneuver his or her
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aircraft to avoid being shot down by the attacker. In this way, a dogfight is similar to cyber-
security.
In a dogfight, performing tactical maneuvers gives the defender a greater chance to
avoid being shot down as opposed to simply doing nothing. If we think of the defender as
an MTD system, the target is the defender that is trying to maneuver the aircraft to dodge
an incoming missile. In this case, the pilot may maneuver in three dimensional physical
space using tactics of defensive aircraft maneuvers (such as a high yo-yo defense, unloaded
extension, high-g barrel roll, defensive spiral, etc.) in order to change the state of the two
aircraft (location, speed, yaw, pitch, roll, etc.) while not exceeding the physical limitations
of the pilot.
This movement can increase the attacker’s uncertainty regarding the defender’s location
and direction. The pilot chooses the time to trigger a maneuver either proactively, based
on pilot’s training and intuition, or reactivity after detecting an incoming missile. Other
examples in the physical world are animals running fast and zig-zagging to avoid being shot
by a hunter or soldiers moving quickly to find the cover to evade gunfire. These are simple
yet intuitive real world examples where targets use movement to protect themselves. More
complex examples include transportation surveillance, airport security patrolling, etc.
Example 6.2. The ARMOR system109,110,111 (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over
Routes) has been successfully deployed at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) since
2007. ARMOR uses a game-theoretic approach to randomly place vehicle checkpoints on
roads entering airport terminals and to schedule canine patrol routes inside terminals for
sniffing for bombs. Both applications are constrained by available resources such as police
units, canine units and inspection devices, etc. The challenge is to optimally allocate lim-
ited resources to increase the effectiveness of airport security, all while avoiding patterns
that may be discovered by persons intent on evading security. ARMOR considers different
characteristics of airport terminals such as physical size, passenger loads, flight schedules in
the risk assessment of the eight LAX terminals. ARMOR models different types of attacks
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using different payoff functions and optimizes the allocation of limited security resources
using a Bayesian Stackelberg game solver112.
In this example, ARMOR can be viewed as using an real-world MTD approach to increase
security by randomizing the allocation of limited defensive resources. The adaptable aspects
are the resources, such as police units and canine units, while the tactic used is a Bayesian
Stackelberg game solver that determine the optimal movement and time to trigger that
movement. Here the movement is not directly applied to the potential targets themselves
(e.g., flights), but instead is applied to defensive elements of the system to obscure them
from potential attackers. By doing so, it increases the difficulty of locating and successfully
compromising the targets by increasing the possibility of detection along the routes required
to reach the targets.
From these real world examples, we see that MTD systems can increase the security
through movement by either increasing the attacker’s uncertainty of locating the target
or by increasing the attacker’s probability of detection along the intrusion path, all while
minimizing the cost to normal system operations. The movement does not necessarily need
to be directly applied to the target, but also can be applied to the path that leads to the
target. These ideas apply to cyber world as well. In either case, solving these problems
using an MTD approach requires us to first identify the attack type to defeat, and then
consider a suitable combination of adaptable aspects with strategies and tactics.
6.1.1 General MTD Adaptation Effect
Figure 6.1 illustrates the effect of adaptation on the attacker. At time t1, an adaptation just
finishes and the system has configuration, sg. Suppose now an attacker starts to investi-
gate the system configuration, as time elapses, the attacker knows more information about
the system, thus the system configuration uncertainty for attaker decreases. As shown at
time, t2, the exploration space shrinks and the attacker gets closer to reaching the potential
vulnerability. However, if at t2 another adaptation launches and produces a new configu-
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Figure 6.1: Adapatation Effect Intuition – Attacker Uncertainty
ration, s′g, which should invalidate the attacker’s previous penetration effort and pull the
configuration uncertainty level back.
6.1.2 General MTD process
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Implement 
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Figure 6.2: Overview of MTD process
The general workflow of an MTD system is shown in Figure 6.2. An MTD is first de-
signed, implemented and deployed in its initial configuration. Once the system is executing,
an MTD system will choose one or more adaptations to apply to its configuration. As dis-
cussed above, the adaptation can be triggered either proactively based on fixed or random
time point or reactively by environment information, such as IDS alerts or operation failures.
All operational systems have a set of constraints and resource limitations as demonstrated
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in Example 6.2. The configuration resulting from the chosen adaptation must be checked
against these constraints to ensure that the new configuration will be valid. If it is not valid,
a new adaptation will have to be chosen. Once an adaptation has passed the validity test,
it can be implemented. As will be discussed later, there are several key problems that must
be solved in order to make an MTD system work.
6.1.3 Motivation for an MTD Theory
In the scientific world, a theory is generally something that defines a set of concepts, their
relationships and principles to help shape the view of a field and clarify the essential prob-
lems. Theories are typically used to understand and explain things we observe and to predict
things that have not been proven.
The past few years has seen a growing need within the research community to develop
a science of security113. The motivation is to develop a systematic body of knowledge with
strong theoretical and empirical underpinnings to inform the engineering of systems that
can better resist known and unanticipated attack types. A theory for moving target defense
will not only create a set of common and well defined terms, but also provide a framework
and systematic way to think and analyze MTD problems and solutions.
Concretely, the theory should define key concepts such as adaptation, diversification,
randomization, attack surface, and exploration space in a way that is both formal and
appropriate to the dynamic nature of MTD system. To support the understanding and
analysis of the interaction between MTD systems and the attacks to thwart, the theory
should also define key concepts that support precise discussion of attacker knowledge, attack
types, and attack instances. Because the implementation of an effective MTD mechanism
only makes sense in the context of a specific threat model114,115.
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6.1.3.1 Motivation Questions to be answered in General
Pragmatically, the theory should be practical enough to inform design decisions during the
design of MTD systems and should be able to answer general questions like these:
• Given an attack type or a sequence of attack types, what can an MTD system do to
defeat it?
• Given an attack type and the MTD system setting, how to analyze whether this MTD
system is potentially effective to thwart this given attack type?
• What are the conditions of, or what constitutes the success likelihood of intrusion
under MTD?
• How does MTD impact attacker’s intrusion?
6.1.3.2 Motivation Questions to be answered in Concrete Scenario
Ideally, the theory should also be straightforward enough to allow MTD system designers
to decide how to use existing configuration choices and diversification to increase security.
Given a concrete MTD system, it should allow MTD designers to analyze the effectiveness of
adapting various combinations of configuration aspects to thwart different types of attacks.
More specifically, it should be able to answer these questions in a concrete MTD system.
• If a given MTD system is potentially effective to thwart an attack type, how can we
quantify this effectiveness in terms of success likelihood of intrusion?
• How are these important parameters, such as Ta, Pstatic, adaptation interval, diversi-
fication, randomization and configuration space, interrelated and impact the success
likelihood of intrusion?
• Fixing Ta, Pstatic, can we change MTD settings, such as adaptation interval, configu-
ration space, etc to see the effectiveness of MTD with different settings?
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• Fixing MTD settings, can we tweak Ta, Pstatic to see when this setting will be effective
or ineffective?
6.1.4 Approach
MTD Systems 
Theory
Attacker 
Theory
MTD Theory
Figure 6.3: MTD Theory Overview
The high level approach to developing a theory for MTD is shown in Figure 6.3. The
first step is to develop a theory of MTD Systems. This theory focuses only on the system
itself and how it adapts over time to achieve its overall goals. The second step is to develop
an Attacker Theory, which will describe an attacker’s goals and actions they can take to
reach their goals. The final step will be to combine the two into an overall MTD Theory.
The objective of MTD Theory will be to define how elements of the MTD and Attacker
theories interact. This is especially important in being able to understand the true effect of
an MTD system as its effectiveness only makes sense in light of actions from an attacker for
a specific type of attack.
6.1.5 Scenarios
This section presents two scenarios that will be used through out. Examples provided below
to help understand definitions and theorems will be based on these two scenarios.
6.1.5.1 K-state Web Authentication
Kansas State University’s web authentication requires each student to register an ID and
password to login to use the university’s online service and resources. Every six month each
student is asked to update their password to a different one to keep their account active.
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6.1.5.2 Mission Planning System
Another scenario is a simple military mission planning system. An overview of this system
is shown in Figure 6.4. An authorized user can remotely access the mission planner to
construct a specific mission. Through the Planner (a web server), which provides the web
UI, authorized actions such as adding new military strategy, establishing plans or tactics,
allocating owned resources, etc. could be performed. To support these actions, related
information are stored in three different databases. An asset database provides the avail-
able resources information such as tanks, troops, aircraft, etc. A geographical database
provides map and geographical information such as coordinates, satellite images, etc. A
target database stores information about targets of interest such as name, location, fea-
tures, etc. Such distributed information storage also enhances security in that one database
compromise does not lose all sensitive data.
In this system, the data stored in the three databases – the AssetDB, the GeoDB and
the TargetDB are most likely targets of interest for a serious attacker.
Planner
TargetDB
AssetDB
GeoDB
FirewallUsers
Figure 6.4: Mission Planning Scenario
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6.2 MTD System Theory
This section defines the key concepts required to formally talk about MTD systems and
their basic properties. The focus is on formally defining an MTD system, although more
definitions about adaptation, configuration space, diversification, and randomization in light
of the MTD system definition are given as well. Since the essence of an MTD system is
adapting the configuration of the system over time, this section starts by defining what a
configurable system is, borrowing key terms and concepts from configuration management
theory116.
6.2.1 Configurable System
When talking about configuring a system, we generally refer to the physical devices that
are part of a system, the software installed on those devices, and the settings of that soft-
ware. In the context of MTD, these configuration elements are defined as a configuration
parameter (borrowing from116) that can take on various values to specify the specifics of the
configuration.
6.2.1.1 Configuration Parameter
The definition of a configurable system starts from defining a configuration parameter as a
variable with an associated type.
Definition 6.1. A configuration parameter, pi, is a unit of configuration information that
can take on a value based on its type.
Definition 6.2. A configuration parameter type, Π, is a label identifiable with the domain of
possible values that the parameter can assume116. The associated domain of a configuration
parameter pii is denoted as Πi.
In essence, a configuration parameter can be viewed as a variable to which we can assign
values. These values can be used to describe a piece of hardware, the software installed on
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that hardware, or the settings of the software itself, etc. Examples of configuration units
can be a specific physical or virtual machine host, the amount of memory installed, the
speed of the processor, the operating system installed, the IP address of the host, the ports
that are open, the password of a user account, etc. While some configuration parameters
are basically fixed (e.g., the size of memory in a physical host), MTD systems obviously are
more interested in the configuration parameters that can be modified during execution (the
size of memory in a virtual host or the IP address of a host). The configuration parameter
that can be modified by MTD system is referred to as an adaptable configuration unit.
To capture the configuration of an entire system or a complex component of that system,
we introduce the notion of a composite configuration parameters.
Definition 6.3. A composite configuration parameter, pi, is a configuration parameter that
is composed of a set of sub configuration parameters, pi = 〈pi1, pi2, . . . , pin〉. The domain
of a composite configuration parameter pi is derived from the sub configuration parameter
domains, Π = Π1 × Π2 × . . .× Πn.
Thus, a configuration unit can be either large or small. In the K-State authentica-
tion scenario, a configuration parameter, piaccount can be used to capture a student’s K-
State account. This parameter, piaccount, can be further divide to a set of sub config-
uration parameters, 〈pieid, pipassword〉. For the mission planning scenario, one can use a
composite configuration parameter piplanner to describe planner’s corresponding (virtual)
machine’s overall configuration. Appropriate sub configuration parameters could include
〈pimemory size, pidisk size, picpu type, pioperating system, piweb application server, piservice implementation,
piip address, piservice port〉. Here sub configuration parameter could be a composite configura-
tion parameter too. For example, pioperating system, piweb application server, piservice implementation are
possible composite configuration parameters.
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6.2.1.2 Configuration State
The process of reconfiguration, which is at the heart of MTD systems, is the process of
moving from one configuration to another. To capture the notion of a specific configuration,
a configuration state is introduced. Typically, a configuration state, by default, refers to the
overall configuration of a system; however, it can also be used to refer part of that system
as well.
Definition 6.4. A configuration state, s, is a unique assignment of value(s) from Π to a
configuration parameter pi. An assignment of some value z in Π to pi is denoted as pi ← z. If
pi is a composite configuration parameter and pi = 〈pi1, pi2, . . . , pin〉, then s is a configuration
state of pi if s = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉 where ∀i ∈ [1, n], si ∈ Πi ∧ pii ← si.
Based on this, the current configuration of a system becomes clear. Using the exam-
ple of the K-State account configuration parameter above, a tuple that combines a stu-
dent’s eid and password such as 〈john,Abc1234〉 is a configuration state of piaccount. An
assignment of valid values to each of the sub configuration parameters of piplanner, for
instance, 〈pimemory size = 4GB, pidisk size = 100GB, picpu type = intel i7, pioperating system =
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 64bit, piweb application server = apache, piservice implementation = PHP,
piip address = 192.168.10.18, piservice port = 80〉 is an example configuration state of piplanner.
Notice here, pioperating system, piweb applicationserver, piservice implementation are composite parame-
ters, and the assigned value for these composite parameters can be understood as the tag or
key of a concrete state. For example, by assign pioperating system = Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 64bit
, then use this tag the program will be able to find the linked OS installation templates.
6.2.1.3 Action
To change one configuration into another configuration requires actions to be taken on
the part of the system administrator. Traditionally, these actions are performed manually.
Although recently new configuration management tools have automated much of the tedious
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nature of these actions, however, ultimate control of what to change still resides with the
administrators.
Definition 6.5. A configuration action, α, is an operation that can modify a value of an
existing configuration parameter, pi, or add/delete a configuration sub parameter from a
composite configuration parameter. When adding a sub parameter, we assume the param-
eter is initialized with a valid value. An action can also be composed of a sequence of sub
configuration actions.
Operations such as powering machines on and off, assigning IP addresses, installing
Operating systems, deploying services, etc. are all typical actions. In addition, operations
such as adding/removing computers to a system, adding/removing deployed services to a
computer, etc. are also actions.
6.2.1.4 Configurable System
The configuration of a system is defined as a set of configuration parameters that can be
modified by a set of configuration actions. By combining these concepts with configuration
states, configurable systems can be defined, upon which the definition of an MTD system is
built.
Definition 6.6. A configurable system is a labeled transition system, Γ = (S,Λ, τ), where
S = {s1, s2, . . .} is a finite or recursively enumerable set of configuration states the system
can be in, Λ = {α1, α2, . . .} is a finite or recursively enumerable set of actions, and τ :
S × Λ→ S is the state transition function.
This configurable system definition is based on labeled transition systems as the essence
of configuration management is change. Here the set of allowable changes is captured in the
state transition function, τ .
For the K-State account scenario, the account authentication can be viewed as a con-
figurable system. Usually, the eid is not changed once it is set, so an eid generally has one
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state. For passwords, however, state, S, is the set of all possible combinations of characters
that a user with eid could choose. Actions consists of editing the account information to
set the password. Transition functions capture the transition from old password to a new
password after the action applied.
The airbattle example can also be considered a configurable system where the state, S,
is the physical locations of the aircraft, actions are the manuevers that the plane could take,
and the state transition function captures the location transition from old position to new
based on the action performed. Similarly, the mission planning scenario can also be thought
as a configurable system. More details that show how this theory maps to the mission
planning scenario will be provided in the validation section after Cyber Attack Theory and
MTD Theory is developed.
Until now, the notion of configuration consistency and validity have been ignored. These
are addressed in the next section using system goals and constraints.
6.2.2 System Goals
The heart of the MTD paradigm is adapting the system to keep an attacker from taking the
time required to successfully attack and compromise the system. However, major problems
associated with this constant adaptation is that this could keep the system from achieving
its intended mission. It has recently been recognized by several in the adaptive systems
community that the key to effective adaptive systems is explicitly modeling the requirements
or objectives of the system117,118. Understanding the objectives of the system is critical in
making the determination of what is a valid adaptation and what will simply lead to chaos.
Thus, the notion of system goals is introduced here, which will be used later to define the
notion of valid adaptations.
Definition 6.7. A goal, g, captures an intended function of a computer system. There are
two types of goals of interest: operational goals and security goals. Each system has a set
of goals, G that is captured by a tuple 〈Go, Gs〉, where Go = {go1, go2, . . . goj} represents the
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operational goals of the system and Gs = {gs1, gs2, . . . . . . gsk} represents the security goals of
the system.
Operational goals capture the mission the system was built to support. An operational
goal is a high-level business goal (e.g., K-State login system, blog website, mission planning
website, etc.) whose purpose is to organize the IT elements of the system around business
objectives. The operational goals are guideposts used to ensure that any adaptations to the
system configuration still support the overall mission. Security Goals, on the other hand,
define the critical parts of the system that should be protected. If an mission plan website
relies on a database of commander’s information, then protecting that database becomes an
important security goal.
While a system can be in a variety of configuration states, only some of those states
actually provide the capabilities required to achieve the operational goals of the system.
For instance, a mission planning system may be in a configuration that does not include a
database server that stores commander’s information (thus ensuring the security goal not
to allow the database to be compromised). However, this configuration is not really helpful
since one of the key goals of the system is to allow commanders to log in and plan missions
through the website. Therefore, a relation needs to be defined between configurations of the
system and the goals that those configurations achieve. This relation is used later to ensure
that as system adapts, it is capable of achieving the overall operational goals.
Definition 6.8. If a goal, g, can be realized in a system in configuration state, s, we say
that s achieves g and define a relation achieves: G × S to capture this relationship. If
∀g ∈ G, 〈s, g〉 ∈ achieves, we say s achieves a set of goals, G, denoted as s ` G.
As discussed in Section 6.1.4, the objective is to define an Cyber Attack Theory as well
as an MTD Systems Theory and then show they are related. Attacker is envisioned to have
their own set of goals and thus it seems obvious that when the goals of the attacker and the
MTD system conflict, then the MTD system must be able to take steps to counterattack
that attack.
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6.2.3 System Policies
To ensure the parts of a system can function together efficiently and effectively, every system
has a set of policies that define how the system can and cannot be structured. For example,
the K-state authentication scenario requires students to change their password every 180
days. To set up a new one, the password chosen needs to fullfil some requirements such
as: 10-30 characters (5 must be different), contains characters from 3 of these categories:
uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers and special characters. These are all typcial
policy examples that one would encounter.
Usually, these policies are implicit, which leads to significant problems when changes
are made to the system without understanding all the pertinent policies. Ideally, an MTD
system will require system designers to explicitly state these policies so that the MTD system
can reason over them before making adaptions.
Definition 6.9. A policy, p, defines a restriction on the configuration state of a system.
Each system has a finite or recursively enumerable set of policies, P = {p1, p2, . . . pl}. The
aggregated restrictions of system policies, P , on system configuration states, S, define a
relation satisfies: S × P . We say a state, s, satisfies a set of policies, P , denoted as s  P ,
if ∀p ∈ P, 〈s, p〉 ∈ satisfies.
If a configuration policy is violated, the system will not operate as intended. Thus, as the
system adapts, it is critical that it does not fall into an inconsistent state where it violates
any policies. Next we define a consistent configuration state.
Definition 6.10. A system is said to be in a consistent state, s, if s  P , where P
represents the current system policies. The set of all consistent states of a system is denoted
as Sc = {s|∀s ∈ S∧s  P}. Any state that is not a consistent state is an inconsistent state.
While being in a consistent state is necessary, the system still needs to ensure it is in a
state so that it can achieve its intended goals. Thus we use the definition of achieves from
Definition 6.8 to define a valid state.
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Definition 6.11. A valid state s is a consistent state that is capable of achieving all of the
existing system operational goals, G, i.e., s ` G. We define the set of all valid states of a
given system, Sv, as Sv = {s|∀s ∈ S, s  P ∧ s ` G}.
Knowing a state is consistent and valid is very useful. However, when dealing with an
entire system, MTD needs to be able to reason about the configurations that are really of
interest – those that define a complete system for the purposes of achieving the operational
goals of the system. Thus, we define a complete configuration as one that has all the
configuration parameters required to configure a system that is actually capable of achieving
the goals of the system.
Definition 6.12. A complete configuration is a configuration parameter whose value can
be a valid state. Formally, this is stated as ∃s ∈ Sv, pi ← s.
Since a complete configuration might also contain unnecessary configuration parameters,
to restrict it to the configuration information that contains only necessary parameters to
achieve the overall goals of the system, we define a minimum complete configuration. Again,
it should be noted that this is a minimum complete configuration whose valid states can
achieve the system goals G.
Definition 6.13. A minimum complete configuration is a complete configuration parameter
that has the minimal required parameters. Formally, this is stated as @pii ∈ pi, such that
∃s ∈ Sv, pi − {pii} ← s.
6.2.4 Adaptation
While actions have been defined above as operations that take a system from one configu-
ration state to another, what MTD is really interested in is transforming a system from one
configuration state to a valid configuration state. This will be the basis of defining the kind
of MTD systems of interest and will be discussed further in the next section. To handle this
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specific type of transformation operation, an adaptation is now defined as a restriction on
the set of actions to capture this.
Definition 6.14. An adaptation is a sequence of actions A = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} that trans-
forms a system from a state, s, to a valid state, sv.
Now we have all the definitions to define an MTD system, which is done in the next
section.
6.2.5 MTD System
An MTD system is a configurable system that can adapt its configuration during execution.
As discussed in the previous section, an MTD system should also be able to configure itself
so that it is always in a consistent state that can achieve the overall goals of the system.
Definition 6.15. A moving target defense (MTD) system, Σ, is a tuple 〈Γ, G, P 〉, where
Γ is a configurable system, G is the set of goals which includes both operational goals and
security goals and P is the set of polices.
Notice that although S in Γ will be restricted to Sv by G and P , an MTD system is
still defined using S, the set of all configuration states of Σ, instead of Sv. The reason is
that an MTD system does not always have to be in a valid state. Operational failures or
system errors could lead the MTD system to an invalid state. However, as defined above,
when applying an adaptation to MTD system, it needs to result in a valid state.
In order to reason and discuss the configuration of an MTD system, one must be able to
refer to the current configuration of a system at any given point in time. Since it is necessary
to reason about the entire configuration, the configuration must be complete as defined in
Definition 6.12. Since no extraneous configuration information should be included, it must
be minimum as defined in Definition 6.13. As configuration actions may add or remove
configuration parameters from a composite configuration parameter, the configuration state
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of an MTD system can change in terms of the configuration parameters as well as their
values. The current configuration of an MTD system is defined as its configuration state.
Definition 6.16. At any point in time, each MTD system, Σ, has a minimum complete con-
figuration denoted Σpi. Σpi also has a unique value, s ∈ S, which is called the configuration
state of Σ.
6.2.6 Configuration Space
The set of all valid states, Sv, captures the overall configuration space of an MTD system’s
valid configuration. This can also be derived from the domain of Σpi, which has been defined
in Definition 6.3.
Definition 6.17. The configuration space of an MTD system, Σ, with configuration pa-
rameter Σpi is the domain of Σpi, which is Sv. Sv can be computed as Sv =
∏
Πi, where the
cross product operation should obey constraints such that ∀s ∈ Sv, s  P ∧ s ` G.
As defined above, Sv can be computed as the cross product from Πi of each configuration
parameter, pii, where the cross product operation should obey the constrains such that the
result is a valid state. Each Πi actually captures the configuration space of the configuration
parameter, pii.
As discussed earlier, a critical part of a cyber attack is the reconnaissance or exploration
of the target system’s configuration. To understand the effect of an MTD system, we must
be able to characterize the space, or exploration space that the attacker must explore before
attacking. Clearly, the exploration space is related to the configuration space of the MTD
system. If we assume the attacker knows the exact domain of the configuration parameter,
Σpi, in a MTD system, then the exploration space equals the configuration space. But
obviously, this assumption is often not the case. For instance, if an attacker is looking
for a specific target host in an IPv4 system, the attacker must check each possible IP
address, or 256 different addresses (assume a /24 network). However, if the configuration
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constraints of the MTD limit the possible IP address of the host to a range of 100 . . . 255,
the configuration space as defined above does not truly reflect the exploration space of the
attacker. As the exploration space is associated with ongoing attacks, we leave its definition
until after defining the Cyber Attack Theory.
6.2.7 Diversification
As summarized in Chapter 3, diversification typically has two related concepts. The first
refers to the configuration choices already available in the system, while the second refers to
techniques used to increase the number of configurations available to the MTD system to use
to confuse attackers. Based on the definitions above, we can see that these both refer to the
configuration space. The first definition relates to the size of the configuration space while
the second concern a variety of techniques to increase the size of the configuration space.
To eliminate this confusion of terms, we propose to use the term artificial diversification to
refer to the second definition.
Definition 6.18. The diversification of an MTD system is the cardinality of its configura-
tion space, or |Sv|. And the diversification of any configuration parameter, pi, is simply the
cardinality of its domain |Π|.
Definition 6.19. Artificial Diversification is a function to increase the configuration space,
Sv, of an MTD system. Formally, it is denoted as, fd : Sv → S ′v, where |Sv| < |S ′v|.
The four artificial diversity techniques summarized in Section 3.3.1.2 of Chapter 3 can
be viewed as examples of this diversification function. As presented in Chapter 1, Kant45
points out that attack surface modification can be aided by introducing diversity. However,
quantitative models for guiding the design of good diversification techniques and assessing
their effectiveness remain largely unexplored. Christodorescu et,al 29 also indicated that a
fundamental challenge in understanding the impact of diversification is to introduce a pre-
cise, computationally-meaningful way to measure the increase in difficulty for the attacker.
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As shown in the definitions, diversification provides the potential to measure security of an
MTD system through configuration space. In an MTD system, a system with a higher diver-
sification is likely to be more difficult to compromise than one of lower diversification, given
that all else is equivalent. Artificial diversification seeks to enhance the security provided by
an MTD system by introducing functionality equivalent alternatives for a configuration pa-
rameter. Diversification determines the size of configuration space, which then provides the
space for adaptation. Again, measure and assess the effectiveness of diversification requires
Cyber Attacker Theory, which will be presented in the next section.
6.2.8 Randomization
Randomization is another term often used in MTD literature as shown in Chapter 3. Of
course, there is nothing in the general understanding of MTD systems that requires random
choices, although there are good arguments for this use. The overall goal of randomization
is to make full use of the available configuration space introduced by diversification, where
a larger configuration space provides more space for adaptation.
In MTD systems, randomization typically refers to choosing random configurations in
order to make full use of configuration space while adding the notion of non-predictability.
Random choices are usually understood as making selections assuming that the probability of
each choice forms a uniform distribution. In this thesis work32,34, Chapter 4 proposed both a
purely random MTD system, which selects the next configuration via a uniform distribution,
as well as an intelligent MTD system, which also considers potential vulnerabilities and
attack alerts when choosing configurations.
In Chapter 3, I suggest to view randomization as a decision making process that chooses
the next valid state based on a specific probability distribution over states in Sv. This way,
choosing the next configuration from a uniform distribution of states as well as considering
alerts become specific instances of randomization. Indeed, given Sv and a specific set of
environmental information, if one want to ensure that state si ∈ Sv is chosen, it is simply
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define a probability distribution that says the probability of picking si is 1. This way,
randomization as a decision making process generalizes so that all kinds of AI techniques,
such as genetic algorithms, machine learning, game theory, etc. all are just different ways
to select the appropriate probability distributions over states Sv. Thus, randomization is
defined as follows.
Definition 6.20. Configuration randomization is a decision making process of selecting the
next valid system configuration value s ∈ Sv for Σpi. If Pj represents the probability that sj
is chosen and pj represents a specific probability value assigned to Pj through randomization,
then ∀sj ∈ Sv, 1 ≤ j ≤ |Sv|, we have Pj = pj ∧ 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1 ∧
∑
j
pj = 1.
6.2.9 Problems
Using the terminology and concepts developed in Section 6.2, this section discusses the
implications of these concepts in the MTD process as shown in Figure 6.2. First this section
extracts and summarizes several problems which are common to any MTD system that
follows from MTD Systems Theory. Then it indicates the next steps towards a theory for
moving target defense.
To carry out a process similar to the one described in Figure 6.2, there are three essential
problems:
1. How to select the next configuration state of the MTD system.
2. How to select the adaptations to take to get to the next configuration state.
3. When to carry out the adaptations to actually change the state of the system.
Each of these interrelated problems are discussed below.
6.2.9.1 MTD Problem
The essential problem of an MTD system is to move the system from current state to a valid
state in such a way as to make an attackers job of compromising the system more difficult.
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Thus, the key problem will be deciding what state to move to.
Definition 6.21. Given the current state, s, of an MTD system, the MTD problem is how
to choose the next configuration state of the system, s′, subject to s′ ∈ Sv, to increase the
effectiveness of the MTD system.
The definition makes it clear that only a valid configuration state will be chosen. In
addition, measuring effectiveness requires additional theory to define the attacker as well as
the relationships as discussed in Section 6.1.4. As seen from the taxonomy, there are several
approaches that could be taken including random selection, intelligent selection based on
environmental information such as IDS alerts, or cost-based strategies. I believe this to be
a prime area of future MTD research.
6.2.9.2 Adaptation Selection Problem
The solution to the MTD problem will lead to a valid next state s′ being chosen. However,
moving the system to this state requires solving the adaptation selection problem, which can
be stated informally as finding an adaptation that can transition the system from s to s′.
Definition 6.22. Given current state of an MTD system, s and a valid next state, s′, the
adaptation selection problem is how to synthesize a sequence of actions A = {a1, a2, . . . , ak}
such that τ : s×A→ s′. This problem may also consider constraints such as time and costs.
This problem is analogous to a planning problem and thus future research will likely lead
in that direction for the general case. The complexity lies in that there could be multiple
sequence of actions that could result in the same configuration state, the optimal solution
would require to take constraints such as time and costs into consideration.
6.2.9.3 Timing Problem
The final problem to consider is the MTD Timing Problem, or “when to adapt”. Timing is
a critical factor in the success of an MTD system. Chapter 6 provides some insight into the
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relationship between several key MTD system factors which include the adaptation time
interval Tr and attack time interval Ta
119.
Definition 6.23. In an MTD system, the Timing Problem is at what point should the
MTD system launch an adaptation to increase the effectiveness of the MTD system, while
maintaining a reasonable cost, c.
Here, reasonable means that the decision of when to launch the adaptation should be
made based on the trade off between operation and security. After the Cyber Attack Theory
is in place, we will be able to reason over the interactions between an MTD system and an
attacker to make such decisions.
6.3 Cyber Attack Theory
Cyber attack success relies on information possessed by an attacker when the attack is
launched and is often measured by the information gained or modified as a result of the
attack. Thus, information must be an essential element of any theory of cyber attacks. MTD
Systems Theory included the notion of a configuration parameter that captures information
about the configuration of a computer system, or more generally a target device. This
configuration information is clearly part of the information of interest in an attack. However,
the information of interest to an attacker goes beyond simple configuration information. For
example, a target system’s execution status and data are not configuration information, but
are critical to many types of attacks. To capture all information of interest, we introduce a
new concept called an information parameter, where the system’s configuration parameters
is a subset of the system’s information parameters. Thus, a target device is described
by a set of information parameters and an attacker expends effort to gain or modify a
target device’s information parameters. Figure 6.5 highlights this relationship. In addition,
an attacker generally has a lot of information that is not necessarily related to the target,
which consists of knowledge about other target systems, specialized skills, or general purpose
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knowledge.
Attacker’s 
knowledge
Target device and its 
information parameters 
Attacker’s 
knowledge of target 
Configuration parameter
Information parameter
Figure 6.5: Attacker and Target System Overview
In Cyber Attack Theory, we formally define attacks and attacker’s knowledge in terms
of information parameters. By reasoning over the relationship between an MTD system’s
configuration parameters and an attack’s information parameters, we can formally describe
and analyze interactions between attackers and MTD systems. We use the mission planning
scenario to help motivate and explain Cyber Attack Theory. In this scenario, attackers try
to exploit a vulnerability in the Planner. The vulnerability details are unimportant, but
we assume that if the vulnerability exists, the attacker can exploit it. A second scenario,
featuring a more concrete code reuse attack and an address space layout randomization
(ASLR) MTD, is provided in Section 6.5.2.
6.3.1 Targets
We start our presentation of Cyber Attack Theory by defining the concept of a target,
which is based on the concept of information parameters introduced above. We formally
define a target and a target system from the attacker’s perspective and then build on them
by defining concepts associated with attackers and cyber attacks. When we talk about
a target, we view it as a device or system of devices that can be described by all kinds of
information, such as configuration parameters, execution state and various other information
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types. Thus, we start by formally defining an information parameter.
6.3.1.1 Information Parameter
We define an information parameter as a name value pair with an associated type, which
defines the domain of possible values an information parameter can assume.
Definition 6.24. An information parameter, ψ = 〈n, v〉, is a unit of information that can
take on a value based on its type, where n is the name and v is a value.
Definition 6.25. An information parameter type, Ψ, represents the domain of possible val-
ues that an information parameter value can assume. We denote the domain of information
parameter ψj as Ψj. An assignment of some value z in Ψ to ψ is denoted as ψ.v ← z.
An information parameter is basically a variable to which we can assign values from its
domain. This is essentially the same definition as that of a configuration parameter. The
difference is that a configuration parameter captures information only about the configura-
tion of a device, types of software on that device, specific software settings, etc. Note also
that a device’s the configuration parameters are a subset of its information parameters. In
order to aggregate all the information parameters of a device or system, we define the notion
of a composite information parameter.
Definition 6.26. A composite information parameter, ψ, is an information parameter that
is composed of a set of sub information parameters, ψ = 〈n, {ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn}〉, where n is
the name, and ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn are sub information parameters. The domain of a composite
information parameter, ψ, is derived from the sub information parameter domains, Ψ =
Ψ1 ×Ψ2 × . . .×Ψn.
For example, the Planner in Figure 6.8 has a set of information parameters that might
include ψ1 = 〈pageviews, 15/d〉, ψ2 = 〈visitors, 250〉, ψ3 = 〈memory, 8GB〉, ψ4 = 〈cpu,
intel i5〉, ψ5 = 〈eax, 0x65442224〉, ψ6 = 〈os, Ubuntu 14.04〉, and ψ7 = 〈ip, 222.20.22.22〉.
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Here, ψ1 and ψ2 are information parameters but not configuration parameters because they
are statistically determined by visitors. ψ5 is an information parameter but not a config-
uration parameter because the content of EAX reflects the execution status of a program.
The remaining information parameters are also configuration parameters.
6.3.1.2 Target
Targets are generally thought of as devices on a computer network that an attacker may
compromise, modify or gain information from. However, we also include humans as potential
targets because users such as administrators, developers, and clients are also prime targets
of attackers.
Definition 6.27. A target, d, is any device an attacker may try to obtain information from,
break into, alter or destroy. In cyber space, the targets are computer network devices and
communication channels, such as machines (either physical or virtual), humans, routers,
switches, cellphones, cables, optical fiber, etc.
In our example system, the Planner, AssetDB, GeoDB, TargetDB and all users of the
mission planning system are potential targets for an attacker. To link the information
parameters to the target they represent, we define the predicate describes.
Definition 6.28. If an information parameter, ψ, represents some aspects of the configu-
ration, data or execution state of a device, d, we say ψ describes d, which we denote as the
predicate describes(ψ, d).
In the mission planning example ψ1 through ψ7 can all be used to describe the Planner.
If we have a composite information parameter that captures all the relevant information
that describes a specific device, we say that composite information parameter is complete
as defined below.
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Definition 6.29. Each device d has a unique complete information parameter ψd whose
value captures all the information that describes d and only information that describes d.
Formally, this is stated as
∀d,∃ψd, describes(ψd, d)∧ (∀ψ, ψ ∈ ψd ⇒ describes(ψ, d))∧ (¬∃ψ, ψ /∈ ψd ∧ describes(ψ, d))
It should be noted that complete information parameters refer to the information pa-
rameters defined for that device. Obviously, the set of information parameters for a device
could be very large, of which only a subset are of practical use as we will see later. Using
the notion of a complete information parameter, we define the state of a particular target
device or system as the current values associated with each information parameter in the
device’s complete information parameter.
Definition 6.30. The state, sd, of target d, is current value of the complete information
parameter of d, ψd. We can also refer to the state of d at time t.
Obviously, the state of a target captures the value of ψd at a given point in time. This
fact will become important when we discuss the effect of attacks in Section 6.3.3.
To judge whether an information parameter exists in a target, a predicate called exists
is defined. This definition will be used to capture the precondition of an attack type in
Section 3.1.
Definition 6.31. If an information parameter,ψ, can be used to describe a target, d, such
that describes(ψ, d) is true, then we say exists(ψ).
For example, ψ1 through ψ7 all can be used to describe the Planner, thus, exists(ψ1),
exists(ψ2),. . . exists(ψ7) are all evaluated as true.
6.3.1.3 Target System
Now that we have defined a target, a target system simply becomes the composition of a
set of targets. This essentially allows us to capture the large, complex computer systems
that are the target of many attackers today.
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Definition 6.32. A target system, D, consists of a set of targets, D = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}.
Definition 6.33. Each target system, D, has a system information parameter, ψD, which
is the set of each target device’s complete information parameter, which is defined as ψD =
{ψdi |di ∈ D} and assumes each target’s complete information parameter name is unique.
Combining the Definitions 6.33 and 6.28 allows us to define describes for a target system
as describes(ψD, D) ⇔ ∀ d ∈ D, describes(ψd, d). The mission planning system (MP) can
be viewed as the target D = {dPlanner, dAssetDB, dTargetDB, dGeoDB} with a system informa-
tion parameter ψMP where describes(ψMP , MP ) is true. In addition, since each target
device has a complete information parameter ψdi , each device also has a complete informa-
tion parameter such as ψPlanner where describes(ψPlanner, Planner). Like the information
parameter, the state of the target system is simply a combination of each target device’s
state.
Definition 6.34. The target system state SD of target system D is the current value of the
system information parameter ψD. We also refer to the state of D at time t.
At this point, we have defined key concepts related to targets and target systems, which
in some ways overlaps the definitions in MTD Systems Theory. (MTD systems are also
target systems, etc.) However, it is important to note that targets are defined from the
attacker’s perspective, which captures the fact that the attacker may not know the poli-
cies and constraints associated with the system. These details are often the objective of
preliminary attacks on the system. As we define attackers and attacks, we show how this
information can be gained via attacks.
6.3.2 Attackers
To begin to understand attacks, including how and why they are launched, we must start
with the attacker. While an attacker is usually interpreted as an individual person, we
extend that notion slightly.
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Definition 6.35. An attacker, x, represents a single intruder or team of intruders, where
an intruder can be either a human or an automated program.
Thus, an attacker is not limited to an individual person. Attackers may be groups of
people where each is responsible for a part of a coordinated attack. Attackers may also be
software programs that automate the intrusion process. As discussed above, for an intrusion
to be successful, an attacker must make an effort to investigate the target, which leads to the
attacker possessing additional or updated knowledge about the target. We also represent
this knowledge as information parameters.
Definition 6.36. A knowledge unit is an information parameter possessed by an attacker.
We say attacker x possesses knowledge ψx, which includes all the attacker’s knowledge units
x. If ψ1, ψ2 . . . ψn are the knowledge units x possesses, then ψ
x = {ψ1, ψ2 . . . ψn}. Note:
attacker’s knowledge may not be true; it only represents what the attacker believes to be
true.
Here, we see ψx represents all the knowledge an attacker can use to attack a target. If
the attacker’s knowledge is not sufficient to attack a specific target to achieve the attacker’s
objective, the attacker will be forced to perform preliminary attacks to gain that knowledge.
To specifically talk about an attacker’s knowledge about a given target, d, or target system,
D, we define ψxd and ψ
x
D.
Definition 6.37. Attacker, x, has knowledge, ψxd , about target, d, where
ψxd = {ψ|ψ ∈ ψx ∧ ψ
n∈ ψd}
Similarly, attacker, x, has knowledge, ψxD, about target system, D, where
ψxD = {ψ|ψ ∈ ψx ∧ ψ
n∈ ψD} =
⋃
d∈D
ψxd
The operator, n∈, is used to capture the fact that an attacker’s knowledge ψxd and ψ
x
D
includes the information parameters that have the same name as those in the target’s com-
plete information parameter, although their values associated may be different. Formally,
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we recursively define
n∈ as
ψ
n∈ ψ′ ⇔ ∃ψi ∈ ψ′.v s.t.(ψ.n = ψi.n ∨ ψ
n∈ ψi)
Capturing attacker knowledge supports reasoning about what an attacker knows, what
information is gained during an attack, etc. This reasoning will be the key to understanding
the affect of MTD adaptation on an attacker’s attempt to penetrate or compromise specific
targets since MTD adaptation works by invalidating attackers’ knowledge of their targets.
To know when an attacker’s knowledge of a target is valid, we define the predicate holds.
Definition 6.38. If during a time period, [t1, t2], a logical statement, l, defined over ψ
x and
ψD is true, we say holds(l, [t1, t2]). If t1 = t2 = t, it simplifies as holds(l, t).
For example, an attacker might have these knowledge about the Planner: 〈memory, 8GB〉,
〈cpu, intel i5〉, 〈os,Windows 8.1〉, and 〈ip, 222.20.22.22〉. However, as defined in Sec-
tion 6.3.1.1, the true value of the operating system for the Planner is 〈os, Ubuntu 14.04〉 and
thus the attacker’s knowledge does not hold. Obviously, any attacks against the Planner
that assumes a Windows OS will fail.
6.3.3 Attacks
Now that we have defined the concepts of attackers and targets, we turn to defining the
attacks themselves. Attacks are a key aspect of our theory as they define the effect of an
attacker’s interaction with the target system. We define attacks in terms of their affect on
system information parameters or attacker knowledge. To help us capture the modifica-
tion of information, we start by defining an assignment of values between two information
parameters.
Definition 6.39. An assignment, o, is a tuple of information parameters 〈ψ1, ψ2〉, that
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when executed, copies the value of ψ2 into ψ1, which is denoted as ψ1.v ← ψ2.v. Formally,
we define the execute operation as execute(o)⇔ o.ψ1.v ← o.ψ2.v.
Essentially, the execution of an assignment affects only the value associated with the
first information parameter. The information parameters themselves do not need to have
the same name, even though it is often used to denote the copying of information from a
target to an attacker’s knowledge or vice versa. From the atttacker’s perspective, when an
assignment o = 〈ψ1, ψ2〉, where ψ2 is a target system information parameter and ψ1 belongs
to attacker’s knowledge, it is called a gain assignment. In contrast, when ψ2 belongs to an
attacker’s knowledge and ψ1 is a target system information parameter, it is called a modify
assignment, which implies that the attacker has successfully modified the target system,
and the attacker’s knowledge of the target system is updated accordingly. For example,
a successful intrusion that obtains the IP address of the Planner can be captured by an
assignment 〈ψxP lanner.ip, ψPlanner.ip〉1, which sets the Planner’s IP address to the address the
attacker’s has in its IP address information parameter for the Planner. We can also define an
intrusion that modifies the system time of the Planner via two assignments 〈ψPlanner.time,
ψxt 〉, and 〈ψxP lanner.time, ψx.t〉, where the first assignment sets the Planner’s system time to
ψx.t (some time the attacker wants to set the system time to) while the second assignment
updates the attacker’s own knowledge of the Planner’s system time.
6.3.3.1 Attack Goals
Based on the previous discussion, we see the gain assignment or modify assignment actually
capture what an attack tries to achieve or the intention behind an attack. In other words,
we could use gain assignment or modify assignment to define the attack goal.
Definition 6.40. An attack goal, ga, captures the attacker’s intention to gain or modify
1Here we use the ‘.’ notation to refer to the ip information parameter in the attackers knowledge about
the Planner.
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the target system information parameter, ψD. It can be represented by the gain or modify
assignments.
6.3.3.2 Attack Types
Next, we use assignments to define the post-conditions of attacks, which are defined over
ψD and ψ
x. These post-conditions can be viewed as the attack goal of corresponding attack.
We start by defining an attack type, which is a template for actual attack instance, which
we define later.
Definition 6.41. An attack type, φ, is a tuple 〈Ωpre, Ωpost〉 where Ωpre is a logical statement
defined over the target system’s information parameter ψD and the attacker’s knowledge ψ
x,
and Ωpost is a set of assignments over ψD and ψ
x.
To simplify our discussion, we assume that the logical statements are valid and that the
names of the information parameters in ψx and ψD are unique. In the mission planning
system example, assume the attacker, x, has the goal to exploit the Planner to obtain
root privileges. To achieve this objective, x considers a sequence of attack types, φ =
{φ1, φ2, . . . , φ6}, where the effects of the attacks are as follows:
• φ1 - gains the IP address of the Planner
• φ2 - gains the port number of a specific app
• φ3 - gains the operating system type
• φ4 - obtains an exploitable vulnerability of the app
• φ5 - deploys an exploit agent on the Planner
• φ6 - connects to the agent (e.g., via reverse shell) and gain the root privilege
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Table 6.1 shows the specification of these attack types. Each attack type’s precondition
is a logic statement that explicitly reflects the relationship between an attacker’s knowledge
of the target and the target’s true information. Also, notice that each attack type’s precon-
dition depends on the previous attack type’s post-condition. For example, φ3 requires that
the attacker’s knowledge about the target’s IP address and the port number is correct. This
means the attacker must have a way to gain prior knowledge before the actual attack, which
is done via the post-conditions of φ1 and φ2. Also note that the post-condition of φ5 can
be viewed as a modify assignment while φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 and φ6 are all gain assignments. This
approach not only allows us to explicitly define an attack type based on the relationship
between an attacker’s knowledge and target system, but it also provides insight into the
key information parameters associated with specific attacks and targets. This relationship
will be instrumental when we tie Cyber Attack Theory to existing MTD System Theory in
order to analyze which configuration parameters can be modified to thwart different types
of attacks and to formally define the attack surface for specific types of attacks. We also
note that a precondition’s logical statement only captures necessary information-based con-
ditions for an attack to succeed. It does not include all the sufficient conditions. We discuss
this in more details in Section 6.3.3.3. While the attack specifications in Table 6.1 provide a
precise description of individual attacks, attackers generally combine a sequence of low-level
attacks to achieve some higher-level objective. To capture this reality, we need to provide
the ability to analyze the composition of a set of low-level attack types. However, before
defining attack type composition, we define three helper functions: transform, union replace,
and substitution.
Definition 6.42. We define two transform functions, ξx and ξd, that compute a set of
information parameters from the assignments in Ωpost. ξx() extracts information parameters
belonging to ψx while ξd() extracts information parameters that describe target d as defined
below
126
ξx(φ.Ωpost) = {〈n, v〉|〈ψ1, ψ2〉 ∈ φ.Ωpost ∧ ψ1 ∈ ψx ∧ n = ψ1.n ∧ v = ψ2.v}
ξd(φ.Ωpost) = {〈n, v〉|〈ψ1, ψ2〉 ∈ φ.Ωpost ∧ ψ1 ∈ ψD ∧ n = ψ1.n ∧ v = ψ2.v}
The purpose of the transform function is to extract information parameters contained in
Ωpost. For example, if we take Ωpost from φ1, ξx(φ1.Ωpost) = {〈ip, ψd1 .ip.v〉}, and ξd(φ1.Ωpost)
= ∅. Similarly, for φ5, ξx(φ5.Ωpost) = {〈Exa, ψx.Exa.v〉}, and ξd(φ5.Ωpost) = {〈Exa,
ψx.Exa.v〉}. To define the union replace function, we first define an operator to deter-
mine that an information parameter name does not exist in a set of information parameters
or assignments. If ψˆ is a set of information parameters, then we recursively define the
operator
n
/∈ as
ψ
n
/∈ ψˆ ⇔ @ψi ∈ ψˆ, s.t.(ψ.n = ψi.n ∨ ψ
n∈ ψi.v)
And when oˆ is a set of assignments,
n
/∈ becomes
o
n
/∈ oˆ⇔ @oi ∈ oˆ, s.t.(oi.ψ1.n = o.ψ1.n ∨ o.ψ1
n∈ oi.ψ1.v).
Using the
n
/∈ operator, we now define the union replace function, which updates one set
of information parameters based on a second set of information parameters. Essentially,
the union replace function replaces the information parameter values in the first set with
those of the second set if the names match. Additionally, if information parameters exist in
the second set but not the first, these new information parameters from the second set are
added to the first set. We also overloaded the union replace operator to work on two sets
of assignments as well.
Definition 6.43. To update one set of information parameters, ψˆ1, based on a second set,
ψˆ2, we define a union replace function, ψˆ1unionmultiψˆ2 = {ψ|(ψ ∈ ψˆ1 ∧ ψ n/∈ ψˆ2) ∨ ψ ∈ ψˆ2}. Likewise,
union replace over assignments is defined as oˆ1 unionmulti oˆ2 = {o|(o ∈ oˆ1 ∧ o n/∈ oˆ2) ∨ o ∈ oˆ2}
Next, we define a substitution function, σ, that substitutes the values from a set of
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information parameters into a logical statement. We use σ to substitute the information pa-
rameters values from an attacker’s knowledge into the corresponding information parameter
in the precondition of a given attack type, φ.
Definition 6.44. Given a logical statement, l, and a set of information parameters, ψˆ,
we define the substitution function, σ(l, ψˆ), as a mapping from names in l to values of
information parameters in ψˆ such that the name in l matches the name of the information
parameter in ψˆ.
In general, we use the σ function to substitute the values of information parameters in
the attacker’s knowledge to variable names in Ωpre. This mapping allows us to evaluate the
precondition, Ωpre. Using these helper functions, we now formally define a composite attack
type. Intuitively, a composite attack type is a sequence of sub attack types. The precondi-
tions of the composite attack type is the conjunction of all the preconditions from the sub
attack types that are not satisfied by previous sub attacks. Likewise, the post-condition
is the union of the sub attack post- conditions where an assignment to an information pa-
rameter later in the sequence takes precedence over assignments to the same information
parameter earlier in the sequence.
Definition 6.45. A composite attack type, φ, is a sequence of attack types, φ = [φ1, φ2, . . . , φn],
where each sub attack type’s pre and post-conditions (φi.Ωpre and φi.Ωpost) are defined over a
target system’s complete information parameter, ψD(i), and the attacker’s knowledge, ψ
x(i).
The composite attack type’s pre and post-conditions are defined as
φ.Ωpre = ∧
1≤i≤n
σ(φi.Ωpre, ψ
x(i−1))
φ.Ωpost = unionmulti
1≤i≤n
φi.Ωpost
where : ψD(0) = {}, ψx(0) = {}
ψx(i) = ψx(i−1) unionmulti ξx(φi.Ωpost)
ψD(i) = ψD(i−1) unionmulti ξx(φi.Ωpost)
128
Note, we use a sequence above to reflect the relationship that the subsequent attack
types depend on previous attack types. If two attack types are independent with each
other, they should be analyzed individually and no composition is required. While not
specifically defined, there is nothing in our theory to limit the analysis of parallel attacks.
To simply the discussion, we also define the concept of minimal composite attack type. A
composite attack type is minimal if it only contains the minimum number of necessary sub
attack types to achieve the post-conditions defined by an attack goal. Thus, from now on,
when talk about the composite attack type, we assume it’s minimal and don’t consider the
situation where redundant attack types being involved and make no contribution to the
attack goal defined post-conditions.
For completeness, we define an atomic attack type as an attack type that cannot be
further decomposed into sub attack types. To demonstrate how pre and post-conditions for
composite attack types are computed, we show how are φ1 and φ2 are composed into φ in
Figure 6.6. Generally speaking, an attack type acts as a template for an actual attack. This
relationship is similar to that of an object-oriented class and an object or instance of that
class. One attack type can be implemented by many different attacks. For example, attack
type φ1 attempts to gain the IP address of the Planner. To implement φ1, an attacker
might use automated IP scanning tools, guess the IP address, or obtain it through social
engineering. Although these are different attacks, they all implement a same attack type.
6.3.3.3 Attack Instances
Definition 6.46. An attack is a process performed by attacker, x, against target, d, im-
plementing attack type, φ, during time period, [ts, tf ]. We denote this attack as
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ).
Each attack, has a success likelihood against static systems of Pstatic and a duration of
Ta = tf − ts.
The development of an Cyber Attack Theory will greatly benefit our understanding of
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Initialization:
ψx(0){}, ψD(0) = {},Ωpre = {},Ωpost = {}
compose φ1 :
ψx(1) = ψx(0) unionmulti ξx(φ1.Ωpost)
= {} unionmulti {〈ip, ψd1 .ip〉}
= {〈ip, ψd1 .ip〉}
ψD(1) = ψD(0) unionmulti ξD(φ1.Ωpost)
= {} unionmulti {}
= {}
Ωpre = σ(φ1.Ωpre, ψ
x(0))
= σ(φ1.Ωpre, {})
= exists(ψd1 .ip)
Ωpost = {} unionmulti φ1.Ωpost
= {〈ψxd1 .ip, ψd1 .ip〉}
compose φ2 :
ψx(2) = ψx(1) unionmulti ξx(φ2.Ωpost)
= {〈ip, ψd1 .ip〉} unionmulti {〈port, ψd1 .port〉})
= {〈ip, ψd1 .ip〉, 〈port, ψd1 .port〉}
ψD(2) = ψD(1) unionmulti ξD(φ2.Ωpost)
= {} unionmulti {}
= {}
Ωpre = σ(φ2.Ωpre, ψ
x(1)) ∧ Ωpre
= σ((ψxd1 .ip = ψd1 .ip ∧ exists(ψd1 .port)),
{〈ip, ψd1 .ip〉}) ∧ Ωpre
= exists(ψd1 .port) ∧ exists(ψd1 .ip)
Ωpost = Ωpost unionmulti φ2.Ωpost
= {〈ψxd1 .ip, ψd1 .ip〉, 〈ψxd1 .port, ψd1 .port〉}
Figure 6.6: Composition of attack types, φ1 and φ2, into attack type, φ.
the interaction between the attacker and MTD system. This will include an understanding
of the cost factors related to the attacker and MTD actions, which we believe are closely tied
to the duration of the attacks and the impact on the attacker’s intrusion success likelihood.
Other cost factors, such as attacker effort, are directly related to the time and intrusion
success likelihood. However, explicitly including Ta and Pstatic in the definition of the attack
does not necessarily mean that we will assign specific values to them. Coming up with real
numbers for these factors is hard46, although there has been work trying to estimate the
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mean time-to-compromise120 and to measure Pstatic
121. Quantifying Ta and Pstatic is out
of the scope of our work. However, we do believe that Ta and Pstatic can be impacted by
MTD designers by manipulating MTD system parameters such as the diversification of the
configuration space and the adaptation interval. One of our future goals is the development
of an analytical model that can inform designers as to how particular parameter settings
will impact the effectiveness given attack parameters, such as Ta and Pstatic. Conversely,
MTD designers will also be able to judge how effective a given MTD system will be based
on various values of Ta and Pstatic.
Definition 6.47. An atomic attack is an attack that implements an atomic attack type
and cannot be decomposed into sub attacks. An atomic attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), is successful with
probability Pstatic, if and only if its precondition, Ωpre, is true from ts to tf . If successful∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ) ensures execute(Ωpost) is true precisely at tf .
If Pstatic is true, that indicates that all the sufficient conditions for the attack to be
successful in a static system, with the exception of those specified in Ωpre are true. However,
Ωpre captures those necessary conditions that can be impacted by the MTD system. As long
as Ωpre remains true from ts to tf and Pstatic is true, the attack will be successful and the
attack’s post-conditions will be executed at tf . Like attack types, attacks themselves are
generally composed of a sequence of smaller attacks to achieve a larger purpose. We now
formally define a composite attack.
Definition 6.48. An composite attack is an attack that implements a composite attack type.
Given composite attack type, φ, that is composed of a sequence of attack types [φ1, φ2, . . . , φn],
a composite attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), that implements φ is composed of a sequence of attacks where
each attack,
∮ ti
ti−1
(x, d, φi), implements φi and t0 = ts ∧ tn = tf . Formally, this is captured
as: ∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ) = [
∮ t1
ts
(x, d, φ1),
∮ t2
t1
(x, d, φ2), . . . ,
∮ tf
tn−1
(x, d, φn)]
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Thus, a composite attack is simply implemented by a sequence of attacks where each
attack implements a corresponding sub attack type. Using the attacks defined in Table 6.1,
an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d1, φ), that implements the composite attack type, φ = [φ1, φ2], requires
the composition of two sub attacks,
∮ t1
ts
(x, d1, φ1), that implements φ1 and,
∮ tf
t1
(x, d1, φ2),
that implements φ2.
6.3.4 Exploration Space
So far, we have introduced two properties of attacks, beside the attack type definition itself,
that are critical to analyzing attacks, the attack interval, Ta, and the static likelihood of
success, Pstatic. Next, we introduce a third concept that is important to the analysis of
attacks and their interactions with MTD systems called the exploration space. Essentially,
the exploration space captures the set of possible values an attacker must search in order to
find the correct value of a specific information parameter or parameters in order to carry out
specific attacks. Figure 6.7 shows an overview of the relationships between an information
parameter, ψ’s, exploration space, its configuration space (as discussed in Section 6.2.6), and
the attacker’s effort to ascertain ψ’s actual value 2. The effort spent on gaining knowledge
through preliminary attacks can be viewed as actions that reduce the attacker’s uncertainty
about ψ’s value from the exploration space down to a single value. For a static system, this
uncertainty can be safely assumed to monotonically decreasing with each additional attack.
However, with MTD systems, this assumption is invalid. Instead, MTD systems make the
attacker’s uncertainty non-monotonic. An exhaustive search of the entire exploration space
Ψ to identify the correct value of ψ is not the preferred approach. However, there are times
when an exhaustive approach are applicable. For example, in the mission planning example,
an attack implementing φ1 may scan all possible IP addresses in an IPv4 subnet to obtain
2If the information parameter in question is a target’s complete information parameter or any other set of
information parameters the values are simply tuples of values corresponding to the information parameters
in the set.
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the correct IP address of the Planner. However, attackers can also use a priori knowledge
to reduce the search space as well. For example, while knowing that port numbers must be
in the range of 0-65535 is of some use in searching ψPlanner for the website port number,
knowledge that public facing websites usually use port number 80 may immediately reveal
the correct value of ψPlanner.port. An attacker can use social engineering to gain required
knowledge. For example, an administrator might be fooled into leaking important system
information such as IP addresses, operating systems, passwords, etc. No matter which
approach is leveraged by attackers, gaining knowledge definitely requires effort on their part
to reduce the size of the exploration space. If an information parameter ψ is a configuration
Attacker Effort
Exploration space Configuration space
Figure 6.7: Exploration Space Overview (dots are possible values of the information param-
eter)
parameter of the MTD system as well, the exploration space of ψ may actually be larger than
configuration space of ψ. Although a configuration parameter’s valid values are typically
limited based on system constraints and policies, attackers usually have no way of knowing
what these constraints are. For example, constraints internal to the system may require
ψAssetDB.port to be either 43, 53, or 63. However, since attackers would not typically know
this information, they would likely be forced to scan the entire range from 0 to 65535. Thus,
in general, the exploration space of information parameter ψ equals its domain ψ.
Definition 6.49. Given information parameter ψ with domain Ψ, the exploration space of
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ψ is
ESpaψ = Ψ
and the size of the exploration space is |Ψ|.
Generally speaking, the exploration space is the maximum set of potential values attack-
ers need to investigate in order to obtain the correct value. This concept itself is objective
and comes with no specific assumptions about an attacker’s capability, skill level, or knowl-
edge about the related target system. Similarly, the exploration space of a target system,
D, is simply the domain of ΨD, which is the cross product of all ψD’s sub information
parameter domains.
Definition 6.50. Given a target system D, with its complete information parameter ψD
with domain of ΨD, the exploration space of D is defined as:
ESpaD = ΨD
Similarly, the size of this exploration space is |ΨD|.
Although theoretically, this definition gives us an intuition about the exploration space
of a target system, it provides little insight to help us understand the exploration space
for each individual attack. To do that, we need to define the exploration space of both
atomic and composed attack types. To facilitate these definitions, we first define a function
to extract the information parameters in an attack type whose value must be gained by an
attacker.
Definition 6.51. Given atomic attack type, φ = 〈ΩPre, ΩPost〉, the function δ extracts all
information parameters from ΩPost whose value the attacker must gain. Formally, this is
134
defined as
δ(ΩPost) = {ψ|∀o ∈ ΩPost, o.ψ1 ∈ ψx ∧ o.ψ2 ∈ ψD ∧ ψ ← o.ψ1}
Based on this function, we define the exploration space of an attack type.
Definition 6.52. The exploration space of attack type, φ = 〈ΩPre, ΩPost〉, is the cross
product of the domain of each information parameter, ψ ∈ δ(φ.ΩPost).
ESpaφ =
∏
ψ∈δ(φ.ΩPost)
Ψ
The size of this exploration space is
∏
ψ∈δ(φ.ΩPost) |Ψ|.
This definition requires that for an atomic attack type, φ, if there are multiple infor-
mation parameters in δ(φ.ΩPost), attacks implementing φ must attempt to gain the value
of each of those information parameter simultaneously. Thus, the exploration space is the
cross product of its information parameter domains. However, atomic attack types tend
to be very simple and usually only attempt to gain the value of a single information pa-
rameter. Because a composite attack is made of a set of sub attacks, one might think that
the exploration space of the composite attack would not be as large as the cross product
of all the information parameters for which it attempts to gain a value. However, this is
untrue. Although the exploration space shrinks as sub attacks are successfully completed,
as shown in Figure 6.7 as attacker effort, the overall exploration space remains the same.
Actually, the concept of sub attacks clearly demonstrates the argument that an attacker’s
effort is actually linear46 instead of exponential as would be suggested by the cross product
operation. Instead of finding all information parameter values simultaneously, a composite
attack breaks that down into a series of steps, whose effort is generally small. Thus, if no
changes occur to the system configuration, each atomic attack type can be viewed as an
attempt to break into a single layer of defense. And, because the effort required to break
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into each layer is relatively low, once a layer is penetrated, the next layer is exposed and
the attacker has almost unlimited time to attack it. Bellovin46 claims that what is really
needed for system security is an approach that makes the effort expended by the attacker
exponential as opposed to linear. Clearly, by constantly adapting the values of the appro-
priate information parameters, MTD systems could eliminate that brittleness. Attackers
can no longer assume that they can ascertain the value of each information parameter one
at a time, but will effectively need to learn, and potentially relearn them all in a very short
time frame, which pushes the attackers effort towards the exponential.
6.4 MTD Theory
Enabled by MTD System Theory and Cyber Attack Theory, we are able to start formally
defining the MTD Theory. The objective of MTD Theory is to define how elements of the
MTD Systems and Cyber Attacks theories interact. This step is especially important in
being able to understand the true effect of an MTD system as its effectiveness only makes
sense in light of actions from an attacker for a specific attack type122,115.
Recall from Chapter 1 that a major challenge to understand moving target defenses is the
need for new metrics. Existing metrics for attack surface areas are not suitable for evaluating
a moving attack surface because two basic assumptions of the existing metrics have been
broken. One is that the attack surface remains unchanged, while the other is that the target
attack surface is always reachable by attackers. Thanks to the MTD System Theory and
Cyber Attack Theory, we are able to relax these two assumptions by introducing a new
definition of attack surface based on a specific attack type. In addition, this section also
introduces two new concepts, the adaptation surface, which captures all of the information
parameters adapted by an MTD system, and the engagement surface, which captures the
information parameters adapted by an MTD system that can be potentially effective to
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thwart an attack type. Based on these new concepts, several metrics, such as coverage,
potential effectiveness and success likelihood of intrusion, will be introduced. These metrics
will greatly benefit the interaction analysis between the attacker and MTD System, and
help quantify the effectiveness of MTD. Based on these new definitions, serveral theorems
can be derived. These theorems provides fundamental guidelines for MTD system design,
analysis and parameter setting. Lastly, this section discusses attack effort indicators and
how different MTD system parameter settings would impact the attack effort.
6.4.1 Attack Surface
Previous definitions of attack surface3,4,31 suffer from its inability to capture the dynamic and
changing nature of MTD, plus the potential state and action space explosion when trying to
capture it from the whole system perspective. To solve these problems, a new attack surface
definition is proposed in this section. As it defined based on information parameters, we
can formally talk about the different state of an attack surface at different time point. As
it only talks about the attack surface in terms of a set of information parameters related to
a specific attack, it avoids the explosion issue and encourages the MTD designers to focus
on the most critical information that could be used to thwart an attack type.
The δ function introduced in Definition 6.51 can be used to extract target system in-
formation parameters from Ωpost, we overload the δ function and define it to also extract
system information parameters from ΩPre to help define the attack surface.
Definition 6.53. Given atomic attack type, φ = 〈ΩPre, ΩPost〉, the function δ also extracts
all system information parameters from ΩPre. Formally, this is defined as
δ(ΩPre) = {ψ|∀ψ ∈ ΩPre, ψ ∈ ψD}
Once how to extract system information parameters from an attack type is in place, the
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attack surface for an attack type is simply the set of these system information parameters.
Definition 6.54. Given an attack type φ, the attack surface of φ, Sattack(φ), equals the
union of δ(φ.ΩPre) and δ(φ.ΩPost). Formally, this is defined as
Sattack(φ) = δ(φ.ΩPre) ∪ δ(φ.ΩPost)
As an information parameter ψ is a name value pair, that can take on various values
at different times. This enables us to formally talk about the state of an attack surface at
different times. In addition, as the attack surface is defined in terms of a set of information
parameters related to a specific attack, it avoids the explosion issue and encourages the
MTD designers to focus on the most critical information that could be used to thwart an
attack type. Concrete examples of attack surfaces are given in Section 6.5.
6.4.2 Adaptation Surface
From attacker’s perspective, the attack surface describes the system information parame-
ters involved in an attack that an attacker needs to gain or modify. While knowing this
information is very helpful, from defender’s perspective, it doesn’t mean all the information
parameters can be adapted due to various constraints, such as the balance between security
and operation, the labor of development or the cost of maintenance. Thus a new concept,
called adaptation surface, is introduced to capture only those system information parameters
that actually adapted. Thus, we eliminate information parameters whose domain contains
only one value.
Definition 6.55. Given an MTD system, Σ, and its minimum complete configuration pa-
rameter, Σpi, the adaptation surface of Σ, Sadapt(Σ), is a set of configuration parameters
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whose domain contain more than one value. Formally, this is defined as
Sadapt(Σ) =
⋃
pii
n∈Σpi
pii, where |Πi| > 1
The adaptation surface clearly captures which configuration parameters are being adapted
by an MTD system and which are not. We provide concrete examples of adaptation surface
in Section 6.5.
6.4.3 Engagement Surface
Once the attack surface of an specific attack type and the adaptation surface of an MTD
system are defined, we can derive which information parameter adapted by an MTD system
can be used to thwart the specific attack type. We call these information parameters the
engagement surface, inspired by military terminology where the engagement of attacker and
a defender occurs.
Definition 6.56. The engagement surface between the attack surface of an attack type, φ,
and adaptation surface of an MTD system, Σ, contains all the configuration parameters an
MTD system uses to thwart that attack type. Formally, this is defined as
Sengage(φ,Σ) = Sattack(φ) ∩ Sadapt(Σ)
Clearly an empty engagement surface, Sengage(φ,Σ), indicates there is no MTD-enabled
protection against φ. An MTD system, Σ, can only impact φ when the engagement surface
is not empty. Based on these concepts, we develop metrics which can quantify the effective-
ness of MTD in the following. Concrete examples of engagement surfaces are provided in
Section 6.5.
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6.4.4 Coverage
Concepts like attack surface, adaptation surface and engagement surface enable us to for-
mally talk about the interaction between a specific attack type and an MTD system. How-
ever, the ultimate goal of having these formal definitions is to formally define useful metrics
that can measure the effectiveness of an MTD as well as to derive useful theorems that guide
the design and implementation of an MTD system.
Starting from this section, several metrics will be introduced. The first one describes
the coverage of an MTD system, Σ, against an attack type, φ, which measures the per-
centage of information parameters that are part of the attack surface of φ but also belong
to the adaptation surface of Σ. Again, concrete examples of these metrics are provided in
Section 6.5.
Definition 6.57. The coverage of an MTD system, Σ, verses an attack type, φ, is the
number of information parameters contained in Sengage(φ,Σ) divided by the number of in-
formation parameters contained in Sattack(φ). Formally, this is defined as
Coverage(φ,Σ) =
|Sengage(φ,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ)|
6.4.5 Potential Effectiveness
Coverage, as a quantified value based on the engagement and attack surfaces, provides a
preliminary measurement of an MTD system’s effectiveness, which we call the potential
effectiveness.
Definition 6.58. We define the potential effectiveness of an MTD system, Σ, against an
attack type, φ, in terms of coverage. Clearly, the potential effectiveness has a value range
[0, 1]. A zero value means Σ has no impact to φ, a one value only means Σ is potentially
effective for thwarting φ.
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According to the definition, a zero potential effectiveness of φ means there is no engage-
ment surface between an MTD system, Σ and a specific attack type, φ. Thus, for attack
type, φ, Σ provides no extra protection benefit when compare to a static system. On the
other hand, a higher coverage value indicates a higher potential effectiveness, but does not
mean that the actual effectiveness is also better. For example, a potential effectiveness of
one means the MTD system, Σ, covers all of the information parameters contained in the
attack surface of φ. However, if Σ takes an extremely long time to actually adapt, then
the actual effectiveness is no better than an static system. After all, the effectiveness of an
MTD system depends on many factors, while the coverage is only one of these factors. But
a coverage of zero indeed provides a clear indication of the non effectiveness of an MTD
against a particular attack type.
To analyze and quantify the MTD effectiveness when its coverage is greater than zero,
we introduce the success likelihood of intrusion.
6.4.6 Success Likelihood of Intrusion
Success likelihood reflects uncertainty, which is a good fit in a cyber security context where
the success of intrusion depends on many factors. However, as discussed in Chapter 1,
measuring security is hard, if not impossible46. Although we start to define the success
likelihood of intrusion in this section, the goal is not to quantify and obtain the absolute
value, as this is still a major challenge. Instead, we show that the success likelihood of
intrusion under MTD depends on several conditions, and part of these conditions can be
quantified nicely. This quantification allows us to analyze relative success likelihood of
intrusion as compared to static systems.
Recall from section 6.3.3.3, that the Ωpre of an attack type captures the necessary condi-
tions of an attack that can be impacted by the MTD system. While Pstatic captures all the
sufficient conditions for the attack to be successful in a static system, with the exception of
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those specified in Ωpre. In this section, we show how the uncertainty impacted by Ωpre can
be quantified, while leaving the quantification of Pstatic as future work.
Before giving the formal definition of success likelihood of intrusion, we first define a
predicate, unchanged(ψˆ, [t1, t2]), which captures the fact that the value of an information
parameter does not change.
Definition 6.59. If during a time period, [t1, t2], for a set of information parameter, ψˆ =
{ψ|ψ n∈ ψD}, the value of each ψ ∈ ψˆ keep unchanged, we say unchanged(ψˆ, [t1, t2]).
Together with holds as given in Definition 6.38, we define the success likelihood of an
attack instance.
Definition 6.60. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), that implements an attack type, φ = 〈Ωpre,Ωpost〉,
the success likelihood of intrusion of this attack under MTD can be defined as:
Psuccess(
∮
) = P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ]))× Pstatic
where :
P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) = P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ]))× P (holds(Ωpre, ts))
Thus, for an attack instance to be successful in attacking an MTD system, not only
does Ωpre need to hold during the attack interval, but all the other conditions captured
by Pstatic also needs to be true. In addition, it turns out P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) can be
further decomposed into two parts, P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])) and P (holds(Ωpre, ts)),
which means for Ωpre to be hold during the whole attack interval, [ts, tf ], we only need
to analyze whether Ωpre is true at the begining of intrusion, plus whether all the system
information parameters involved in Ωpre is changed or not during the attack interval, [ts, tf ].
The failure of either part will lead to an unsuccessfull intrusion. Conversely, if both parts are
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fulfilled, Pstatic also needs to be true for Psuccess(
∮
) to be true. Concrete examples that show
how to quantify P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])) and P (holds(Ωpre, ts)) will be provided in
Section 6.5.
6.4.7 Theorems
As discussed, the ultimate goal of having an MTD theory is to formally define useful metrics
that help analyze and quantify the effectiveness of an MTD, and to derive useful theorems
that could guide the design and implementation of an MTD system. Theorems provide
intuitive conclusions that can be used by MTD system designers to decide how to use
existing configuration choices and diversification to increase security.
Before presenting theorems, we first introduce what constitutes the characteristics of
an MTD system and an attack. These characteristics represent the key factors that im-
pact the effectiveness of an MTD system against a specific attack type. We will use these
characteristics when describing the conditions under which the theorems are satisfied.
Definition 6.61. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), that implements an attack type, φ = 〈Ωpre,
Ωpost〉, and an MTD system, Σ, the characteristics of Σ and φ include Sattack(φ), Sengage(φ,Σ),
Coverage(φ,Σ), the attack interval Ta, the adaptation interval Tr, and an algorithm that
controls how each configuration parameter in Sengage(φ,Σ) is adapted.
These characteristics captures the most important factors involved in analyzing the effec-
tiveness of an MTD system against a specific attack type. These factors are closely related
and in the following theorems, we will see how each factor will impact the effectiveness in
terms of Psuccess(
∮
) when fixing other characteristics.
Theorem 6.1. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, if all other char-
acteristics in Definition 6.61 hold during the attack from ts to tf , a smaller Tr leads to a
lower Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)). Conversely, a larger Tr leads to higher Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
143
Proof. For a given Tr and attack interval, Ta = [ts, tf ], where ts could be any time point,
there are Ta
Tr
times of MTD adaptation could occur. A reduction in Tr will increase
Ta
Tr
, which
means more times of MTD adaptation could occur during [ts, tf ], thus unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre),
[ts, tf ]) is less likely to be hold, which means the probability P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ]))
is decreased. According to Definition 6.60, the success likelihood of intrusion is proportional
to P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])), thus a decreased P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])) leads
to a lower Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)). Using a similar argument, we can prove that a larger Tr
leads to a higher Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Theorem 6.2. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, if all other char-
acteristics in Definition 6.61 hold during the attack from ts to tf , a smaller Ta leads to a
higher Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)). Conversely, a larger Ta leads to a lower Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Proof. For a given Tr and attack interval, Ta = [ts, tf ], where ts could be any time point,
there are Ta
Tr
times of MTD adaptation could occur. A reduction in Ta will decrease
Ta
Tr
, which
means less times of MTD adaptation could occur during [ts, tf ], thus unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre),
[ts, tf ]) is more likely to be hold, which means the probability P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ]))
is increased. According to Definition 6.60, the success likelihood of intrusion is proportional
to P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])), thus an increased P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])) leads
to a higher Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)). Using a similar argument, we can prove that a larger Ta
leads to a lower Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Theorem 6.3. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, if all other
characteristics in Definition 6.61 hold during the attack from ts to tf , adding more con-
figuration parameters into Sengage(φ,Σ), increases Coverage(φ,Σ) and will not increase
Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Proof. According to Definition 6.57, Coverage(φ,Σ) = |Sengage(φ,Σ)||Sattack(φ)| , thus adding more con-
figuration parameters into Sengage(φ,Σ) increases |Sengage(φ,Σ)| which in turn increases
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Coverage(φ,Σ). If there are more configuration parameters contained in Coverage(φ,Σ),
it means more configuration parameters could be changed during ts to tf , thus the proba-
bility of P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])) is going to decrease or remain unchanged, as such,
Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)) will not increase.
Lemma 6.1. Given a configuraton parameter, pi, a larger configuration space of pi, CSpapi,
leads to non smaller exploration space of pi, ESpapi.
Proof. Because CSpapi = Πpi, where ∀s ∈ Πpi, s is valid. On the other hand, ESpapi = Ψpi,
where Ψpi is the domain of pi and ∀s ∈ Ψpi, s can be either valid or invalid, then |ESpapi| ≥
|CSpapi|. Thus increasing configuration space of pi leads to a non-smaller exploration space.
Lemma 6.2. Given an information parameter, ψ, if an attacker needs to spend a finite
amount of time, ti, on each value of ψ in order to determine the true value, a larger explo-
ration space of ψ leads to a longer mean time of compromise, Ta.
Proof. As the size of the exploration space of ψ is |ESpaψ|, if an attacker needs to spend
time ti on each value, then the total time spend on investigating all the values is
i=|Espaψ |∑
i=1
ti,
then the mean time of compromise will be Ta =
1
2
×
i=|Espaψ |∑
i=1
ti. Thus Ta is monotonically
increasing when the size of the exploration space of ψ increases, hence increasing exploration
space of ψ will increase the mean time of compromise, Ta.
Note, the lemma doesn’t apply to situations where attacker don’t need to try all possible
values because of the behavior of the user. There are situations where a larger exploration
space could result in less time of compromise when the attacker doesn’t needs to try each
possible value. Examples include social engineering attacks and man-made errors. In our
analysis of MTD systems, we assume people behave properly.
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Theorem 6.4. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, then if all other
characteristics in Definition 6.61 holds, if ∀ψi ∈ Sengage(φ,Σ), the attacker spends a finite
amount of time tij on each state of ψi, then increasing the configuration space of each
ψi ∈ Sengage(φ,Σ) leads to non-increased Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Proof. If ∀ψi ∈ Sengage(φ,Σ), the attacker spends a finite amount of time, tij, on each state of
ψi, then the mean time of compromise Ta =
i=|Sengage(φ,Σ)|∑
i=1
(1
2
×
j=|ESpaψi |∑
j=1
tij). Based on lemma
1, increasing configuration space of each ψi ∈ Sengage(φ,Σ) leads to non-smaller exploration
space of ψi, |ESpaψi |. As Ta =
i=|Sengage(φ,Σ)|∑
i=1
(1
2
×
j=|ESpaψi |∑
j=1
tij), thus a non-smaller |ESpaψi|
will leads to a non-smaller overall Ta. Then according to Theorem 6.2, a larger Ta reduces
Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)), thus a non-smaller Ta leads to a non-increased Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Theorem 6.5. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, then if all other
characteristics in Definition 6.61 holds, if ∀ψi ∈ Sengage(φ,Σ), the attacker spends a finite
amount of time tij on each state of ψi, then increasing the exploration space of each ψi ∈
Sengage(φ,Σ) will reduce Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
Proof. Based on lemma 6.2, a larger exploration space of ψi leads to a longer mean time
compromise of each ψi, thus the overall Ta will be increased. Then according to Theorem 6.2,
a larger Ta reduces Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)), thus increasing the exploration space of each ψi ∈
Sengage(φ,Σ) will reduce Psuccess(
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ)).
6.4.8 Attack Effort
Generally speaking, attack effort is hard to define and quantify. There are many factors,
such as attacker skill level, attack time, available resources, or network bandwidth, which
can be used to indicate the attack effort. Unfortunately, these factors are also usually hard
to know. As such, the goal of this section is not to define and quantify attack effort, but
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instead to propose a potential attack effort indicator based on the expected number of attack
trials to first achieve a certain success likelihood of intrusion.
Before defining attack effort indicator, we first present an theorem about the number
of trials until first success. Interested users could find more information about the proof of
theorem in123,124.
Theorem 6.6. Let V be an event that occurs in a trial with probability, p. Mathematical
expectation, E, of the number of trials to first occurrence of V in a sequence of trials is
E = 1/p.
As discussed, it’s hard to define attack effort as there are many unknown factors. How-
ever, we do believe the number of attack trials can be part of all possible attack effort
indicators and we define the attack effort indicator as follows.
Definition 6.62. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, an attack effort
indicator can qualitatively indicate the relative amount of effort spent on conducting this
attack until success. In this thesis, we focus on the number of attack trials until the first
success of
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), and a larger number of attack trials leads to a higher attack effort.
Based on Theorem 6.6 and Definition 6.62, we derive another theorem that states the
relationship between success likelihood of intrusion and attack effort.
Theorem 6.7. Given an attack,
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ), against an MTD system, Σ, a lower success
likelihood of intrusion, Psuccess(
∮
), leads to a higher effort of the first success of
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ).
Proof. According to Theorem 6.6, the lower success likelihood of intrusion, Psuccess(
∮
) leads
to larger number of trials to first occurance of successful
∮ tf
ts
(x, d, φ). Based on Defini-
tion 6.62, a larger number of attack trials leads to a higher attack effort.
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6.4.9 Relationships between MTD system Parameters and Attack
Effort
Based the theorems proved in Section 6.4.7, we know larger Ta, less Tr, and a larger ex-
ploration space Espaφ can reduce the success likelihood of intrusion. In addition, a larger
Coverage(φ,Σ) and larger configuration space of Sengage(φ,Σ) will not increase the success
likelihood of intrusion. Then from the previous section we know that larger Ta, less Tr and
larger exploration space Espaφ lead to a higher attack effort, and that larger Coverage(φ,Σ)
and larger configuration space of Sengage(φ,Σ) will not reduce attack effort.
In short, we can define the following relationships between MTD system parameter
settings and attack effort.
• Larger Ta, higher attack effort.
• Less Tr, higher attack effort.
• Larger Coverage(φ,Σ), non-decreased attack effort.
• Larger configuration space of Sengage(φ,Σ), non-decreased attack effort.
• Larger exploration space of Espaφ, higher attack effort.
By introducing attack effort indicator, we connect the success likelihood of intrusion
with attack effort, which provides further insight into how various MTD parameters impact
attack effort. These relationships provide MTD designers a clear understanding about the
effect of moving target defense and gives them powerful theoretical insights about how MTD
will impact the success likelihood of intrusion as well as attack effort. Armed with these
guidelines, MTD designers will be able to make more confident trade-off decisions when
designing and implementing MTD systems.
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6.5 Validation
Until now, we have developed a theory of moving target defenses. However, no complete
examples have been provided to show how things work together and why this theory would
benefit design and analysis when implementing an MTD system. While a formal and full
validation of the theory is out of the scope for this thesis, this section starts the validation
process by introducing concrete scenarios and showing examples of how the concepts defined
in the theory are instantiated and how this theory can be used to analyze and quantify the
effectiveness of an MTD system.
Specifically, there will be two examples provided. The first example describes an attack
that targets a mission planning system. It provides concrete specifications for the attack as
well as MTD system. These specifications are based on the definitions in Cyber Attack The-
ory and the MTD System Theory. Then, by taking advantage of MTD Theory, we show how
to analyze the potential effectiveness of this MTD system against the given attack as well as
quantify the success likelihood of intrusion. A concrete discussion of how various parameter
settings would impact the effectiveness of MTD system in terms of success likelihood is also
given.
The first example focuses on analyzing an MTD system that only adapts one configu-
ration parameter (IP address) invovled in the attack surface. To see how more than one
configuration parameters being adapted impacts the given attack type, the second example
extends the first MTD system to enable address space layout randomization (ASLR) where
the memory address is also adapted. Again the second example provides concrete specifi-
cations for the attack as well as the MTD system based on the definitions in Cyber Attack
Theory and MTD System Theory. We also analyze the coverage as well as its potential ef-
fectiveness based on MTD Theory. In addition, by adopting two adaptation mechanisms, we
show how different adaptations will impact the success likelihood of intrusion. By enabling
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more than one configuration parameter in the second example, we provide a more complete
example to show how to analyze and quantify MTD system’s potential effectiveness and
success likelihood of intrusion. It also provides a more complete view and understanding
about what an MTD system can do to thwart a given attack type.
6.5.1 Attack Mission Planning System
We start with the simple military mission planning system, which is shown in Figure 6.8.
Authorized users can remotely access the mission planner to construct military type mis-
sions. The Planner (a web server with a user interface) allows users to carry out authorized
actions, such as adding new strategies, establishing plans/tactics or allocating resources.
To support these actions, the Planner accesses three associated databases – the AssetDB,
GeoDB and TargetDB. In this scenario, attackers try to exploit a vulnerability in the Plan-
Attacker Planner
TargetDB
GeoDB
AssetDB
Figure 6.8: Motivating Attack Scenario
ner. The vulnerability details are unimportant here, but we assume that if the vulnerability
exists, the attacker can exploit it. A more detailed vulnerability and realistic attack will be
provided in the next example.
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6.5.1.1 MTD System Specification
The mission planning system has the following settings:
The Planner:
• Runs a C++ web application based on Apache and Ubuntu.
• Web application has port number 80.
• Adaptation contains actions to replace the old Planner machine with a new machine
and notify the changes to the AssetDB, GeoDB and TargetDB.
• New Planner is configured with the same C++ web app, port and OS.
• New Planner’s IP address is picked from 192.168.10.100–192.168.10.199.
• Adaptation occurs in every time interval Tr.
• Every Tr, the Planner gets refreshed in a probability of pr.
As an example, here we assume pr = 1/4. The AssetDB, GeoDB and TargetDB remain
unchanged and only update related configuration when the Planner is refreshed.
Configuration Space Because IP address is the only configuration parameter that is
changed in this system, the configuration space has the size of 100. Later, when discuss
the ASLR attack example, we will show that this configutaton space can be enlarged by
enabling the address space layout randomization.
Diversification The adaptation in this mission planning system takes advantage of the IP
address space. No artificial diversification technique is used in this example.
Randomization When adaptation occurs, the new machine’s IP address is randomly picked
from the IP pool, except for the previous IP address, thus each IP address has the probabiliy
of ps = 1/99 to show up and the old IP address has probability of ps = 0 to be choosen.
In addition, for every Tr, there is a probability of pr = 1/4 the Planner actually gets
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refreshed. Thus, the current selected IP address has the probability of (1 − pr) = 34 to
remain unchanged.
MTD Problem In this concrete example, the solution to the MTD problem is to replace
the Planner in every Tr with a probability of pr = 1/4. After refreshing, the new Planner
will have the same configuration as before except for the IP address, which is randomly
picked from the IP pool.
Adaptation Problem In this concrete example, the solution to the adaptation problem
is to synthesize a sequence of configuration actions to shutdown the old Planner machine,
start and configure a new Planner, and then notify the IP address change of the Planner to
the AssetDB, GeoDB and TargetDB machines.
Timing Problem In this example, the solution to the timing problem is to simply schedule
the adaptation in every time interval, Tr. Notice here Tr does not need to be a constant.
6.5.1.2 Attack Specification
6.5.1.2.1 Attack Goal In this example, an attacker, x, has the goal to exploit the
Planner to obtain root privileges. We will extend and analyze a more realistic attack that
will try to steal data from a database server in the next example.
6.5.1.2.2 Target System The mission planning system in this example is the tar-
get system, D, with a complete information parameter, ψMissionP lanning, and the Planner,
dPlanner (or dP for short), as the specific target of interest, which has its complete informa-
tion parameter, ψPlanner. Concrete information parameters that will be used in this example
include ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .vul
6.5.1.2.3 Attacker To carry out this attack successfully, the attacker, x, must have
correct knowledge of the Planner, ψxdP , including the Planner’s IP address, Apache web
server port number, operating system, and the vulnerability of the web server. Formally,
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these are captured via attacker knowledge in the form of information parameters, such as
ψxdP .ip.
6.5.1.2.4 Attack Type To achieve the objective, x considers a sequence of attack types,
φ = [φ1, φ2, . . . , φ6], where the effects of the attacks are as follows:
• φ1 - gains the IP address of the Planner, ψdP .ip
• φ2 - gains the port number of a specific app, ψdP .apache port
• φ3 - gains the operating system type, ψdP .os
• φ4 - obtains an exploitable vulnerability of the app, ψdP .vul
• φ5 - deploys an exploit agent on the Planner, ψdP .exa
• φ6 - connects to the agent (e.g., via reverse shell) and gains the root privilege, ψdP .root.
Table 6.1 shows the specification of these attack types.
Table 6.1: Attack Type Specification
Type Ωpre Ωpost
φ1 exists(ψdP .ip) 〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉
φ2 ψ
x
dP
.ip = ψdP .ip ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) 〈ψxdP .apache port〉,〈ψdP .apache port〉
φ3 ψ
x
dP
.ip = ψdP .ip ∧ ψxdP .apache port = ψdP .apache port ∧
exists(ψdP .os)
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉
φ4 ψ
x
dP
.ip = ψdP .ip∧ψxdP .apache port = ψdP .apache port∧ψxdP .os =
ψdP .os ∧ exists(ψdP .vul)
〈ψxdP .vul, ψdP .vul〉
φ5 ψ
x
dP
.ip = ψdP .ip∧ψxdP .apache port = ψdP .apache port∧ψxdP .os =
ψdP .os ∧ ψxdP .vul = ψdP .vul
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉
φ6 ψ
x
dP
.ip = ψdP .ip∧ψxdP .apache port = ψdP .apache port∧ψxdP .exa =
ψdP .exa ∧ exists(ψdP .root)
〈ψxdP .root, ψdP .root〉
6.5.1.2.5 Attack Instances Concrete attacks that implements attack type φ1−φ6 are
attack instances.
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6.5.1.3 Interaction Analysis
In this section, we analyze the interactions between φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 and the mission planning
MTD system. With a concrete MTD system setting, We show the attack surface, adapta-
tion surface and engagement surface, we also show how to quantify coverage and success
likelihood of intrusion. In the next example, We will extend this analysis to φ5, φ6.
6.5.1.3.1 Attack Surface Each attack type has its own attack surface.
• Sattack(φ1) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sattack(φ2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port}
• Sattack(φ3) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, }
• Sattack(φ4) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .vul}
If we compose φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4, we get compositional attack type, φ = [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4], as
specified in Table 6.2,
Table 6.2: Compositional Attack Type Specification
Type Ωpre Ωpost
φ = [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4] exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .vul)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,〈ψxdP .apache port,
ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,〈ψxdP .vul, ψdP .vul〉
The compositional attack type, φ = [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4], also has its own attack surface, which
can be viewed as the overall attack surface of [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4].
• Sattack(φ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .vul}
6.5.1.3.2 Adaptation Surface Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}. Although refreshing the Planner
means we remove the complete configuration parameter, pidP , and recreate it, our analysis
focuses on concrete sub configuration parameters of pidP that change during runtime.
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6.5.1.3.3 Engagement Surface Base on the definition, engagement surafce between
the mission planning system and each attack type are,
• Sengage(φ1,Σ) = Sattack(φ1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ2,Σ) = Sattack(φ2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ3,Σ) = Sattack(φ3) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ4,Σ) = Sattack(φ4) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
The engagement surface between Σ and compositional attack type, φ = [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4],
is,
• Sengage(φ,Σ) = Sattack(φ) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
6.5.1.3.4 Coverage Based on the definition, coverage between the mission planning
system and each attack type are,
• Coverage(φ1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ1,Σ)||Sattack(φ1) = 1
• Coverage(φ2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ2,Σ)||Sattack(φ2) = 1/2
• Coverage(φ3,Σ) = |Sengage(φ3,Σ)||Sattack(φ3) = 1/3
• Coverage(φ4,Σ) = |Sengage(φ4,Σ)||Sattack(φ4) = 1/4
The coverage between Σ and compositional attack type, φ = [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4], is,
• Coverage(φ,Σ) = |Sengage(φ,Σ)||Sattack(φ) = 1/4
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6.5.1.3.5 Potential Effectiveness Clearly, as all the values of coverage are greater
than 0, the mission planning MTD system is potentially effective to the given attack types
φ1 - φ4. Notice, we emphasize it is only potentially effective. Whether this MTD system
is really effective and how, depends on extra factors that we will proceed to the Psuccess
analysis in the next section.
On the other hand, if this value is zero against an attack type, φ, then according to
Definition 6.58, this MTD system has no impact to φ at all. In this situation, it implies that
MTD system designer should consider increasing the adaptation surface of Σ to improve its
effectiveness against φ.
6.5.1.3.6 Success Likelihood of Intrusion We first analyze the attack instances that
implement attack type, φ1, and then extend the analysis to φ2, φ3 and φ4.
Let an attack instance,
∮
(x, dP , φ1), which implements φ1, have a mean time of compro-
mise, Ta1 , and success likelihood of intrusion Pstatic1 . According to Definition 6.60
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)) = P (holds(φ1.Ωpre, [ts, tf ]))× Pstatic1
where :
P (holds(φ1.Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) = P (unchanged(δ(φ1.Ωpre), [ts, tf ])× P (holds(Ωpre, ts))
For this concrete example,
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)) = P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [ts, tf ]))× P (holds(exists(ψdP .ip), ts))× Pstatic1
= (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr × Pstatic1
Note, here P (holds(exists(ψdP .ip), ts)) = 1, because we assume that there is an IP address
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exists in the Planner at the beginning of this attack. In addition, P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [ts, tf ])
equals (1−pr)
Ta1
Tr because during attack interval Ta, adaptation could occur
Ta
Tr
times. While
for each adaptation, the probability of the Planner’s IP address does not change is (1− pr).
Table 6.3 shows the value of (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr based on different values of pr and
Ta1
Tr
. As we
can see, given a fixed pr, higher
Ta1
Tr
leads to less success likelihood. Given a fixed
Ta1
Tr
, higher
pr leads to the less success likelihood. When pr = 0, (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr becomes 1 and this means
when pr = 0, a MTD system is degraded to a static system. When pr = 1 and
Ta1
Tr
> 0,
(1−pr)
Ta1
Tr becomes 0. This special condition captures the fact that as long as MTD system
ensures that the configuration parameter being adapted, the attack will eventually fail when
adaptation happens.
Table 6.3: Value of (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr based on different pr and
Ta1
Tr
pr \Ta1Tr 0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.0 3.0 6.0 9.0
0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.1 1.0 0.9895 0.9689 0.9289 0.9 0.729 0.5314 0.3874
0.3 1.0 0.9650 0.8985 0.7791 0.70 0.343 0.1176 0.0404
0.6 1.0 0.9124 0.7597 0.5266 0.40 0.064 0.0041 0.0003
0.9 1.0 0.7943 0.5012 0.1995 0.10 0.001 1e-6 1e-9
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0
To have a more complete understanding about (1 − pr)
Ta1
Tr , we plot its value based on
different pr and
Ta1
Tr
values. Let x = pr, y =
Ta1
Tr
, Figure 6.9 plots the value of (1 − pr)
Ta1
Tr
when 0 ≤ pr ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ta1Tr ≤ 1. As we can see from Figure 6.9b, there is a large area that has
(1− pr)
Ta1
Tr ≥ 0.5, which means adapting the IP address does not provide much help under
these situations. More specifically, when pr → 0, then for 0 ≤ Ta1Tr ≤ 1, (1 − pr)
Ta1
Tr → 1,
which means when pr → 0 and 0 ≤ Ta1Tr ≤ 1, this mission planning MTD system is like a
static system because Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)) almost equals Pstatic1 . On the other hand, when
pr → 1, Ta1Tr needs to be small, for example
Ta1
Tr
≤ 0.1, to make (1 − pr)
Ta1
Tr → 1, otherwise,
(1−pr)
Ta1
Tr → 0. This tells us that when the mission planning system has a high pr, in order
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to maintain Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)) as high as Pstatic1 , the attacker needs to shorten its mean
time of compromise, Ta1 , to maintain the
Ta1
Tr
as low as 0.1. Conversely, it clearly indicates
that the mission planning MTD system should set a high adaptation probability, pr, and
maintain the ratio of
Ta1
Tr
larger than 0.1, in order to effectively reduce Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)).
When it comes the situation where Tr has to be configured relatively large, then the MTD
designer should consider approaches that could increase the attack time, Ta1 .
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An interesting point to note here is that lim
pr→1,Ta1Tr →0
(1 − pr)
Ta1
Tr = 1, which means even
when the system has a very high adaptation probability, pr → 1, but as long as the attack
instance is fast enough to make
Ta1
Tr
→ 0, the MTD system for this particular attack instance
looks like a static system. This actually shows that intrusion speed divided by adaptation
speed,
Ta1
Tr
, dominate the adaptation probability, pr, which perfectly matches a proverb –
“There is no martial art is indefectible, while the speed defines the winner”.
From a defensive perspective, the MTD designer should try to keep
Ta1
Tr
as large as
possible. Figure 6.10 shows the value of (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr when 0 ≤ pr ≤ 1, 1 ≤ Ta1Tr ≤ 50. As we
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see, MTD becomes more effective under this situation. For example, in Figure 6.10b, when
0 ≤ pr ≤ 1, 1 ≤ Ta1Tr ≤ 50, there is a large portion that (1 − pr)
Ta1
Tr ≤ 0.2, which means the
MTD system under this situation, could reduce the success likelihood of intrusion around
80% when compared to the static system. However, we should also notice that when pr is
small, such as pr ≤ 0.05, the MTD system doesn’t help much even when Ta1Tr is relatively
high, for example
Ta1
Tr
= 50. Actually, Figure 6.10b suggests that pr should be at least 0.5
to effectively invalidate attack instances when Ta1 ≥ Tr. This forces the attacker to finish
the attack no longer than Tr to achieve a relatively high Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)).
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If we want to consider the success likelihood of gaining a specific IP address, say
192.168.10.100, in the range of configuration space: 192.168.10.100 – 192.168.10.200, then
ψdP .ip = 192.168.10.100 should be part of φ1.ΩPre. Thus according to the success likelihood
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definition,
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1)) = P (holds(φ1.Ωpre, [ts, tf ]))× Pstatic1
= P (unchanged(δ(φ1.Ωpre), [ts, tf ]))× P (holds(φ1.Ωpre, ts))× Pstatic1
= P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [ts, tf ]))
× P (holds(ψdP .ip == 192.168.10.100), ts)× Pstatic1
= (1− pr)
Ta
Tr × 1
100
× Pstatic1
Here, P (holds(ψdP .ip == 192.168.10.100), ts) =
1
100
because based on the randomization
adopted in this mission planning system, each IP address has the probability of 1
99
to be
selected, and 1 time of 0 probability being selected, thus each IP address in general has
a 1
100
chance of being selected. It seems this analysis only helps when we consider the
situation where an attacker tries to attack a specific state. However, it actually provides
very useful information for the MTD designer. If each state in the configuration space has
an equal probability to be selected, then a larger configuration space leads to a smaller
P (ψdP .ip = 192.168.10.100). In addition, a larger configuration space could reflect an even
larger exploration space that costs the attacker more time to identify the true value. Thus,
when the MTD system can not afford to change fast, which means keeping Tr relatively
short or pr relatively high, then the MTD designer should consider putting in more effort to
diversify the configuration space to increase Ta. Approaches to diversifying IP address space
that making gaining IP address harder, which could be adopted in this MTD example, are to
consider switching from IPv4 to IPv620, or to take advantage of the spatio-temporal address
mutation technique125. Chapter 5 discussed that the model presented has a limitation that
VMs assigned to play the same role are assumed to have the same vulnerability. With MTD
theory, this limitation can be eliminated by knowing the probability of each configuration
state being selected.
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Until now, we only analyzed the attack instance that implement φ1 and discussed what
an MTD system could do to thwart φ1. Next, we analyze a sequence of attack instances
that implement φ2, φ3 and φ4.
Let’s start by assuming when no adaptation happens, attack instances that implement
φ1 to φ4 have the time interval, Ta and Pstatic as specified in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Attack Instances Specification
Attack Instances Ta Pstatic∮ t1
t0
(x, dP , φ1) Ta1 Pstatic1∮ t2
t1
(x, dP , φ2) Ta2 Pstatic2∮ t3
t2
(x, dP , φ3) Ta3 Pstatic3∮ t4
t3
(x, dP , φ4) Ta4 Pstatic4
Then for attack instance,
∮
(x, dP , φ2), which implements attack type φ2, we can derive
its success likelihood based on the condition that
∮
(x, dP , φ1) is success. According to the
definition,
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ2)|
∮
(x, dP , φ1)) = P (holds(φ2.Ωpre, [t1, t2]))× Pstatic2
= P (unchanged(δ(φ2.Ωpre), [t1, t2]))
× P (holds(φ2.Ωpre, t1))× Pstatic2
= P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port}, [t1, t2])
× 1× Pstatic2
= (1− pr)
Ta2
Tr × Pstatic2
Here, P (holds(φ2.Ωpre, t1)) is set to 1 because we analyze it based on the condition
that
∮
(x, dP , φ1) is successful and also assume that exists(ψdP .ip) is true. Notice the
caveat that exists(ψdP .ip) is true, otherwise the attack will fail for sure. In addition,
P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port}, [t1, t2]) is set to (1 − pr)
Ta2
Tr , because only the IP ad-
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dress is changed and the port number remains unchanged, thus the result is similar as
P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [t0, t1])) in φ1 except the time interval switches from Ta1 to Ta2 . Us-
ing the Bayesian rule, we can derive the success likelihood when two attack instances,∮
(x, dP , φ1) and
∮
(x, dP , φ2) are both successful.
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1),
∮
(x, dP , φ2)) = Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1))
× Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ2)|
∮
(x, dP , φ1))
= (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr × Pstatic1 × (1− pr)
Ta2
Tr × Pstatic2
= (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
This formula actually provides another way to understand the intrusion. Attack in-
stances
∮
(x, dP , φ1) and
∮
(x, dP , φ2) can be viewed as a single attack instance φ
′, which has
time interval T ′a = Ta1 + Ta2 and P
′
static = Pstatic1 × Pstatic2 .
This process can be extended to φ3 and φ4 as well to get the following results.
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1),
∮
(x, dP , φ2),
∮
(x, dP , φ3)) =(1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3
Tr × Pstatic1
× Pstatic2 × Pstatic3
Psuccess(
∮
(x, dP , φ1),
∮
(x, dP , φ2),
∮
(x, dP , φ3),
∮
(x, dP , φ4)) =(1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4
Tr
× Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
× Pstatic3 × Pstatic4
Thus, this sequence of four attack instances can be viewed as a single attack instance,
∮ ′
,
which has a time interval T ′a = Ta1 +Ta2 +Ta3 +Ta4 and P
′
static = Pstatic1×Pstatic2×Pstatic3×
Pstatic4 . And this attack instance,
∮ ′
can be viewed as an instance which implements the
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compositional attack type φ = [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4].
This also tells us that the success likelihood of intrusion analysis needs to be tied to
concrete attacks and what the attacker tries to gain or modify. For example, when we
consider attack instance,
∮
(x, dP , φ1), we only focus on the IP address. However, the IP
address itself is usually just a tiny step towards obtaining more valuable information from
the target system, thus, if the MTD system cannot change as fast as Ta1 , it doesn’t have to.
If all an MTD system cares is that φ4 is not successfully implemented, then it only needs to
be change as fast as Ta1 +Ta2 +Ta3 +Ta4 to decrease the Psuccess. However, as port number,
OS and web application in this example all remain unchanged, Ta2 +Ta3 +Ta4 could be very
small. Imagine the case where attacker purchases a same system and studies it oﬄine, then
once the system is broken, the attacker could simply reuse exactly the same knowledge about
port, OS and web application vulnerability and apply it to the target. Although adapting
IP address will force the attacker to regain the IP address in each attack, but clearly we
can diversify and change other configuration parameters as well to increase or maintain the
overall attack time to avoid the situation mentioned.
In the next section, we show an MTD system where more than one configuration param-
eters are changed, instead of only the IP address, and analyze its effectiveness. We also show
that different adaptation mechanisms will have notable varying impact to the intrusion.
6.5.2 Attack ASLR-enabled Mission Planning System
In this example, an attacker needs to correctly gain some memory locations in order to take
adavantage of exploitable vulnerabilities. Thus, instead of only changing the IP address, the
designer decides to enable the PaX address space layout randomization (ASLR) to add more
protection. ASLR is a security technique that guards against code reuse attacks, which work
by overwriting memory locations to point to potentially malicious code. By randomizing
memory locations, ASLR makes it difficult to correctly guess the memory locations of specific
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processes. More specifically, a processs address space contains three areas: the executable
area, the mapped area and the stack area. Instead of fixing each areas base address, ASLR
randomizes it by adding an extra variable to the base address when the process is created.
For the Intel x86 architecture, PaX ASLR randomizes 16 or 24 bits for these areas.
For instance, the mapped data area variable delta mmap has 16 bits of randomness,
which means the attacker only needs to iterate from 0 to 65535 to determine its value. PaX
ASLR has two properties. First, PaX ASLR randomizes only the base addresses of the three
memory areas but not the layout within each area. Second, the layout is fixed throughout
a process and all its children’s lifetime.
Next, we provide more details to the attack types given in the previous example and con-
sider a concrete return-to-libc attack instance that implements these attack types. The im-
plementation of the return-to-libc attack first creates a memory hole in the Oracle 9 PL/SQL
Apache module by creating an overflow buffer in the ap getline() function in http protocol.c.
To conduct the attack, the base of the mapped area mmap base and the offset of the usleep()
function usleep offset in libc are precomputed.(libc is the standard C-language library that
is loaded into all Unix programs.). Then the value of delta mmap is found by repeatedly
overflowing the stack buffer with guesses for the absolute address of the usleep() function.
An unsuccessful guess causes the child process to crash and be replaced by a new process
with the same randomization offsets. A successful guess calls the usleep() function and
hangs the connection for 16 seconds, which helps determine the value of delta mmap. Once
the value of delta mmap is gained, the absolute locations of all functions in libc can be
calculated. The final step is to smash the stack to point to another libc function, system(),
which executes user supplied commands through the command shell. Shell commands are
sent to system() as an argument.
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6.5.2.1 MTD System Specification
In this new example, the mission planning system remains mostly the same as previous
settings. The planner has all the prevous settings that are reproduced here as a reference.
The Planner:
• Runs a C++ web application based on Apache and Ubuntu.
• Web application has port number 80.
• Adaptation contains actions to replace the old Planner machine with a new machine
and notify the changes to the AssetDB, GeoDB and TargetDB.
• New Planner is configured with the same C++ web app, port and OS.
• New Planner’s IP address is picked from 192.168.10.100–192.168.10.200.
• Adaptation occurs once during each time interval Tr.
• Every Tr, the Planner get refreshed in a probability of pr.
However, the Planner has one more configuration parameter being changed, which is
delta mmap.
• New Planner’s delta mmap is randomly picked from 0 - 65535
In addition, instead of analyzing the adaptation mechanism that the Planner gets re-
freshed (where both IP and delta mmap changes) every Tr with a probability of pr, we
analyze a more general adaptation approach where every Tr, the IP address has a probabil-
ity pr1 to change and delta mmap has a probability of pr2 to change.
• Every Tr, the Planner’s IP address is adapted with probablity pr1 and delta mmap is
adapted with probability pr2 .
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6.5.2.1.1 Configuration Space The configuration space in this example has been
greatly enlarged and has the size of 100 x 65536. The reason is that we can set the value of
IP address and delta mmap independently in each adaptation.
6.5.2.1.2 Diversification The adaptation in this mission planning system takes ad-
vantage of the IP address space as well as the memory space. No artificial diversification
technique is used in this example.
6.5.2.1.3 Randomization For first adaptation option: new Planner machine’s IP ad-
dress is randomly picked from the IP pool except the previous IP address, thus each IP ad-
dress has the probabiliy of psip = 1/99 to be selected and the old IP address has probability
of psip = 0 to be chosen. Similarly, each delta mmap has probability psdelta mmap = 1/65535
to be selected and the old delta mmap has probability of zero to be chosen. In addition, for
every Tr, there is a probability of pr = 1/4 the Planner actually gets refreshed. Thus, the
current IP and delta mmap has the probability of (1− pr) = 34 to remain unchanged.
For second adaptation option: new Planner machine’s IP address is randomly picked
from the IP pool except the previous IP address, thus each IP address has the probabiliy of
psip = 1/99 to be selected and the old IP address has probability of psip = 0 to be chosen.
Similarly, each delta mmap has probability psdelta mmap = 1/65535 to be selected and the old
delta mmap has probability of zero to be chosen. However, the difference is that there is a
probability of pr1 that the IP address get changed and pr2 that delta mmap get changed.
Thus, the current IP has probability (1 − pr1) and current delta mmap has probability of
(1− pr2) to remain unchanged. As an example, one may set pr1 = 0.5 and pr2 = 0.6.
6.5.2.1.4 MTD Problem The two adaptation mechanisms described above are the
solutions to MTD problem in this concrete example. When adaptation occurs, the new
Planner will have the same configuration as before except the IP address is randomly picked
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from an IP pool and the web application’s memory variable delta mmap is randomly picked
from its available memory address space.
6.5.2.1.5 Adaptation Problem The solution to the adaptation problem in this con-
crete example is to synthesize a sequence of configuration actions to shutdown the old
Planner, start and configure the new Planner, and then notify and update the AssetDB,
GeoDB and TargetDB. When PaX ASLR is enabled, each new machine’s web application
will have its randomly selected delta mmap value.
6.5.2.1.6 Timing Problem The solution to the timing problem is simply to schedule
an adaptation in every time interval, Tr, where Tr can take different value.
6.5.2.2 Attack Type Specification
6.5.2.2.1 Attack Goal An attacker, x, has the goal to first exploit the Planner to
obtain root privileges and then access TargetDB to steal sensitive data.
6.5.2.2.2 Target System In this example, the mission planning system is the target
system, D, with its complete information parameter ψMissionP lanning. The Planner, dPlanner
(or dP for short), and the TargetDB, dTargetDB (or dT for short) are the specific targets
of interest, which have complete information parameter, ψPlanner and ψTargetDB. Concrete
information parameters that will be used in this example include: ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port,
ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdT .ip, ψdT .db port, ψdT .data
Notice we use ψdT .data to refer any sensitive data the attacker might obtain from the
TargetDB.
6.5.2.2.3 Attacker To carry out the intrusion successfully, the attacker, x, must have
correct knowledge of the Planner, ψxdP , including the Planner’s IP address, Apache web
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server port number, operating system, the vulnerability of the web server, and tables of
database. Formally, these are captured via attacker knowledge in the form of information
parameters such as ψxdP .ip. In addition, the attacker should have general knowledge in ψ
x
that captures special skills, such as how to scan the IP address, port number, how to find
out mmap base, delta mmap and how to query data from a database.
6.5.2.2.4 Attack Type In this scenario, the attacker will face an MTD system that
changes both IP address as well as the mapped data area location delta mmap. The attack
type φ1, φ2, φ3, φ6 remain unchanged from the previous example, but the φ4 and φ5 are
actually decomposed into sub attack types. Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show the decomposition.
Note, we omit part of the preconditions in the table, ψxdP .ip = ψdP .ip ∧ ψxdP .apache port =
ψdP .apache port ∧ ψxdP .os = ψdP .os, from φ4 and φ5 to save space.
Table 6.5: Attack Type φ4 Decomposition
Type Ωpre Ωpost
φ4.1 exists(ψdP .mmap base) 〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉
φ4.2 ψ
x
dP
.mmap base = ψdP .mmap base∧ exists(ψdP .usleep offset) 〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉
φ4.3 ψ
x
dP
.mmap base = ψdP .mmap base ∧ ψxdP .usleep offset =
ψdP .usleep offset ∧ exists(ψdP .delta mmap)
〈ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉
Table 6.6: Attack Type φ5 Decomposition
Type Ωpre Ωpost
φ5.1 ψ
x
dP
.mmap base = ψdP .mmap base ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset)
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉
φ5.2 ψ
x
dP
.mmap base = ψdP .mmap base ∧ ψxdP .system offset =
ψdP .system offset ∧ ψxdP .delta mmap = ψdP .delta mmap
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉, 〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉
In addition, we add another attack type φ7, which obtains data from database, Table 6.7
shows the decomposition of φ7. Note, we omit part of the preconditions in the table, ψ
x
dP
.ip
= ψdP .ip ∧ ψxdP .apache port = ψdP .apache port for φ7.1, φ7.2 and φ7.3 to save space. In addition, we
assume the TargetDB database can be connected using the Planner machine’s root privilege,
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otherwise the attacker needs to gain correct credentials before connecting TargetDB and
retrieving the data.
Table 6.7: Attack Type φ7 Decomposition
Type Ωpre Ωpost
φ7.1 ψdP .exa = ψ
x
dP
.exa ∧ ψdP .root = ψxdP .root ∧ exists(ψdT .ip) 〈ψxdT .ip, ψdT .ip〉
φ7.2 ψdP .exa = ψ
x
dP
.exa ∧ψxdP .root = ψdP .root ∧ψxdT .ip = ψdT .ip ∧
exists(ψdT .db port)
〈ψxdT .db port, ψdT .db port〉
φ7.3 ψdP .exa = ψ
x
dP
.exa ∧ψxdP .root = ψdP .root ∧ψxdT .ip = ψdT .ip ∧
ψxdT .db port = ψdT .db port ∧ exists(ψdT .data)
〈ψxdT .data, ψdT .data〉
Table 6.8 shows the compositional attack types which are minmal. Later we will compare
the analysis applied to each individual attack types and the overall compositional attack
type.
Table 6.8: Compositional Attack Types Specification
Type Ωpre Ωpost
φ′′4.1 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉
φ′′4.2 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1,
φ4.2]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉
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φ′′4.3 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1,
φ4.2, φ4.3]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset) ∧
exists(ψdP .delta mmap)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉,
ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉
φ′′5.1 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1,
φ5.1]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉
φ′′5.2 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1,
φ4.2, φ4.3, φ5.1,
φ5.2]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset) ∧
exists(ψdP .delta mmap) ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉,
〈ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉,
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉,
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉
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φ′′6 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1,
φ4.2, φ4.3, φ5.1,
φ5.2, φ6]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset) ∧
exists(ψdP .delta mmap) ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset) ∧ exists(ψdP .root)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉,
〈ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉,
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉,
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .root, ψdP .root〉
φ′′7.1 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3,
φ4.1, φ4.2, φ4.3,
φ5.1, φ5.2, φ6,
φ7.1]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset) ∧
exists(ψdP .delta mmap) ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset)∧exists(ψdP .root)∧
exists(ψdT .ip)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉,
〈ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉,
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉,
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .root, ψdP .root〉,
〈ψxdT .ip, ψdT .ip〉
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φ′′7.2 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3,
φ4.1, φ4.2, φ4.3,
φ5.1, φ5.2, φ6,
φ7.1, φ7.2]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset) ∧
exists(ψdP .delta mmap) ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset)∧exists(ψdP .root)∧
exists(ψdT .ip) ∧ exists(ψdT .db port)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉,
〈ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉,
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉,
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .root, ψdP .root〉,
〈ψxdT .ip, ψdT .ip〉,
〈ψxdT .db port, ψdT .db port〉
φ′′7.3 =
[φ1, φ2, φ3,
φ4.1, φ4.2, φ4.3,
φ5.1, φ5.2, φ6,
φ7.1, φ7.2, φ7.3]
exists(ψdP .ip) ∧ exists(ψdP .apache port) ∧
exists(ψdP .os) ∧ exists(ψdP .mmap base) ∧
exists(ψdP .usleep offset) ∧
exists(ψdP .delta mmap) ∧
exists(ψdP .system offset)∧exists(ψdP .root)∧
exists(ψdT .ip) ∧ exists(ψdT .db port) ∧
exists(ψdT .data)
〈ψxdP .ip, ψdP .ip〉,
〈ψxdP .apache port, ψdP .apache port〉,
〈ψxdP .os, ψdP .os〉,
〈ψxdP .mmap base, ψdP .mmap base〉,
〈ψxdP .usleep offset, ψdP .usleep offset〉,
〈ψxdP .delta mmap, ψdP .delta mmap〉,
〈ψxdP .system offset, ψdP .system offset〉,
〈ψdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .exa, ψx.exa〉,
〈ψxdP .root, ψdP .root〉,
〈ψxdT .ip, ψdT .ip〉,
〈ψxdT .db port, ψdT .db port〉,
〈ψxdT .data, ψdT .data〉
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6.5.2.2.5 Attack Instances The return-to-libc attack can be viewed as a concrete im-
plementation of attack type φ1 to φ6. Once the attacker has the root privilege of Planner,
the attacker can learn the TargetDB address and db port through network connections,
and then connect to the database with a db client to query data. We will analyze attack
instances that implement φ1 to φ7 one by one.
6.5.2.3 Interaction Analysis
6.5.2.3.1 Attack Surface Each attack type has their attack surface.
• Sattack(φ1) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sattack(φ2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port}
• Sattack(φ3) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, }
• Sattack(φ4.1) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base}
• Sattack(φ4.2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset}
• Sattack(φ4.3) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset, ψdP .delta mmap}
• Sattack(φ5.1) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset}
• Sattack(φ5.2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
• Sattack(φ6) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .exa, ψdP .root}
• Sattack(φ7.1) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .exa, ψdP .root, ψdT .ip}
• Sattack(φ7.2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .exa, ψdP .root, ψdT .ip, ψdT .db port}
• Sattack(φ7.3) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .exa, ψdP .root, ψdT .ip, ψdT .db port, ψdT .data}
Each compositional attack type also has their own attack surface,
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• Sattack(φ′′4.1) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base}
• Sattack(φ′′4.2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset}
• Sattack(φ′′4.3) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset, ψdP .delta mmap}
• Sattack(φ′′5.1) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset}
• Sattack(φ′′5.2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset, ψdP .delta mmap,
ψdP .exa}
• Sattack(φ′′6) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset, ψdP .delta mmap,
ψdP .exa, ψdP .root}
• Sattack(φ′′7.1) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset, ψdP .delta mmap,
ψdP .exa, ψdP .root, ψdT .ip}
• Sattack(φ′′7.2) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset, ψdP .delta mmap,
ψdP .exa, ψdP .root, ψdT .ip, ψdT .db port}
• Sattack(φ′′7.3) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .system offset, ψdP .delta mmap,
ψdP .exa, ψdP .root, ψdT .ip, ψdT .db port, ψdT .data}
6.5.2.3.2 Adaptation Surface Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}. Although refresh-
ing the Planner means we remove the complete configuration parameter, pidP , and recreate
it, our analysis does not remain at this level but only focus on concrete configuration pa-
rameters that will be changed to a different state. However, it does impact the coverage
analysis to attack types φ5.2, φ6, φ7.1, φ7.2, φ7.3.
6.5.2.3.3 Engagement Surface The engagement surface between the PaX ASLR en-
abled mission planning system and each attack type are,
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• Sengage(φ1,Σ) = Sattack(φ1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ2,Σ) = Sattack(φ2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ3,Σ) = Sattack(φ3) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ4.1,Σ) = Sattack(φ4.1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ4.2,Σ) = Sattack(φ4.2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ4.3,Σ) = Sattack(φ4.3) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}
• Sengage(φ5.1,Σ) = Sattack(φ5.1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ5.2,Σ) = Sattack(φ5.2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ6,Σ) = Sattack(φ6) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ7.1,Σ) = Sattack(φ7.1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ7.2,Σ) = Sattack(φ7.2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ7.3,Σ) = Sattack(φ7.3) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .exa}
The engagement surface between the PaX ASLR enabled mission planning system and
each compositional attack type are:
• Sengage(φ′′4.1,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′4.1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ′′4.2,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′4.2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ′′4.3,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′4.3) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}
• Sengage(φ′′5.1,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′5.1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip}
• Sengage(φ′′5.2,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′5.2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
175
• Sengage(φ′′6,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′6) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ′′7.1,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′7.1) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ′′7.2,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′7.2) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
• Sengage(φ′′7.3,Σ) = Sattack(φ′′7.3) ∩ Sadapt(Σ) = {ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap, ψdP .exa}
Notice the difference between Sengage(φ6,Σ) and Sengage(φ
′′
6,Σ), Sengage(φ7.1,Σ) and Sengage(φ
′′
7.1,Σ),
Sengage(φ7.2,Σ) and Sengage(φ
′′
7.2,Σ), and Sengage(φ7.3,Σ) and Sengage(φ
′′
7.3,Σ). The reason for
these differences is that compositional attack types combine all information parameters
contained in each sub attack type, while each sub attack type only contains the informa-
tion parameters required by itself. For example, ψdP .delta mmap belongs to Sengage(φ
′′
6,Σ)
because φ′′6 include the sub attack type φ4.3 that gains ψdP .delta mmap. However, ψdP .delta mmap
doesn’t belong to Sengage(φ6,Σ) because φ6 as an individual attack type does not require
ψdP .delta mmap.
6.5.2.3.4 Coverage Based on the definition, coverage between the mission planning
system and each attack type are,
• Coverage(φ1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ1,Σ)||Sattack(φ1) = 1
• Coverage(φ2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ2,Σ)||Sattack(φ2) = 1/2
• Coverage(φ3,Σ) = |Sengage(φ3,Σ)||Sattack(φ3) = 1/3
• Coverage(φ4.1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ4.1,Σ)||Sattack(φ4.1) = 1/4
• Coverage(φ4.2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ4.2,Σ)||Sattack(φ4.2) = 1/5
• Coverage(φ4.3,Σ) = |Sengage(φ4.3,Σ)||Sattack(φ4.3) = 2/6
• Coverage(φ5.1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ5.1,Σ)||Sattack(φ5.1) = 1/5
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• Coverage(φ5.2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ5.2,Σ)||Sattack(φ5.2) = 3/7
• Coverage(φ6,Σ) = |Sengage(φ6,Σ)||Sattack(φ6) = 2/4
• Coverage(φ7.1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ7.1,Σ)||Sattack(φ7.1) = 2/5
• Coverage(φ7.2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ7.2,Σ)||Sattack(φ7.2) = 2/6
• Coverage(φ7.3,Σ) = |Sengage(φ7.3,Σ)||Sattack(φ7.3) = 2/7
Note, the coverage for attack types φ5.2, φ6, φ7.1, φ7.2 and φ7.3 take ψdP .exa (which is an
execution agent uploaded by attacker) into account because it is added to the system by
the attacker and it will be removed by refreshing the Planner. Clearly, if the MTD system
does not adopt a refreshing approach, but only changes the IP and delta mmap inside the
original Planner machine, then ψdP .exa should not be taken into consideration.
We can also derive the coverage between the mission planning system and each compo-
sitional attack type.
• Coverage(φ′′4.1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
4.1,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′4.1) = 1/4
• Coverage(φ′′4.2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
4.2,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′4.2) = 1/5
• Coverage(φ′′4.3,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
4.3,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′4.3) = 2/6
• Coverage(φ′′5.1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
5.1,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′5.1) = 1/5
• Coverage(φ′′5.2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
5.2,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′5.2) = 3/7
• Coverage(φ′′6,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
6 ,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′6 ) = 3/8
• Coverage(φ′′7.1,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
7.1,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′7.1) = 3/9
• Coverage(φ′′7.2,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
7.2,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′7.2) = 3/10
• Coverage(φ′′7.3,Σ) = |Sengage(φ
′′
7.3,Σ)|
|Sattack(φ′′7.3) = 3/11
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6.5.2.3.5 Potential Effectiveness As the coverage values are all greater than zero,
the ASLR-enabled mission planning system is potentially effective against all the specified
attack types from φ1 to φ7.3. Thus, we can proceed to analyze the effectiveness further in
terms of success likelihood of intrusion.
6.5.2.3.6 Success Likelihood of Intrusion In the previous example, we analyzed the
Psuccess(
∮
) of the attack instances that implement φ1, φ2, φ3 and φ4 under a changing
IP environment. In this section, we analyze the MTD impact to Psuccess when multiple
configuration parameters are adapted simultaneously. We will show that the results of
Psuccess are different given the two adaptation options presented in the randomization section.
Let’s start by assuming attack instances that implement φ1 to φ7 have the time interval,
Ta, and Pstatic as specified in Table 6.9. To simplify the writing, we use symbols
∮
1
-
∮
7.2
to
represent the event that each attack instance is successful.
Table 6.9: Attack Instances Specification
Symbol Attack Instances Ta Pstatic∮
1
∮ t1
t0
(x, dP , φ1) Ta1 Pstatic1∮
2
∮ t2
t1
(x, dP , φ2) Ta2 Pstatic2∮
3
∮ t3
t2
(x, dP , φ3) Ta3 Pstatic3∮
4.1
∮ t4.1
t3
(x, dP , φ4.1) Ta4.1 Pstatic4.1∮
4.2
∮ t4.2
t4.1
(x, dP , φ4.2) Ta4.2 Pstatic4.2∮
4.3
∮ t4.3
t4.2
(x, dP , φ4.3) Ta4.3 Pstatic4.3∮
5.1
∮ t5.1
t4.3
(x, dP , φ5.1) Ta5.1 Pstatic5.1∮
5.2
∮ t5.2
t5.1
(x, dP , φ5.2) Ta5.2 Pstatic5.2∮
6
∮ t6
t5.2
(x, dP , φ6) Ta6 Pstatic6∮
7.1
∮ t7.1
t6
(x, dT , φ7.1) Ta7.1 Pstatic7.1∮
7.2
∮ t7.2
t7.1
(x, dT , φ7.2) Ta7.2 Pstatic7.2∮
7.3
∮ t7.3
t7.2
(x, dT , φ7.3) Ta7.3 Pstatic7.3
Based on this, we first analyze the success likelihood of intrusion based on the first
adaptation option, then extend it to a more general case, the second adaptation option.
First adapation option: For every Tr, there is a probability of pr that the Planner
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actually gets refreshed. Thus, the current IP and delta mmap has the probability of (1−pr)
of remaining unchanged. If the Planner gets refreshed, the IP address and delta mmap will
be changed to a different value. This option is the same as the approach used in the previous
example, except that it changes both the IP address and delta mmap simultaneously. The
Psuccess for attack instances that implements φ1-φ4.2 can be derived similarly as the previous
example.
Psuccess(
∮
1
) = (1− pr)
Ta1
Tr × Pstatic1
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
) = (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
) = (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2 × Pstatic3
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
) = (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2 × Pstatic3 × Pstatic4.1
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) = (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2 × Pstatic3
× Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2
Because the attack surface of φ1−φ4.2 doesn’t include delta mmap, the success likelihood
derivation is the same as the previous mission planning system example.
However, from attack type φ4.3, the change of delta mmap should be taken into consid-
eration. We can rewrite Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
) according to the bayesian rule,
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
) =
Psuccess(
∮
4.3
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
)× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
)
As Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) is already known, thus, we only need to derive
Psuccess(
∮
4.3
| ∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
).
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Again, according to Definition 6.60
Psuccess(
∮
) = P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ]))× Pstatic
where :
P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) = P (unchanged(δ(φ.Ωpre, [ts, tf ]))× P (holds(Ωpre, ts))
Then,
Psuccess(
∮
4.3
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) =P (unchanged(δ(φ4.3.Ωpre), [t4.2, t4.3]))
× P (holds(φ4.3.Ωpre, t4.2))× Pstatic4.3
=P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base,
ψdP .usleep offset, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3]))× 1× Pstatic4.3
=P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3]))× Pstatic4.3
=(1− pr)
Ta4.3
Tr × Pstatic4.3
Notice, P (holds(φ4.3.Ωpre, t4.2)) is set to one because we consider the success likelihood of∮
4.3
given that
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
are successful. In addition, P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port,
ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3])) has been simplified to
P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}), [t4.2, t4.3]) because apache port, os,mmap base, and
usleep offset all remains static and are independent of ip and delta mmap. However,
P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3])) equals (1 − pr)
Ta4.3
Tr , which is the same as
when we only change the IP address. Notice that this fomula still applies when delta mmap
is also adapted. The reason is quite straight forward due to the adaption mechanism
adopted. The change of IP and delta mmap is controlled by a single switch, pr. Thus,
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these two factors either change simultaneously or both remain unchanged. In the second
adaptation option, we will see that the changes of IP and delta mmap each have their own
switch, then P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3])) =
P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [t4.2, t4.3]))×P (unchanged(ψdP .delta mmap, [t4.2, t4.3])), which will lead to
a different result.
However, this does not mean that using the first adaptation option that changing multiple
factors adds no benefit. The reason is the same as disscussed in the previous example.
Imagine an attacker purchased the same system and studied it oﬄine. If delta mmap
remain unchanged, then this knowledge can be used directly to the target system, which
will greatly reduce the attack time Ta4.3 and lead to a higher success likelihood. Thus,
if PaX ASLR is enabled, the attack time used to gain delta mmap will also be forced to
remain relatively stable instead of decreasing. From this perspective, the adaptation pushes
the time cost on each intrusion to be relatively stable and makes each attack look like a
first time intrusion. Thus, in the long term, the more configuratoin parameters an MTD
system adapts, a relatively longer attack time can be forced on the attacker, which leads to
a relatively less success likelihood of intrusion.
Based on this derivation, we have
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
) =Psuccess(
∮
4.3
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
)× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
)
=(1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2+Ta4.3
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
× Pstatic3 × Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2 × Pstatic4.3
By changing IP address and delta mmap, an MTD could maintain the mean time of
compromise Ta1 and Ta4.3 relatively stable and avoid the situation discussed above. Clearly,
if the MTD system could also add difficulty to attackers each time they want to gain port,
os, mmap base and usleep offset, then the overall intrusion time Ta1 + Ta2 + Ta3 + Ta4.1 +
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Ta4.2 + Ta4.3Tr could be remarkably increased, which leads to less success likelihood.
Next, we have:
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
5.1
) = Psuccess(
∮
5.1
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
)× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
)
= (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta5.1
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
× Pstatic3 × Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic5.1
Notice, the composite attack type [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1, φ5.1] is minimal in terms that φ5.1 try to
gain system offset, which doesn’t depends on φ4.2 that gains usleep offset and φ4.3 that gains
delta mmap. Again, as indicated, only minimal composite attack type is considered.
Next, we consider the composite attack type [φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4.1, φ4.2, φ4.3, φ5.1, φ5.2]. This
time, all previous attack types needs to be considered because uploading the execution
agent needs all the information parameters gained in previous attack types.
Before derive Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
), we need to first derive Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
).
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
) = Psuccess(
∮
5.1
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
)
× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
)
= Psuccess(
∮
5.1
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
)× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
)
= (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2+Ta4.3+Ta5.1
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
× Pstatic3 × Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2 × Pstatic4.3 × Pstatic5.1
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Then,
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
) = Psuccess(
∮
5.2
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
)
× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
)
= (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2+Ta4.3+Ta5.1+Ta5.2
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
× Pstatic3 × Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2 × Pstatic4.3 × Pstatic5.1 × Pstatic5.2
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
,
∮
6
) =
Psuccess(
∮
6
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
)× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
)
= (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2+Ta4.3+Ta5.1+Ta5.2+Ta6
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2 × Pstatic3
× Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2 × Pstatic4.3 × Pstatic5.1 × Pstatic5.2 × Pstatic6
Notice, the attack instance that implements φ6 is an interesting case. By the precondition
of φ6, we see it doesn’t depend on the apache port, os, mmap base, etc. However, because
of the refreshing, once the Planner is adapted, the uploaded execution agent will be deleted
and the attacker will lose the root privilege. Thus, the attacker will be forced to perform all
the intrusion steps again. However, if in the first adaptation option, we switch to another
mechanism that only changes the IP address and delta mmap within the original Planner
machine, then once
∮
5.2
is true, the uploaded execution agent can remain inside the Planner
after adaptation. Then, obtaining the root privilege is just a matter of whether it can
successfully onnect to the uploaded agent or not. If the uploaded agent can provide a
reverse shell automatically, then Psuccess(
∮
6
) = (1−Pr)
Ta6
Tr ×Pstatic6 . This means there is no
need to perform the whole sequence of attack any more, and at this stage, the attacker has
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successfully reduced the overall intrusion time from Ta1 + Ta2 + Ta3 + Ta4.1 + Ta4.2 + Ta4.3 +
Ta5.1 + Ta5.2 + Ta6 to Ta6 , which greatly increases the chance of success. This also shows the
benefit of including refreshing to the MTD system.
In addition,
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
,
∮
6
,
∮
7.1
) =
Psuccess(
∮
7
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
,
∮
6
)
× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
,
∮
6
)
= (1− pr)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2+Ta4.3+Ta5.1+Ta5.2+Ta6+Ta7.1
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2 × Pstatic3
× Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2 × Pstatic4.3 × Pstatic5.1 × Pstatic5.2 × Pstatic6 × Pstatic7.1
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,
∮
5.2
,
∮
6
,
∮
7.1
,
∮
7.2
) and Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
,
∮
5.1
,∮
5.2
,
∮
6
,
∮
7.1
,
∮
7.2
,
∮
7.3
) can be derived similarly and we omit here.
Second adaptation option: In this option, for each Tr, the Planner gets replaced.
However, the difference is that there is a probability, pr1 , that IP address gets changed and,
pr2 , that delta mmap get changed. Thus, the IP address and delta mmap each have their
own switch to decide change or not.
In this case, the probability from Psuccess(
∮
1
) to Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) remains the
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same as the first adaptation option. The difference happens at
∮
4.3
,
Psuccess(
∮
4.3
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) = P (unchanged(δ(φ4.3.Ωpre), [t4.2, t4.3]))
× P (holds(φ4.3.Ωpre, t4.2))× Pstatic4.3
= P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .apache port, ψdP .os, ψdP .mmap base, ψdP .usleep offset, ψdP .delta mmap},
[t4.2, t4.3]))× 1× Pstatic4.3
= P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3]))× Pstatic4.3
= P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [t4.2, t4.3]))× P (unchanged(ψdP .delta mmap, [t4.2, t4.3]))× Pstatic4.3
= (1− pr1)
Ta4.3
Tr × (1− pr2)
Ta4.3
Tr × Pstatic4.3
As we see, this adaptation option makes the change of IP address and delta mmap in-
dependent, thus we can decompose P (unchanged({ψdP .ip, ψdP .delta mmap}, [t4.2, t4.3])) into
P (unchanged(ψdP .ip, [t4.2, t4.3])) × P (unchanged(ψdP .delta mmap, [t4.2, t4.3])). In addition, if
we set pr1 = pr2 = pr, then Psuccess(
∮
4.3
| ∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) = (1 − pr)
2×Ta4.3
Tr × Pstatic4.3 in-
stead of Psuccess(
∮
4.3
| ∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
) = (1−pr)
Ta4.3
Tr ×Pstatic4.3 . Thus, changing two factors
is like doubling the attack time Ta4.3 , which in turn decreased the Psuccess. On the other
hand, if set pr2 = 0, which makes the delta mmap remain unchanged, then (1 − pr2)
Ta4.3
Tr
immediately becomes one and the overall success likelihood is increased. From this aspect,
changing multiple factors will indeed help reduce the success likelihood.
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Accordingly,
Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
,
∮
4.3
) =
Psuccess(
∮
4.3
|
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
)× Psuccess(
∮
1
,
∮
2
,
∮
3
,
∮
4.1
,
∮
4.2
)
= (1− pr1)
Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4.1+Ta4.2+Ta4.3
Tr × (1− pr2)
Ta4.3
Tr × Pstatic1 × Pstatic2
× Pstatic3 × Pstatic4.1 × Pstatic4.2 × Pstatic4.3
The other success likelihood can also be updated correspondently and omitted here.
6.5.3 Discussion
In this validation section, we make a start towards validation of our theory by introducing
two concrete example scenarios and show how various definitions in the theory can be
instantiated. As we see, the theory can be successfully applied to these example scenarios.
These examples provide concrete understanding about how it can be used to analyze the
potential effectiveness of an MTD system as well as Psuccess. Moreover, they give the MTD
designer a more complete understanding of how various parameter settings will impact its
effectiveness compared to a static system, as well as what can an MTD system do to thwart
specific attack types.
Note that there are two parts that constitute Psuccess, P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) and Pstatic.
However, we only have shown how to quantify P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])). Because the focus
here is to analyze and quantify the security benefit gained as compared to a static system,
which P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) illustrates nicely. More discussion about this can be found in
Section 7.3.
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6.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a theory of moving target defense. It starts by first introducing several
real world examples and extracts the work flow of MTD in general.
Secondly, it defines the basic concepts and problems associated with an MTD system.
The MTD system theory starts by defining a configurable system based on configuration
management theory and labeled transition systems. Then, it defines system goals and poli-
cies to help capture and determine what are valid and complete configurations. Adaptation
and MTD system definitions are given next. Finally, the configuration space is defined along
with a new concept called the exploration space. Two key tactics as discussed in Chapter 3,
diversification and randomization, are also formally defined.
Next, Cyber Attack Theory is presented, which include definitions to precisely capture
targets, target systems, attacker’s knowledge, attack types, attack instances and exploration
space. Building on top of MTD System Theory and Cyber Attack Theory, MTD Theory
captures the dynamic and changing nature of MTD by defining several new concepts – attack
surface, adaptation surface, engagement surface. These three theories together provide a
better understanding of the interactions between attackers and MTD systems, which enable
the development of a powerful and fine-grained model to analyze the success likelihood of a
multi-step intrusion.
To validate the theory, examples showing how this theory maps to a memory-based
remote exploit attack demonstrate its use in supporting intrusion analysis under typical
movement mechanisms. How this theory can be used to guide the design of an MTD system
is also shown.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This chapter concludes this dissertation by first summarizing the current state of MTD
research in Section 7.1 and the contributions of this work in Section 7.2, then describing
the limitations of this work in Section 7.3 and highlighting some areas of future work in
Section 7.4.
7.1 Current State
Powered by its capability to eliminate an attacker’s asymmetric time advantage and increase
the attacker’s uncertainty, MTD is envisioned as a potential game changer in cyber warfare.
However, in its current state, there is little science behind it. In fact, the approach is so new
that there is no standard definition of what an MTD is, what is meant by attack surface or
metrics to define the effectiveness of such systems.
Although there are many ongoing research efforts, moving target defense is still in its
infancy. Most of the previous work focuses on some specific aspect of system configuration,
such as IP address, memory layout, instruction set, HTML keyword, etc. While as discussed
in Chapter 3 there are several comprehensive frameworks that have been proposed, most of
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these frameworks are still at the conceptual level and significant effort is required to bring
them to fruition, from both theoretical and practical standpoints.
As a recall from Chapter 3, there are two major challenges in MTD research based on
the literature review. The first major challenge is the need for new metrics. Existing met-
rics for attack surface areas are not suitable for evaluating a moving attack surface because
two basic assumptions of the existing metrics have been broken. One assumption is that
the attack surface remains unchanged, while the other is that the target attack surface is
always reachable by attackers. Thus, new metrics are required to take into account MTD’s
changing and unpredictable nature. Although the changing of attack surface can be done
by introducing diversity, quantitative models for guiding the design of good diversification
techniques and assessing their effectiveness remain largely unexplored. Actually, a funda-
mental challenge in understanding the impact of diversification is to introduce a precise,
computationally-meaningful way to measure the increase in difficulty for the attacker. As
will be discussed in Section 7.2, the main contribution of this work is to tackle this challenge.
Operation and security are both important concerns today. Unfortunately, these two as-
pects could be conflicting in MTD. Increased security usually brings increased operational
costs. The work in this thesis will not only help measure and analyze the different mecha-
nism’s impact on security, but will also help MTD designers to make better decisions about
system parameter settings such that reasonable trade offs between security and operation
can be achieved.
The second major challenge is also due to the tension between operation and security in
MTD. It is engineering based and lies in how to sanitize potentially compromised machines
while not interrupting normal operations significantly. MT6D20 does a good job at the
network-level although IP collisions are still possible. But at the machine-level, ensuring
a potentially compromised VM is cleaned is still a major challenge. Although ideas like
checkpointing have been proposed, no concrete system that evaluates the performance or
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validates such an approach’s applicability is presented. Although this challenge is out of
the scope, this work could still be beneficial in terms that it can help MTD designers make
decisions about adopting different techniques to balance operation and security.
7.2 Contributions
This thesis focuses on tackling the first major challenge for understanding and quantifying
moving target defense.
First, a taxonomy based on the review of related MTD work is presented. This taxonomy
shows that many different MTD mechanisms have been tried to defeat different attack types.
These mechanisms include different combinations of strategies and tactics that applied to
various adaptable aspects. It not only helps one understand the state-of-the-art research in
MTD, but also underscores the need for a comprehensive theoretical framework for MTD.
Because the taxonomy clearly indicates that the effectiveness of MTD only makes sense in
the context of a specific attack type, and to anlyze and quantify the effectiveness of MTD,
we must be able to reason the interactions between attacker and MTD system, which further
requires that an MTD System Theory that clarifies what constitutes an MTD system as well
as a Cyber Attack Theory that captures the characteristics of cyber attacks to be defined.
Second, a high-level MTD system design is presented. Based on this design, an MTD
simulator is developed with core algorithms given. The simulator is used to investigate
the degree to which proactive and random adaptations can decrease an adversary’s chance
of success. A set of experiments are conducted to examine both a purely random MTD
system, as well as an intelligent MTD system, which uses attack indicators to augment
adaptation selection. The results show that the attackers success likelihood can be reduced
under such MTD system. Although simulations help us understand the effect of MTDs with
intuitive results, this brings up the question of whether an underlying model exists that can
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be used to predict the intrusion success likelihood. Models like this will be invaluable for
MTD systems because they can explicitly reveal the key relationships between the important
parameters involved and are the key to help understanding why and how adaptation can
improve security. Driven by this question, a scalable analytical model suitable for non-cyclic
network topology structure is proposed. The model is scalable because it can be used to
analyze deep multi-hop remote attacks from high-level. The original simulator is extended
to validate the accuracy of this model. The results show that the success likelihood of
intrusion estimated by this model match the simulation results.
The taxonomy, simulated experiments and analytical model provide important insight
for MTD designers. However, a systematic way to understand and quantify the effectiveness
of MTD is still missing. To address this, the third contribution is a theoretic framework.
This framework includes an MTD System Theory, a Cyber Attack Theory and the
MTD Theory. MTD System Theory defines the basic concepts and problems associated
with an MTD system and is founded on configuration management theory in order to define
a configurable system, upon which the definition of an MTD system is built. Goals and
policies are also captured as essential elements to determine what should be considered
complete and valid configurations of an MTD system. Based on that, configuration space is
formally defined. MTD system theory also formally defines the concepts of diversification
and randomization and showed how they relate to MTD systems and how their use can
increase the effectiveness of those systems. In addition, key problems of MTD system is
also formally defined. Specifically, the essential problem of an MTD system is how to select
the next valid configuration state of the system. This problem drives the solution of the
other problems, such as the Adaptation Selection Problem and the Timing Problem. Cyber
Attack Theory introduced a new concept called information parameter, which has been used
to support the information-based definitions of target systems and attacker’s knowledge. In
addition, information parameters have also been used to define the concepts of attack type,
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attack goal, attack instance and exploration space. The Cyber Attack Theory encourages
MTD designers and researchers to formally specify and compose attack types to discover the
exact system information parameters of interest and how they interact with specific attacks,
the attacker’s knowledge, and the target system. Specification and analysis of attacks will
enable MTD designers to potentially ignore unrelated information parameters while focusing
on those most critical, dramatically limiting the scope and cost of MTD systems without
sacrificing effectiveness. Finally, MTD Theory is introduced based on MTD System Theory
and Cyber Attack Theory. It defines how elements of the MTD system and cyber attacks
interact. Specifically, concepts, such as attack surface, adaptation surface, and engagement
surface, are defined to capture the interaction between an MTD system and a specific attack
type. Metrics, such as coverage, success likelihood of intrusion, are defined to analyze the
effectiveness of an MTD system against an attack type. Built on top of the theory definitions,
several useful theorems are derived, which can be used as general guidelines for MTD system
implementation. To validate the theory, two concrete scenarios are provided and show how
the theory can be used to guide the MTD design as well as analyze what an MTD system
could do and to thwart a concrete return-to-libc attack.
7.3 Limitations
There are two limitations of this work. First, it lacks experimental validation from real world.
All the experiments conducted are based on a simulated environment. Although simulation
captures the most important factors or parameters, it also abstracts away some details. For
example, the adaptation happens every Tr time interval in the simulation, which means the
adaptation start and finish instantaneously every Tr. However, in reality, adaptation itself
takes time and could break the normal functionality of the system. Although simulation
does not precisely capture the reality, I should emphasize that the adaptation case that the
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simulation actually gives the advantage to the attacker, because a zero time of adaptation
essentially allows the attacker to make full usage of every adaptation interval Tr.
Second, when analyzing the success likelihood of an intrusion under MTD, there are
two parts that constitute Psuccess, P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) and Pstatic. However, only how to
quantify P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) is shown. It may be unfair to claim this as a limitation
of this thesis because, in a cyber security context, to quantify Pstatic in general is hard.
However, for completeness, without quantifying Pstatic, we can never get the absolute value
of Psuccess, even though a relative analysis for MTD could be good enough. In addition,
when we analyze composite attack types, the assumption is that for each sub attack type,
Pstatic part is always satisfied, which means we only focus on the analysis of one attempt.
However, it is possible that for each sub attack, more than one intrusion needs to be made.
For example, under a static system, a sub attack with success probability Pstatic, may fail in
the first and second attack, and yet be successful on the third try, leading to a probability
of (1 − Pstatic) × (1 − Pstatic) × Pstatic. However, as this thesis focuses on analyzing and
quantifying the security benefit gained as compared to static system, the effort is spent on
understanding how an MTD system impacts P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])), and we leave Pstatic as
future work.
7.4 Future Work
One area of future work would be to develop a real MTD testbed where machines that
provide the same functionality could be adapted to different configurations in specified time
intervals. As a comparison, a static system can be implemented as a control and an intrusion
testbed can be developed based on penetration tools, such as Metasploit, which launches
attacks on the MTD testbed. The results can be used to compare with the results obtained
from the theory. Conversely, the theory can be used to guide the settings of MTD testbed
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to increase or decrease the success likelihood of intrusion, and in turn validate the theory
from newly results gained.
Another future work could be relaxing the assumption for Psuccess analysis that Pstatic
is always satisfied, as discussed in the limitation section, and extend it to a more general
case where each sub attack type could take n arbitrary times of intrusion until it is suc-
cessful. In this situation, Pstatic in the definition of Psuccess will need to be updated to
(1−Pstatic)(n−1)×Pstatic. But quantifying P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) could be more challenging,
because for each of the first n − 1 attacks, holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ]) associated with it could be
either true or false, and only the holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ]) associated with the last attack needs
to be true. In addition, during these n attacks, there could be multiple adaptations. Al-
though this direction could provides more general results, from a research perspective, this
doesn’t add too much for understanding the essence of MTD, because it mixes the analy-
sis of P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])) and Pstatic. However, the way MTD invalidates the intrusion
is essentially through invalidating the attacker’s knowledge about the system, which only
requires or is captured by P (holds(Ωpre, [ts, tf ])).
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